Investigative Reports

DATE OF INCIDENT: 04/20/2024
INVOLVED PERSON: Dennis Vincent Mulqueen
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Det. Josh Sontag
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Sgt. Loren Hilliard
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Sgt. Joe Andreoli
OPA: OPA24-0084
OIA: OIA24-0023
DATE OF REPORT: 11/22/24

PREFACE

We join the community in expressing our deepest condolences for the tragic loss of Deputy Bolter, who gave his life in service to our community. We share in the sorrow felt by his family, colleagues, and all those who knew and admired Deputy Bolter for his dedication and bravery. As an oversight agency, we work to ensure transparency, accountability, and trust. Today, we pause to remember the sacrifice made by Deputy Bolter, whose commitment to public safety and community protection serves as a profound reminder of the challenges faced by those who serve.

CASE SYNOPSIS

On the night of April 20, 2024, Ada County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Tobin Bolter made a traffic stop within the city of Boise. During the traffic stop, the driver of the vehicle, Dennis V. Mulqueen, shot and fatally injured Deputy Bolter. Mr. Mulqueen used his vehicle to flee the scene. Shortly after the shooting, a responding BPD officer located Mr. Mulqueen’s vehicle parked in a Boise residential neighborhood. Officers located Mr. Mulqueen hiding in a nearby backyard. The BPD Special Operations Unit (SOU) was activated and responded to the scene. Mr. Mulqueen refused to surrender. When he began moving toward a residence that officers believed was possibly occupied, SOU officers attempted to arrest him. Mr. Mulqueen fired one shot from a handgun at the officers. An SOU officer returned fire, striking Mr. Mulqueen two times. He later died because of his injuries.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On April 20, 2024, at approximately 8:55 pm, Ada County Sheriff Deputy Tobin Bolter conducted a traffic stop on a Chevrolet Suburban. Prior to the stop, he provided the Suburban’s license plate number to Ada County Dispatch. As Deputy Bolter was approaching the vehicle, the driver fired a handgun through the driver’s window. Deputy Bolter was fatally shot in the neck. Mr. Mulqueen fled the shooting scene in his vehicle. Officers from multiple law enforcement agencies, including BPD, responded to assist at the scene and search for the shooter. Ada County Dispatch determined that the Suburban was registered to Mr. Mulqueen. They provided registration information, the vehicle’s description, and license plate number to responding officers.

At approximately 9:28 pm, BPD Ofc. Feldner located the Suburban abandoned near W. Dorian and S. Roosevelt streets in Boise. Officers knew that Mr. Mulqueen’s last known address was nearby. BPD began an extensive search of the area. At 9:35 pm, a Meridian Police Department officer launched a drone to aid in the search for Mr. Mulqueen. Other drones operated by BPD were also used in the search. At 9:43 pm, a drone operator located a man they believed was likely Mr. Mulqueen hiding under a tree and against a fence in a backyard on S. Jackson Street.

BPD set up a command post nearby and patrol officers established a perimeter to contain the man. BPD continued drone observation throughout the incident.

The BPD SOU was activated at 9:57 pm. SOU officers responded and began preparations to arrest the suspect. SOU’s preparations included establishing an inner perimeter around the suspect’s location and extensive planning to address logical tactical and medical contingencies. One concern was that Mr. Mulqueen might try to break into a nearby residence and create a hostage situation. SOU officers made a specific plan to intervene if this occurred.

Once SOU’s preparations were in place, a BPD negotiator began giving commands to the suspect over a loudspeaker mounted on SOU’s armored “Bearcat” vehicle. The vehicle was located within 50 yards of where Mr. Mulqueen was hiding. Over the next half-hour, the negotiator gave approximately 30 sets of announcements to the suspect over the loudspeaker. The negotiator called Mr. Mulqueen by name, described the specific location where they knew he was hiding, and provided instructions so that he could safely surrender to a nearby SOU arrest team. BPD obtained Mr. Mulqueen’s telephone number and made multiple unsuccessful attempts to call him. Mr. Mulqueen never responded to any command or attempt to contact him. BPD confirmed that officers positioned well beyond Mr. Mulqueen’s location could clearly hear the negotiator’s announcements and commands.

The Ada County 911 dispatch center sent out a “Code Red,” emergency notification to telephones in the immediate area. This notification instructed residents to shelter in place because of on an ongoing police emergency. During announcements over the loudspeaker, the negotiator instructed neighbors to stay inside, shelter in place, and lock doors and windows because of an ongoing police operation.

During this time, a low flying drone captured clear footage of Mr. Mulqueen hiding underneath a tree holding a handgun as if he were waiting to ambush officers. This information, along with a screenshot depicting him holding the handgun, was provided to SOU team members.

Shortly afterward, the low flying drone required a battery change and had to be recalled by the operator. At 11:49 pm, officers heard Mr. Mulqueen fire one shot with his handgun.

Then at 11:53 pm, a high elevation drone captured Mr. Mulqueen moving from his place of hiding toward the back door/patio area of four adjacent apartments on S. Jackson Steet. Concerned that Mr. Mulqueen would break into an apartment through the patio glass slider doors and potentially take a hostage, a pre-designated SOU arrest team moved rapidly on foot from their staging area at the Bearcat to locate and arrest him. The high elevation drone momentarily lost sight of Mr. Mulqueen as he moved. The low elevation drone was still having its battery changed temporarily leaving the SOU team without drone coverage of the suspect’s exact location.

As the SOU team moved through the dark narrow corridor accessing the back patio area of the four apartments, they noted a section of privacy fence dividing each patio. They slowed down recognizing that Mr. Mulqueen may be waiting to ambush them from behind one of the sections of privacy fence. The SOU team cleared the first three patios without locating Mr. Mulqueen. As they approached the fourth patio, Mr. Mulqueen leaned out slightly from a concealed position behind the final section of privacy fence. He fired one shot at the SOU team. Det. Josh Sontag, who had the best angle to observe the area behind the privacy fence, detected Mr. Mulqueen’s movement, saw the muzzle flash, and heard the shot. Nearly simultaneously, Det. Sontag engaged Mr. Mulqueen with 6 rounds from his rifle, striking him twice in the upper chest. Mr. Mulqueen fell to the ground incapacitated. Shortly afterward the low elevation drone returned and reported the location of Mr. Mulqueen’s handgun on the ground just out of reach. The team moved forward and took him into custody. Ada County Fire Department tactical medics performed life saving measures at the scene. Mr. Mulqueen was transported to the hospital where he died of his injuries.

Det. Sontag did not have his on-body video (OBV) camera at the time of the shooting. Sgt. Andreoli and Sgt. Hilliard were near Det. Sontag. Their on-body video cameras captured portions of the shooting incident. The high elevation drone footage also captured the shooting incident.

As SOU team members checked themselves for any gunshot injuries, they observed that the gunshot fired by Mr. Mulqueen’s gun had struck a ballistic shield carried by Sgt. Andreoli. The shield stopped the bullet, preventing it from striking Sgt. Andreoli in the upper chest area.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Boise City Code Title 2 Chapter 10 defines the authority and duties of the Office of Police Accountability (OPA). As the City’s police oversight entity, the OPA is authorized to investigate and evaluate the conduct of Boise City police officers involved in critical incidents. Critical incidents include the use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission. OPA is also authorized to make BPD policy, procedure, practice, and training recommendations to the Mayor, the City Council, and the Chief of Police.

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

A. 300 USE OF FORCE

B. 424 PORTABLE AUDIO/VIDEO RECORDERS

C. 500 CRITICAL AND TRAUMATIC INCIDENTS

D. 15.003 TACTICAL CONSULTS

E. SOU TEAM DIRECTIVES

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

A. CRITICAL INCIDENT TASK FORCE FINDINGS:
After the officer involved shooting incident, the Ada County Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) was activated, led by the Garden City Police Department. The CITF conducted a forensic investigation of the scene, interviewed witnesses, interviewed the involved officers, collected dispatch records and audio/video evidence, and produced numerous reports. The investigation was detailed and thorough. The Bonner County Prosecuting Attorney reviewed the CITF investigation and determined that Det. Sontag’s use of deadly force against Mr. Mulqueen was justified under Idaho law.

B. BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT FINDINGS:
BPD conducted an administrative review of this critical incident, which included reviewing the CITF investigation in its entirety and administrative interviews with each involved officer. BPD’s administrative review concluded that by pointing and firing a handgun at officers Mr. Mulqueen presented an imminent threat of death or serious injury to the officers. Det. Sontag’s use of lethal force in response to that immediate threat was reasonable and did not violate applicable law. BPD found that Det. Sontag’s actions were compliant with existing BPD policies. BPD identified no training recommendations specific to the individual officers involved in this incident.

Tactical Decisions: BPD found that the key tactical decisions made by SOU during the incident were sound and appropriate. These included:

SOU leadership quickly organized the team, identified objectives, made assignments, and coordinated with BPD command staff.
SOU attempted to de-escalate the situation by attempting to negotiate with the armed suspect for over 30 minutes using announcements and commands over a loudspeaker and by making multiple attempts to contact him by telephone.
SOU used aerial drones to maintain visual surveillance of the suspect. This provided valuable information to SOU and permitted officers to stage operations a greater distance from Mr. Mulqueen creating a safer operating environment for officers and the suspect.
SOU used Bearcat armored vehicles and ballistic shields to provide team members with mobility while providing some protection from gunfire.
SOU made plans to address multiple logical contingencies that could arise during the incident. These included area containment, medical treatment and evacuation, arrest plans, and response to emergencies such as an active threat/shooter and hostage situations.
SOU used the loudspeaker to warn nearby residents about the situation and to instruct them to shelter in place. BPD arranged for Ada County Dispatch to use the “CodeRed” telephone warning system to inform nearby residents of the threat.
After taking Mr. Mulqueen into custody, SOU moved him a short distance away so that medical personnel could be brought forward to treat him in a safer location. They ensured that no civilians had been hit by gunfire and no further threats existed. Crime scene investigators then took over the scene.
There was some confusion in communication within the team immediately after the shooting, but this was quickly resolved.

Department Recommendations: BPD’s findings included the following Department recommendations:

Policy
- On body video: Amend BPD’s policy or SOU Directives to clarify that all SOU team members are to utilize their on-body video cameras during any SOU operation.
- Designation of roles: Update SOU Directives to identify and clarify the specific supervisory roles held by additional sergeants that have been added to the SOU since the Directives were enacted.
Equipment
- Less lethal tools: During the operation, an SOU member was assigned the role of carrying and being prepared to use a certain less lethal weapon. When the team responded to arrest the suspect, the SOU member forgot to bring the less lethal weapon with him. BPD recommended that SOU leadership address this issue directly with the SOU member if it had not already been addressed.
- Drones: BPD found that aerial drones proved to be a valuable tool in locating and observing the suspect during the incident. BPD recommended that SOU explore expanded drone capabilities to ensure seamless drone coverage and real-time viewing of drone footage by the SOU members.
- Bearcats: BPD found that SOU’s use of the armored Bearcat vehicle was essential in providing protection from gunfire in an environment where little natural cover existed. Bearcats are also typically utilized as a medical evacuation vehicle in high threat environments. During this incident SOU deployed 3 separate teams to different locations within the crisis site. BPD’s Bearcat was augmented by a second Bearcat that belongs to the Ada County Sheriff’s Office. Thus, there were only two Bearcats available to provide mobility, ballistic protection, and medical evacuation capabilities to three separate SOU elements who each had different assignments. BPD recognized that Ada County’s Bearcat may not be available during every SOU deployment. Given this, BPD recommended considering options for acquiring a second BPD Bearcat.

C. OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FINDINGS:
OPA finds that BPD’s tactical decisions were sound. Officers rapidly located the suspect vehicle, began a search, and utilized drones and other resources to safely locate the suspect. A command post and an outer perimeter were quickly established. Nearby residents were appropriately warned and instructed concerning the incident. Officers attempted to evacuate the four apartments where the shooting ultimately occurred, but the residents were uncooperative and refused to leave.

Despite numerous team members being off duty at the time of the incident, SOU quickly deployed and organized its operation. They planned for logical contingencies, assigned roles, and pre-positioned medical assets. Once planning was complete and the inner perimeter was in place, officers made multiple attempts to contact the suspect. They used a specialized loudspeaker mounted on the Bearcat designed to project clear, loud voice commands to the suspect’s exact location. They also tried to contact him via telephone.

SOU made considerable efforts to de-escalate the situation. They gave over 30 announcements and commands during half an hour. Mr. Mulqueen did not respond to any efforts to communicate with him.

SOU strategically utilized appropriate equipment, including aerial drones and the Bearcat. The drones maintained surveillance on Mr. Mulqueen. While he was hiding, drones were able to clearly confirm that Mr. Mulqueen was sitting upright, alert, and easily within range to hear commands. Drones also confirmed that he was armed with a handgun and pointing it in the direction from which he likely expected officers to approach. This information enhanced SOU’s situational awareness and informed their decision not to approach closer while attempting to negotiate and de-escalate the situation. Their use of the Bearcats as ballistic protection, a staging area, and a platform from which to attempt negotiations further enhanced de-escalation efforts.

SOU successfully executed their tactical contingency planning when Mr. Mulqueen deliberately escalated events, initially by firing a shot from his handgun at an unknown target. Then four minutes later the high elevation drone observed him moving toward the back patio area of four nearby apartments. To prevent him from potentially taking a hostage inside an apartment, an SOU arrest team quickly moved to confront and arrest him. OPA finds that BPD’s decision to deploy the arrest team was reasonable and necessary given the exigent circumstance and risk of harm to civilians created by Mr. Mulqueen’s actions.

Drone footage confirms that Mr. Mulqueen concealed himself behind a section of privacy fence and prepared to ambush SOU officers. The drone video depicts Mr. Mulqueen moving forward to the end of the fence and firing one shot from his handgun at officers. Det. Sontag immediately engaged him with rifle fire causing fatal wounds.

Forensic evidence at the scene, including Mr. Mulqueen’s handgun, spent shell casings, and the ballistic shield that was struck by Mr. Mulqueen’s gunfire, is consistent with videos and SOU officers’ accounts of the incident. OPA finds BPD’s reports to be thorough and accurate.

OPA notes that BPD Policy and SOU Directives require officers to be equipped with and record on their OBV when uniformed and taking enforcement action. Neither the policies or directives contain an exemption for officers responding while off duty and without immediate or timely access to their OBV equipment, as occurred here. OPA finds Det. Sontag’s failure to capture this incident on his OBV a violation of Policy 424 and recommends BPD’s consideration of this finding. Given the equipment challenge for members of the SOU called from off duty, OPA recommends BPD consider providing officers with specialty group assignments duplicate OBV equipment.

Overall, OPA finds that by pointing a handgun and firing at officers, Mr. Mulqueen presented an immediate threat of death or serious injury to Det. Sontag, Sgt. Andreoli, and the other SOU officers on the arrest team. Det. Sontag’s use of deadly force against Mr. Mulqueen in response to this threat was reasonable, necessary, and consistent with BPD policy and the applicable legal standard for use of force by law enforcement officers.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Several factors contributed to this critical incident.

First and foremost, Mr. Mulqueen engaged in escalating and dangerous criminal behavior, presenting an extreme risk to officer safety. Just prior to this incident, Mr. Mulqueen shot and killed Deputy Bolter during a routine traffic stop. Firing through the driver’s side window before Deputy Bolter could detect and assess the threat suggests an intent to ambush him. Mr. Mulqueen then fled the shooting scene in his vehicle, abandoned his vehicle, and hid from officers who were actively searching for him. Mr. Mulqueen waited under a tarp in the backyard of his apartment with a handgun, knowing officers were coming. This, again, suggests an intent to ambush.

Second, Mr. Mulqueen failed to cooperate. After Mr. Mulqueen was located by BPD, he ignored numerous attempts to contact him, negotiate his surrender, and arrest him safely.

Third, Mr. Mulqueen further escalated the situation by firing a handgun during negotiation efforts and later moving towards an occupied dwelling creating a risk of a 8 hostage situation or other harm to civilians. When officers attempted to intervene, he fired his handgun at them, striking a ballistic shield carried by an officer.

Finally, Mr. Mulqueen’s history suggests additional potential contributing factors to this incident. Mr. Mulqueen was reported by individuals known to him to have a history of alcohol abuse, mental health challenges, and was estranged from family members. His Idaho criminal history indicates numerous alcohol related charges since 2007 and when pulled over had a warrant for his arrest for failure to appear on alcohol related charges. Mr. Mulqueen had also shared anti-government sentiments to acquaintances over the years. He had no known history of violent crime.

While we cannot know with certainty the state of Mr. Mulqueen’s mind or motives in taking extreme, life-ending action against a law enforcement officer, given the totality of his actions, it is certainly conceivable that his desire to not return to jail was a significant motive.

OPA commends officers for their effective and efficient response to this incident. Officers rapidly located the suspect vehicle and began a search. Activation of the SOU was reasonable and necessary to provide the best possible chance to resolve the incident peacefully. In a short amount of time, the SOU established effective command, control, and communication, utilized appropriate equipment, pre-planned roles, created contingency plans, alerted neighbor residents, and engaged in deescalation efforts to mitigate risks to the public, officers, and the suspect. Overall, officers acted with restraint and professionalism despite Mr. Mulqueen having killed a fellow officer only hours before.

OPA will continue to track data on potential contributing factors for evaluation of community support and response, as well as aggravating or mitigating factors by officers to inform best policing practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OPA concurs with BPD’s policy and equipment recommendations. In particular, the drones proved to be essential tools in locating the suspect and provided valuable situational awareness during SOU’s operation. Likewise, the Bearcats provided mobility, ballistic protection, and enhanced medical response capabilities in a high threat environment. OPA supports BPDs recommendation to enhance and further integrate drone use into SOU operations. OPA also concurs with BPD’s recommendation to explore options for obtaining an additional Bearcat or similar asset. Both tools provide 9 additional capabilities, de-escalation options, and enhance safety for officers, suspects, and the public.

LINK TO DOCUMENTS

Use the link below to view the Critical Incident Task Force report, the officer body-worn camera video, and BPD news releases of this critical incident. Documents are under “2024 Critical Incidents” and “April 20, 2024.”

REPORT PREPARED BY:

William R. Long, OPA Investigator
Nicole McKay, OPA Director

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE

TO: Director Nicole McKay

FROM: Chief of Police Christopher Dennison

DATE: 11/22/2024

RE: Boise Police Response

I have reviewed the report from the Office of Police Accountability (OPA) and concur
with their findings. Specifically, regarding Detective Sontag not having his On Body
Video (OBV) equipment accessible, equipped, and active while in uniform and taking
enforcement action is a violation of Boise Police Department (BPD) policy 424 and the
following actions have been implemented:

Expectations for the Special Operations Group (SOG) have been set to ensure
members utilize OBV when deployed and taking enforcement action.
Members of SOG been issued two OBV systems to ensure they can deploy off
duty and from home with necessary equipment to adhere to BPD policy.
- This action has been taken following a critical incident which occurred on
  November 10, 2024.

Additionally, on November 12, 2024, Mayor and Council approved the interagency
agreement and purchasing of a new armored rescue vehicle in partnership with Idaho
Office of Emergency Management. This falls in line with OPA’s concurrence with BPD
on obtaining an additional armored vehicle.

2023

OPA Use of Force Report - Johnson, 8/3/2023

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

DATE OF INCIDENT: 08/03/2023
INVOLVED PERSON: Christian P. Johnson
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Cpl. Andrew Johnson
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Garrett Miller
OIA: 23-0150
DATE OF REPORT: 05/21/2024

CASE SYNOPSIS

On August 3, 2023, Christian Johnson made a 911 hang-up call to Ada County
Dispatch. He called 911 again and reported that someone was trying to kill him with a
“social media event.” He made a statement about a gun that the 911 operator could
not fully understand. The call was dispatched and BPD officers Cpl. Johnson and Ofc.
Miller responded for a welfare check at Mr. Johnson’s apartment.

When BPD officers arrived, Mr. Johnson came down the exterior stairs of his apartment building armed with a large knife in his right hand and a hammer and a pry bar in his left hand. Officers gave Mr. Johnson numerous commands to drop the weapons. Mr. Johnson refused to comply with the officers’ commands. Mr. Johnson then ran towards the officers with the weapons in his hands. He held the knife with the blade pointing towards the officers, and advanced to within 20 feet of them. Both officers then fired their duty handguns at Mr. Johnson, striking him several times. Mr. Johnson died at the scene as a result of his wounds.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On August 3, 2023, at approximately 10:52 a.m., Mr. Johnson made a 911 hang-up call. Mr. Johnson called back and told the 911 operator that he was in trouble. He stated that someone was trying to kill him with a “social media event.” He stopped talking directly to the operator, but the call remained connected. In the background, the operator heard Mr. Johnson say something about a gun. Mr. Johnson later re-engaged with the operator and asked when the officers would arrive.

At 10:59 a.m., BPD Ofc. Miller and Cpl. Johnson responded to the dispatched welfare
check on Mr. Johnson. Cpl. Johnson made a telephone call to Mr. Johnson while en
route. This telephone call was not recorded as BPD policy at that time did not require
recording interactions with the public that were considered “service oriented” in nature. During this call, Cpl. Johnson asked Mr. Johnson how he could help. Mr. Johnson stated that he wanted a ride to Aladdin Bail Bonds. Cpl. Johnson asked why he needed a bondsman, but Mr. Johnson did not answer. Mr. Johnson’s speech was muffled and difficult to understand. Cpl. Johnson offered to help Mr. Johnson get counseling, go to the hospital, or access other community resources such as Pathways of Idaho. Mr. Johnson stopped talking to Cpl. Johnson and Cpl. Johnson ended the call.

While driving to Mr. Johnson’s location, Ofc. Miller advised Cpl. Johnson about a prior contact that Ofc. Miller had with Mr. Johnson approximately two days earlier. Ofc. Miller shared that he had contacted Mr. Johnson at his apartment in response to a similar welfare check call. During that incident, Mr. Johnson told Ofc. Miller that he had been using methamphetamine and that he had not slept for several days. Mr. Johnson seemed paranoid and told Ofc. Miller that he believed a nearby neighbor was trying to get him. Mr. Johnson denied that he was in possession of methamphetamine at that time. Mr. Johnson said that he intended to check himself into a drug rehabilitation facility. After a brief discussion and determination that there was no evidence of criminal activity and that Mr. Johnson did not need the assistance of law enforcement, Ofc. Miller closed the call.

Ofc. Miller also advised Cpl. Johnson that he had checked BPD records and noted that Mr. Johnson had been charged with resisting and obstructing officers during several prior interactions with police. Ofc. Miller warned Cpl. Johnson that they should use caution in dealing with Mr. Johnson.

When Ofc. Miller and Cpl. Johnson arrived, they parked within line of sight of Mr. Johnson’s apartment. Both officers were driving marked BPD patrol vehicles, wearing full police uniforms, and were equipped with on-body video cameras. The cameras were activated and captured the incident.

Upon arrival the officers heard yelling coming from the direction of Mr. Johnson’s apartment. Cpl. Johnson heard Mr. Johnson say something about a gun but could not discern exactly what he said. Both officers moved behind a parked car as Mr. Johnson appeared on the landing of the exterior stairwell of the apartment building. The officers observed that Mr. Johnson had a large knife in his right hand and both a hammer and a sharp metal object in his left hand. The knife was later determined to have a 12-inch blade.

Mr. Johnson walked to the bottom of the stairs, into the parking lot and said, “Sir, you want to just take me out, or I mean, I’ll come at you”. Both officers gave Mr. Johnson numerous commands to “drop the knife,” “put everything on the ground,” and “drop the weapons.” They also called him by his first name when giving commands. Mr. Johnson responded by saying “no” and “come and get it,” or “come and get me.”

When Mr. Johnson was approximately 75-80 feet from the officers, he placed the point of the knife at his own stomach as if he intended to stab himself. By radio, the officers called for two additional police units to assist, and to expedite their response. Officers had been giving commands to Mr. Johnson for approximately one minute at this point. Rather than obeying the commands, Mr. Johnson then began moving towards the officers and raised the knife above shoulder height. He then ran towards the officers with the knife in an ice pick style grip. The blade was oriented towards the officers enabling him to stab downwards.

Mr. Johnson covered approximately 60 feet in 4-5 seconds as he charged the officers with the knife raised, yelling, “I’m going to kill you mother f***er.” When Mr. Johnson was approximately 18-20 feet from them, both officers fired their duty handguns at him. They collectively fired a total of 9 rounds striking him each time. Mr. Johnson continued forward and fell to the ground approximately 6-8 feet from the officers. No on-scene medical treatment was provided to Mr. Johnson as officers quickly determined he was deceased due to the nature and extent of his wounds.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

A. 1.001 USE OF FORCE/AUTHORIZATION
The legal standard for use of force generally by officers.

B. 1.003 USE OF FIREARMS IN THE LINE OF DUTY
Firearms may be used by officers to “protect themselves or others from what they reasonably believe to be an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.”

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

The CITF investigation determined that Mr. Johnson was on parole for felony DUI at the time of the incident. CITF investigators learned that Mr. Johnson had a history of alcohol and other substance abuse, and a criminal history that included convictions for aggravated assault, resisting and obstructing officers, and attempted robbery. Investigators were told by individuals known to Mr. Johnson that he may have been struggling with recent mental health issues. He also had an ongoing dispute with a neighbor. Mr. Johnson had recently been charged with malicious damage to property for breaking the neighbor’s window.

The CITF investigation was detailed and thorough. The Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney reviewed the CITF investigation and determined that both officers’ actions were justified under Idaho law.

B. BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT FINDINGS:
BPD conducted an administrative review of this critical incident, which included reviewing the CITF investigation in its entirety and administrative interviews with each involved officer. BPD’s administrative review concluded that Cpl. Johnson and Ofc. Miller were each faced with an immediate threat to their lives and that their use of lethal force in response to that immediate threat was reasonable and did not violate applicable law. BPD found that each officer’s actions were compliant with BPD policies in place at the time of the incident. BPD did not assign any additional training to the individual officers involved based upon this incident.
BPD’s findings noted that after this incident, BPD’s Audio/Video Recording policy changed. Had the new policy been in place at the time of this incident, it would have required Cpl. Johnson to record the telephone conversation he had with Mr. Johnson while responding to the call.

BPD found that when the officers initially contacted Mr. Johnson in person, they gave him commands to drop to his weapons, but did not attempt to engage him in conversation to de-escalate his behavior.
BPD found that department wide in-service training should emphasize using de-escalation tactics when feasible including:

If circumstances do not require an immediate response, officers should first meet away from the scene to:
- Gather background information.
- Call for additional resources (such as the Behavioral Health Response Team, a supervisor, and additional officers) if necessary.
- Pre-plan and designate officer’s roles.
- Pre-plan less-lethal force options.
- Approach the scene and engage with the subject only when planning and preparation are complete.

BPD found that the BPD Training Division should identify best practices and a uniform procedure for determining whether a person is deceased after a shooting incident.

BPD found that the incident supervisor should ensure that definite points of ingress and egress from a crime scene are established, and appropriate scene logs are kept.

C. OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FINDINGS:
OPA recognizes that using or attempting de-escalation tactics are appropriate in some situations and not feasible in others. Officers are guided by training, experience, department policy and best practices in making such decisions. Likewise, some calls are of an exigent nature and require an immediate response. Others do not require an immediate response and give officers an opportunity to plan and prepare before deploying, as noted in BPD’s findings.

In this case, the call was dispatched as a welfare check. The officers saw dispatch call notes indicating that there was a 911 hang-up call, that Mr. Johnson was not communicating clearly with the 911 operator, that he said something about a gun, and that he asked the operator when the officers would be arriving.

Days earlier, Ofc. Miller had interacted with Mr. Johnson on a similar call where he contacted Mr. Johnson in person. During that incident, Ofc. Miller learned that Mr. Johnson likely had a methamphetamine addiction, had not been sleeping, and exhibited paranoid behavior concerning his neighbors. Ofc. Miller also checked BPD records and learned that Mr. Johnson had a history of resisting and obstructing officers. Ofc. Miller shared this information with Cpl. Johnson.

Cpl. Johnson spoke to Mr. Johnson by telephone while responding to the call. Cpl. Johnson recognized that Mr. Johnson was likely having an emotional, mental health,
or other type of crisis, could be under the influence of illegal substances, and offered to help him obtain counseling, medical treatment, or other community resources. Mr. Johnson did not respond to this offer of assistance.

The post-incident investigation showed that the officers recognized these factors as indicators that this call had an elevated level of risk.

As there were no exigent circumstances, there was no necessity to go to the scene and contact Mr. Johnson immediately. Officers had the opportunity to meet off-site, plan, and prepare a response. With further inquiry into BPD’s records, they could have learned that Mr. Johnson was on parole. Mr. Johnson’s parole officer could likely have been a valuable source of intelligence information about Mr. Johnson, his current circumstances and mindset. Officers could have asked for assistance from BPD’s Behavioral Health Response Team, pre-planned a de-escalation strategy, less-lethal force options, and utilized other resources as appropriate.

Because the officers recognized the elevated risk factors, OPA concludes that they could have slowed down, made plans, prepared for predictable contingencies, and possibly influenced the sequence of events or the necessity for use of force. OPA recognizes there is no guarantee that any amount of preplanning or de-escalation tactics will influence an outcome, but we are certain that employment of such tactics increase the likelihood of a peaceful resolution.

When officers arrived at the call, Mr. Johnson appeared on the steps of his apartment building. The officers observed that he was armed with a large knife, hammer, and another sharp object. They immediately commanded Mr. Johnson to drop the weapons. He was not compliant. He paced back and forth 80-90 feet from the officers for approximately one minute. This time and distance permitted officers an opportunity to attempt verbal de-escalation techniques, such as engaging in conversation with gathered intelligence, without increasing officer safety risks. Instead, the officers continued only to give commands to drop the weapons. This strategy ultimately proved to be unsuccessful, as Mr. Johnson continued to ignore commands. Thus, officers missed a second opportunity to possibly de-escalate the situation and avoid the necessity to use deadly force. However, once Mr. Johnson raised the weapons and ran directly toward the officers, he created an imminent risk of death or serious injury to the officers and to others. Mr. Johnson ran approximately 60 feet in 4-5 seconds. He was armed with a large knife and other weapons. Officers were aware that several civilian witnesses were standing near them, and that the witnesses would be at risk of being attacked if Mr. Johnson were able to move past the officers. The officers waited until Mr. Johnson was 18-20 feet from them before they fired. He fell approximately 6-8 feet from the officers after he was shot.

Given these circumstances and proximity, OPA concurs with the CITF and BPD investigations that the use of deadly force against Mr. Johnson was objectively reasonable and necessary when faced with an imminent and lethal threat to themselves and others. The officer’s actions were consistent with BPD policy in place at the time and complied with the applicable legal standard for use of force by law enforcement officers.

While the BPD Use of Force policy in place at the time required use of de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force when safe and feasible to do so in the totality of the circumstances, OPA does not find that these missed opportunities constitute a violation of policy given the de-escalation techniques that were employed and the totality of the circumstances. More specifically, Cpl. Johnson engaged in de-escalation when placing the call to Mr. Johnson to better understand what he needed and how to best help him. He listened to Mr. Johnson and offered available services before Mr. Johnson quit communicating. Officers also employed de-escalation tactics calling for two additional police units to assist with an expedited response. Those efforts, coupled with the rapid escalation of threat from arrival to the use of deadly force, satisfy the use of force policy in place at the time.

It should be noted that since this incident, BPD has updated its Policy Manual, effective April 1, 20242. Policy 300 “Use of Force” and its subparts prescribe a detailed and robust set of standards for safeguarding the sanctity of life, use of force, duty to intervene, and employment of de-escalation tactics. An analysis of this critical incident under these updated policies would have required a demonstration of tactics to prepare offsite, gather intelligence, call for appropriate resources, preplan, and designate roles to allow time, distance, and flexibility for the situation to resolve, and if unfeasible, documentation of the justification.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Several factors contributed to this critical incident.

Mr. Johnson aggressively ran towards officers armed with a large knife, hammer, and a pry bar with an expressed intent to be “taken out.” He failed to obey 13 commands in total to drop his weapons and continued to move aggressively towards officers while holding the weapons in a threatening manner. He refused numerous opportunities to comply with the officers before deadly force was used against him.

Mr. Johnson had a lengthy history of criminal behavior, including convictions for aggravated assault, obstructing, and resisting officers, multiple DUI’s, and an attempted robbery.

The CITF investigation revealed that Mr. Johnson had a history of alcohol abuse and substance abuse. It is unknown whether Mr. Johnson was experiencing an emotional or mental health crisis at the time of this incident. Toxicology results contained in the autopsy report revealed the presence of methamphetamine, amphetamines, and THC in Mr. Johnson’s blood.

Although there is no certainty that the missed opportunities for de-escalation stated above could have mitigated the incident, they had the potential to influence the sequence of events or the need for use of force. Specifically, the utilization of Mr. Johnson’s request to go to the bail bond business could have been used to engage Mr. Johnson in dialogue. In addition, officers could have reoffered the services communicated by phone while en route in an attempt to calm the subject and look towards a peaceful resolution. OPA recognizes that there was less than one minute to engage Mr. Johnson in conversation before he aggressed the officers and thus without backup officers on scene, this may not have been feasible. Additionally, OPA notes that even if these additional steps towards de-escalation had been taken, Mr. Johnson may have remained uncompliant and aggressive towards the officers consistent with his statement to officers that “Sir, you want to take me out, or I mean, I’ll come at you.”

OPA recognizes the mitigation efforts used by Cpl. Johnson prior to arriving at the scene of this incident. Cpl. Johnson contacted Mr. Johnson by telephone and asked how he could help him. Cpl. Johnson recognized that Mr. Johnson was potentially having an emotional or mental health crisis. He offered to help Mr. Johnson obtain counseling, medical aid, or assistance with other resources such as Pathways of Idaho, a community-based mental and behavioral health provider.
OPA will continue to track data on potential contributing factors for evaluation of community support and response and aggravating or mitigating efforts by officers to inform best policing practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OPA recognizes the proactive policy development and training by BPD since this incident. BPD is training all sworn officers on the new policies, which emphasizes pre-planning, gathering appropriate resources, controlling the pace, constant communication between officers, supervisors and involved individuals, de-escalation, and report documentation. This training is conducted through classroom instruction and participation in live action scenarios with role players.
With policy updates and subsequent training aligned, OPA has no additional recommendations. OPA will review future use of force incidents occurring after the effective date of these policies accordingly and specifically looking to this training’s impact in the field.

LINK TO DOCUMENTS

Use the link below to view the Critical Incident Task Force report, the officer body worn camera video, and BPD news releases of this critical incident. Documents are under “2023 Critical Incidents” and “August 3, 2023.”

REPORT PREPARED BY:

William R. Long, OPA Investigator
Nicole McKay, OPA Director

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT REFERENCED POLICIES

1.000 Use of Force

1.001 Use of Force/Authorization

Force is a deliberate and intentional application of effort by a police officer on another person.

A police officer shall never employ unnecessary force or violence and shall use only such force in the discharge of duty as is objectively reasonable in all circumstances.
The decision to use force should be based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. While the use of force is occasionally unavoidable, every police officer shall refrain from unnecessary infliction of pain or suffering and shall never engage in cruel, degrading, or inhumane treatment of any person.

Under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), Officers will only apply force reasonably believed to be necessary under the circumstances. When determining when to apply force, consider the totality of the circumstances including the following.

Immediate threat of the suspect to the officer/(s) or public
Level of resistance offered
The severity of the crime.

Force intentionally applied in excess of what is reasonably necessary, or in circumstances where there is no justification for its use, is an excessive application of force.

Officers will use de-escalation techniques to prevent or reduce the need for force when safe and feasible to do so based on the totality of the circumstances. This includes continually assessing the situation and modifying the use of force as circumstances change, consistent with officer safety.

Examples of de-escalation techniques include but are not limited to:

Utilizing verbal skills and providing a warning prior to the use of force.
Determining whether the officer may be able to stabilize the situation through the:
- use of time, distance, or positioning to isolate and contain a subject,
- request of additional personnel to respond or make use of specialized units or equipment and alternate resources including crisis-intervention team trained officers.

In the discharge of their duties an officer may encounter a dynamic situation requiring immediate action where time does not allow for the de-escalation techniques listed above.

1.003 Use of Firearms in the Line of Duty

An officer shall be authorized to discharge firearms in the line of duty under the following conditions:

To use their firearm to protect themselves or others from what they reasonably believes to be an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.
To use their firearm to affect the capture or prevent the escape of a felony suspect whose freedom is reasonably believed to represent a significant threat of serious bodily injury or death to the officer or other persons.
During firearms training sessions as directed by the firearms instructors.
To shoot an animal as outlined in Treatment of Animals.
An officer shall not discharge firearms:
As a warning
When the discharge of the weapon may unreasonably endanger the lives of persons not involved in the commission of the crime in progress.

OPA Use of Force Report - Juker, 7/26/2023

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

DATE OF INCIDENT: 07/26/2023
INVOLVED PERSON: Macey J. Juker
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Dominic Rogers
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Ryan Pollard
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Chase Fiddler
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Sgt. Kirk Rush
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Craig Sousa
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Sgt. Jason Pietrzak
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Jonathon Howarth
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Jacob Lee
OPA: OPA24-0060
OIA: OIA23-0148
DATE OF REPORT: 08/20/2024

CASE SYNOPSIS

On the night of July 26, 2023, BPD Officers responded to a dispatched 911 crisis call in a residential neighborhood of Boise’s North End. Ofc. Lee contacted the 911 caller, Macey Juker, by telephone. During the telephone conversation, Ofc. Lee learned that Mr. Juker had consumed alcohol, purchased heroin, and was exhibiting signs of a mental health crisis. Ofc. Lee attempted to engage Mr. Juker in further conversation but Mr. Juker stopped responding, though he remained on the call. Ofc. Lee then heard Mr. Juker fire several rounds from a rifle.

Multiple BPD officers responded to assist. Officers determined that Mr. Juker was firing shots while on foot in the neighborhood. Officers located Mr. Juker outdoors in a dimly lit area. Mr. Juker fired his rifle at arriving officers. Officers returned fire striking Mr. Juker with multiple shots. Mr. Juker died at the scene as a result of his injuries.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On July 26, 2023, at approximately 10:24 pm, Mr. Juker called 911. He reported that there were people outside his house “trying to get in and kill me.” Mr. Juker responded very slowly to the dispatcher’s questions. He told the dispatcher that he had an “assault rifle” and that “radiation is melting my brain.”

The call was assigned to Ofc. Lee. While responding to the call, Ofc. Lee set up a staging area a short distance away. He then contacted Mr. Juker by telephone. During the telephone conversation it became apparent that Mr. Juker was likely suffering from a mental health crisis. Mr. Juker told Ofc. Lee that he was “really drunk” and that he had bought some heroin. Ofc. Lee inquired if Mr. Juker was thinking of hurting himself or others, and Mr. Juker answered yes to being suicidal, but did not respond to the question of whether he was homicidal. Ofc. Lee then heard a series of gun shots coming from the direction of Mr. Juker’s residence a few blocks away. He heard the same gunshots over the phone. Officers realized that Mr. Juker was firing a weapon while on foot in the neighborhood.

Numerous officers responded to locate Mr. Juker. Officers were wearing full police uniforms, operating marked police vehicles, and were equipped with on-body video cameras. Their cameras functioned properly and captured the incident.

During the initial police response into the neighborhood, Sgt. Rush and Ofc. Pollard parked in a dimly lit area to listen for gunfire and attempt to locate the suspect. Immediately upon getting out of their cars, Mr. Juker walked up on them. He was holding an AK-47 style rifle. Officers gave Mr. Juker commands with which he initially complied. He placed the rifle on the trunk of a nearby car. Officers had him move closer to them so that he would be farther from the rifle. Mr. Juker obeyed commands and assumed a kneeling position in the street. Because officers were concerned that he may have a concealed handgun or other weapons, they waited for additional officers to arrive before coordinating a custody plan.

As Officers Rogers, Fiddler, Sousa, and Sgt. Pietrzak were arriving, Mr. Juker jumped to his feet and sprinted to where he had placed the rifle. Officers commanded him to stop. Mr. Juker grabbed the rifle, ran a few more steps, turned and fired towards officers. Officers were aware that he was also firing toward multiple occupied homes.

Officers fired at Mr. Juker in response to his actions. A review of the on-body video footage shows that officers’ shots likely struck Mr. Juker during this initial exchange of gunfire. Despite this, Mr. Juker ran approximately 25 yards farther, turned and again fired toward officers and nearby homes. Officers returned fire striking Mr. Juker. He fell to the street and continued to fire at officers while lying in the street. Officers fired at Mr. Juker several more times eventually incapacitating him.

Officers quickly organized a custody team, which utilized a patrol car as a rolling bunker, a ballistic shield, and a police K9 to take Mr. Juker into custody. Officers provided medical aid to Mr. Juker until emergency medical personnel arrived. Mr. Juker died at the scene because of his wounds.

The ensuing Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) investigation revealed that Mr. Juker fired multiple rifle shots near his residence, as he moved throughout the neighborhood, and during the engagements with police officers. Five spent shell casings from his rifle were found near his residence. Seven spent shell casings from his rifle were found near where the final exchange of gunfire occurred. Because the scene was a large outdoor area, it is likely that not all of Mr. Juker’s spent shell casings were recovered.

The CITF investigation found that Sgt. Pietrzak, Sgt. Rush, Ofc. Pollard, Ofc. Fiddler, Ofc. Sousa, and Ofc. Rogers each fired their weapons at Mr. Juker at different times and from different vantage points during the incident. The investigation found that Mr. Juker was struck by more than eight rounds fired by officers before he stopped firing at them.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

A. 001 USE OF FORCE/AUTHORIZATION
The legal standard for use of force generally by officers.

B. 003 USE OF FIREARMS IN THE LINE OF DUTY
Firearms may be used by officers to “protect themselves or others from what they reasonably believe to be an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.”

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

A. CRITICAL INCIDENT TASK FORCE FINDINGS:
After the shooting incident, the Ada County Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) was activated, led by the Garden City Police Department. The CITF conducted a forensic investigation of the scene, interviewed witnesses, interviewed the involved officers, collected dispatch records and audio/video evidence, and produced numerous reports. The investigation was detailed and thorough. The Gem County Prosecuting Attorney reviewed the CITF investigation and determined that each officers’ use of deadly force against Mr. Juker was justified under Idaho law.

B. BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT FINDINGS:
BPD conducted an administrative review of this critical incident, which included reviewing the CITF investigation in its entirety and administrative interviews with each involved officer. BPD’s administrative review concluded that by pointing and firing a rifle multiple times at officers and toward occupied homes, Mr. Juker presented an imminent threat of death or serious injury to officers and members of the public. Each officer’s use of lethal force in response to that immediate threat was reasonable and did not violate applicable law. BPD found that the officers’ actions were compliant with existing BPD policies. BPD identified no additional training recommendations specific to the individual officers involved in this incident.

BPD noted that Ofc. Lee’s decision to initially stage away from the scene and contact Mr. Juker by telephone to gather first-hand information was well thought out and consistent with standard BPD de-escalation protocols. When Mr. Juker began firing his rifle, it created an exigent circumstance requiring officers to move in and locate him.

BPD found this critical incident highlighted the continuing need to emphasize certain key aspects of BPD’s operational philosophy:

Supervision

BPD found that arriving supervisors should have asserted operational oversight sooner to coordinate resources and direct incoming officers’ route of travel to the crisis point. BPD recognized that this effort was complicated by the fact that initially officers did not know the suspect’s location. The armed suspect walked up on Sgt. Rush and Ofc. Pollard as soon as they arrived, interrupting their coordination efforts.

Suspect Control

BPD found that prior to the suspect fleeing to obtain the rifle, officers placed him in a kneeling position for approximately 90 seconds and that no one was communicating with him during this time. BPD found that officers should have used better communications with the suspect as they waited for additional resources to arrive to take him into custody.

Training and Philosophy

BPD recommended that the Training Division and BPD leadership continue to emphasize the general principles of early supervisory involvement, incident communications, and overall de-escalation at every opportunity.

C. OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FINDINGS:
OPA concurs with BPD’s findings regarding operational oversight and suspect engagement, and recognizes the challenges presented during the incident that impacted their preplanning, coordination, and communication.

OPA finds that Ofc. Lee complied with existing BPD de-escalation policy by establishing a staging area and making telephone contact with Mr. Juker. By firing his rifle, Mr. Juker created an exigent circumstance forcing officers to immediately move in and begin searching for him.

Upon contacting Mr. Juker, officers gave commands, separated him from his rifle, and began directing arriving officers to their location. While officers were coordinating additional resources, officers missed an opportunity to continue a dialogue with Mr. Juker in an attempt to maintain compliance. Again, OPA recognizes this effort was complicated due to the limited number of officers present at the time of contact, the compressed time frame in which this incident unfolded, and the continuing threat posed by Mr. Juker (officers did not know whether Mr. Juker had additional firearms on his person).

When Mr. Juker sprinted toward his rifle, officers gave additional commands and attempted to gain compliance without using force. By firing his rifle toward officers and occupied homes, Mr. Juker presented an imminent threat of death or serious injury to officers, occupants of nearby homes, and the public generally. For this reason, each officers’ use of deadly force against Mr. Juker was reasonable, necessary, and consistent with BPD policy and the applicable legal standard for use of force by law enforcement officers.

Once Mr. Juker was incapacitated, supervisors quickly made and directed an effective custody plan. Officers provided on-scene medical care to Mr. Juker until emergency medical personnel arrived.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Several factors contributed to this critical incident.

First and foremost is Mr. Juker’s conduct. He armed himself with a rifle and fired multiple shots in his neighborhood forcing police to respond and confront him. When they located him, he initially complied with their commands. He put his rifle down, moved toward officers with his hands up, and took a kneeling position as instructed. For no apparent reason, Mr. Juker sprang to his feet and retrieved his rifle. Despite officers’ commands to stop and drop his rifle, he ran a few steps, turned, and fired toward officers and occupied homes. Officers fired on Mr. Juker in response, likely wounding him.

As officers continued to give commands, Mr. Juker moved again, turned, and fired several more shots at officers. He was struck with multiple rounds and died because of his wounds.

Mr. Juker’s actions demonstrate a deliberate effort to force an armed confrontation with officers. He could have stopped the confrontation at any point by complying with officers’ commands. He could have chosen not to shoot at officers and toward nearby homes.

Mr. Juker told Ofc. Lee that he was very drunk and had recently purchased heroin. Mr. Juker’s blood alcohol concentration (BAC) was .432. Given this high BAC, alcohol was a contributing factor to this incident, though it is unknown to what degree. There is no evidence of any previous mental health or substance abuse-related incidents or violent conduct with law enforcement.

Ofc. Lee’s initial efforts were designed to slow things down, learn more information, and de-escalate the situation. When forced to act, officers quickly located Mr. Juker as he moved through the dimly lit residential neighborhood firing a rifle.

Officers used restraint, gave commands, and attempted to resolve the matter without using force. When faced with an imminent deadly threat, officers responded with disciplined, accurate gunfire in a tense and rapidly evolving situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OPA concurs with BPD’s findings and training and procedural recommendations concerning this incident. OPA supports BPD in its efforts to balance dynamic tactics and firearms training with training emphasizing command and control, slow tactics, de-escalation, communication and less-lethal tools during high-risk events.

OPA also recognizes the proactive policy development and ongoing training by BPD since this incident. BPD is training all sworn officers on the new polices, which emphasizes pre-planning, gathering appropriate resources, controlling the pace, constant communication between officers, supervisors and involved individuals, de-escalation, and report documentation.

With policy updates and subsequent training aligned, OPA has no additional recommendations. OPA will review future use of force incidents occurring after the effective date of these policies and will be assessing this training’s impact in the field.

LINK TO DOCUMENTS

Use the link below to view the Critical Incident Task Force report, the officer body-worn camera video, and BPD news releases of this critical incident. Documents are under “2023 Critical Incidents” and July 26, 2023”.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

William R. Long, OPA Investigator
Nicole McKay, OPA Director

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT REFERENCED POLICIES

1.000 Use of Force

1.001 Use of Force/Authorization

Force is a deliberate and intentional application of effort by a police officer on another person.

A police officer shall never employ unnecessary force or violence and shall use only such force in the discharge of duty as is objectively reasonable in all circumstances.

The decision to use force should be based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. While the use of force is occasionally unavoidable, every police officer shall refrain from unnecessary infliction of pain or suffering and shall never engage in cruel, degrading, or inhumane treatment of any person.

Immediate threat of the suspect to the officer/(s) or public
Level of resistance offered
The severity of the crime.

Force intentionally applied in excess of what is reasonably necessary, or in circumstances where there is no justification for its use, is an excessive application of force.

Examples of de-escalation techniques include but are not limited to:

Utilizing verbal skills and providing a warning prior to the use of force.
Determining whether the officer may be able to stabilize the situation through the:
- use of time, distance, or positioning to isolate and contain a subject,
- request of additional personnel to respond or make use of specialized units or equipment and alternate resources including crisis-intervention team trained officers.

In the discharge of their duties an officer may encounter a dynamic situation requiring immediate action where time does not allow for the de-escalation techniques listed above.

1.003 Use of Firearms in the Line of Duty

An officer shall be authorized to discharge firearms in the line of duty under the following conditions:

To use their firearm to protect themselves or others from what they reasonably believe to be an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.
To use their firearm to affect the capture or prevent the escape of a felony suspect whose freedom is reasonably believed to represent a significant threat of serious bodily injury or death to the officer or other persons.
During firearms training sessions as directed by the firearms instructors.
To shoot an animal as outlined in Treatment of Animals.

An officer shall not discharge firearms:

As a warning
When the discharge of the weapon may unreasonably endanger the lives of persons not involved in the commission of the crime in progress.

OPA Use of Force Report - Wasson, 6/24/2023

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

DATE OF INCIDENT: 06/24/2023
INVOLVED PERSON: Payton Wasson
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Chance Feldner
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Cpl. Brian Holland
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Chase Fiddler
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Jacy Palic
OIA: OIA23-0136
DATE OF REPORT: 08/13/2024

CASE SYNOPSIS

On June 24, 2023, BPD officers working in downtown Boise observed two men thought to be affiliated with the Norteños street gang. Officers ran their car license plate and other records checks. They found the car was registered to the driver, Mario Garza. They also found that Mr. Garza had a significant history of violent crime, was on felony parole, legally prohibited from possessing firearms, and was as an affiliate of the Norteños gang.

After the two men walked away from the car, officers looked through the windows and saw a handgun in plain view on the front passenger floorboard.

When the men returned to their car, officers saw the second man, Payton Wasson, obtain something from the passenger floorboard and place it in his waistband. Officers believed Mr. Wasson was now in possession of the gun. Officers contacted the men as they again walked away from the car. Mr. Garza complied with officer’s commands.

Mr. Wasson refused to comply with commands and ran from officers toward the crowded downtown bar and restaurant district. As officers chased after him, Mr. Wasson pulled the gun from his waistband. He pointed the gun at an uninvolved civilian and at Ofc. Feldner. Ofc. Feldner fired his duty handgun 4 times at Mr. Wasson, striking him once in the head. Mr. Wasson fell and dropped his gun. Officers provided medical aid at the scene. Mr. Wasson later died at the hospital because of his injury.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On June 24, 2023, at approximately 1 a.m., four BPD officers working downtown as part of a Gang Enforcement Team[1] observed two men exit a parked car in a parking lot in the 100 block of 5^th Street near Idaho Street. The driver of the car, later identified as Mario Garza, was wearing clothing associated with gang attire. Specifically, officers observed Mr. Garza wearing a red hat, red shoes, and cuffed pants with red on the bottom, which are known to officers to be associated with the Norteños Gang. Officers ran records checks and found that the car was registered to Mr. Garza. They also found that Mr. Garza had a significant history of violent crime, was on felony parole, legally prohibited from possessing firearms, and was known to law enforcement as an affiliate with the Norteños gang. Mr. Garza and the passenger, later identified as Payton Wasson, walked away from the car into the downtown area, which was crowded with bar patrons.

Officers looked through the windows of the car and observed the grip of a Glock handgun in plain view on the front passenger floorboard. The pistol was partially concealed under the seat. They photographed the handgun and sent the photos to other officers working in the downtown area. Officers then informed the Idaho Probation and Parole duty officer of their observations regarding Mr. Garza. The duty officer instructed BPD officers to detain Mr. Garza and search him and his vehicle pursuant to Mr. Garza’s court ordered parole conditions. The duty officer told the BPD officers to arrest Mr. Garza if they found him to be in violation of his parole restrictions.

The officers continued to observe Mr. Garza and Mr. Wasson as they walked to two bars and engaged in what officers suspected to be drug sales. The officers decided to contact the men. The purpose of contacting the men was to detain and search Mr. Garza because of his felony parole status. Based on their observations, officers believed they also had probable cause to detain Mr. Wasson to determine whether he was involved in illegal drug sales or related criminal activity.

The officers decided to let the men return to their car before contacting them. They decided to permit the men to get inside their car and then use police cars to block Mr. Garza’s car in place. Officers reasoned that if the men got into the car, there would be stronger evidence of Garza’s possession of the handgun. The officers also wanted the men contained in the car, so they could block it and minimize the possibility of a foot or vehicle pursuit. During post-incident interviews, some officers said they understood that the plan was to first block the car and then approach Garza’s car on foot using a dynamic vehicle assault tactic to gain compliance and detain the men. Another officer understood that once blocked in, officers would call the suspects back to them in a controlled manner from positions of cover.

When the bars closed at 2 a.m., officers watched as the men walked several blocks towards their car. Officers noticed that the men were accompanied by an unidentified female. When Mr. Garza, Mr. Wasson, and the female reached the car, officers observed the female get into the driver’s seat. Officers decided not to contact them at that moment to avoid risk to the female. Mr. Garza and Mr. Wasson stood outside the car with the car doors open. Officers saw Mr. Wasson obtain something from the front passenger floorboard and place it in his waistband. Officers believed Mr. Wasson was now in possession of the gun they had seen earlier in the car. Mr. Wasson also took a backpack from the car and put it on his back. After a few moments, Mr. Garza, Mr. Wasson, and the female closed the car doors and began walking toward downtown. The officers then decided to drive up and initiate contact as the three suspects walked away from the car.

Four officers were operating two marked police cars with two officers assigned to each car. They were wearing full police uniforms and were equipped with body-worn video cameras. Officers Feldner, Fiddler, and Cpl. Holland activated their cameras, which functioned properly and captured the incident. Ofc. Palic failed to activate her camera until after the incident, although she was not in a location to physically observe or record the shooting.

Officers contacted the group at the corner of 5^th and Idaho Streets. Mr. Garza and the female complied with officers’ commands and were safely detained. Mr. Wasson did not obey the officers’ commands. He immediately thrust his right hand into his waistband, turned away, and then ran south on 5^th Street towards Main Street, in the direction of the crowded downtown bar district. Ofc. Feldner chased after him, followed by Cpl. Holland. Ofc. Feldner’s on-body video showed that Mr. Wasson pulled the handgun from his waistband two or three seconds into the pursuit. Ofc. Feldner gave multiple commands for Mr. Wasson to drop the gun. As they approached the corner of 5^th and Main Streets, Mr. Wasson pointed the gun toward a bystander and at Ofc. Feldner. As he continued to flee toward the crowd and was approaching the corner of a building with the gun in his hand, Ofc. Feldner fired his duty handgun 4 times at Mr. Wasson striking him once in the back of the head. Mr. Wasson fell and dropped his gun. Officers provided medical aid at the scene. Mr. Wasson later died at the hospital because of his injury.

During the Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) investigation, detectives discovered that Mr. Wasson’s backpack contained two baggies of methamphetamine, 4 pouches of Naloxone (used to reverse opioid overdose), digital scales, a pipe for smoking illegal drugs, and 11 rounds of .45 caliber handgun ammunition. Digital forensic analysis of his cell phone revealed text messages indicative of fentanyl sales, photographs of what appeared to be illegal drugs, and photographs of a person off screen pointing a handgun at Mr. Wasson’s girlfriend’s head.

Mr. Wasson was previously convicted of felony eluding/fleeing from a police officer, had served a prison sentence, and had been on felony probation. As a convicted felon, it was illegal for him to possess a firearm. Toxicology findings during Mr. Wasson’s autopsy revealed the presence of methamphetamine and fentanyl in his bloodstream.

Mr. Garza was found in possession of a vial containing fentanyl pills and $1,367 in US currency. Their female associate was considered a witness and not charged with any crimes.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

A. 001 USE OF FORCE/AUTHORIZATION
The legal standard for use of force generally by officers.

C. 427 FOOT PURSUIT
Guidelines to assist officers in making the decision to initiate or continue the pursuit of suspects on foot.

D. 17.020 AUDIO/VIDEO RECORDINGS
Uniformed officers shall record all investigative enforcement contacts when it is anticipated to be confrontational in nature unless an articulated reason justifies otherwise. Officers are responsible for recording their own actions. The Department recognizes activation of a recording device, in some cases, may jeopardize the safety of the officers or others. In those cases, failing to record will not be considered a violation of policy.

E. 11.008 Relationship with Others and Demeanor
An employee shall treat all other persons in a civil and respectful manner. They shall not use profanity or uncomplimentary speech in the presence of employees or the public, prisoners, or other persons they have contact with nor shall they intentionally antagonize any person.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

A. CRITCAL INCDIENT TASK FORCE FINDINGS:
After the shooting incident, the Ada County Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) was activated, led by the Ada County Sheriff’s Department. The CITF conducted a forensic investigation of the scene, interviewed witnesses, interviewed the involved officers, collected dispatch records and audio/video evidence, and produced numerous reports. The investigation was detailed and thorough. The Gooding County Prosecuting Attorney reviewed the CITF investigation and determined that Ofc. Feldner’s actions were justified under Idaho law.

B. BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT FINDINGS:
BPD conducted an administrative review of this critical incident, which included reviewing the CITF investigation in its entirety and administrative interviews with each involved officer. BPD’s administrative review concluded that by refusing to comply with lawful commands to drop the gun, and by pointing the gun at Ofc. Feldner and a member of the public, Payton Wasson presented an immediate threat to the life of Ofc. Feldner as well as members of the public and, that Ofc. Feldner’s use of lethal force in response to that immediate threat was reasonable and did not violate applicable law. BPD found that Ofc. Feldner’s actions were compliant with existing BPD policies, including their policy concerning foot pursuits. BPD identified no additional training recommendations specific to the individual officers involved in this incident.

BPD found that by failing to turn on her on-body video until after the shooting incident, Ofc. Palic violated BPD policy 17.020 Audio/Video Recordings. The relevant portion of this policy requires uniformed officers to record all investigative enforcement contacts or when a contact is anticipated to be confrontational in nature.

BPD found this critical incident highlighted the ongoing need to emphasize certain key aspects of BPD’s operational philosophy through training and supervisory oversight including:

De-escalation

Officers had a legal basis to detain Mr. Garza and Mr. Wasson. However, officers made a conscious decision to allow the suspects to return to the car rather than detaining them beforehand. This decision had the consequence of allowing Mr. Wasson the opportunity to retrieve the firearm, which increased the risk of an armed encounter. The officers’ desire to strengthen the evidence of a criminal offense does not outweigh the necessity to make sound tactical decisions. Officers’ tactical decisions should seek to decrease the risk of a violent encounter whenever feasible. Officers should have de-escalated risk by contacting the suspects prior to their arrival at the car where officers knew they would have access to a firearm.

Supervision

BPD supervisors responsible for these officers should have asserted operational oversight earlier in the chain of events. Supervisors should actively take control rather than passively monitoring events as they unfold. Future policy should include specific expectations of supervisors in managing high risk events.

Tactical Strategy

Patrol Officers should use time and distance to their advantage and not rely on inherently risky dynamic techniques such as vehicle assaults. Future policy should prohibit the use of advanced tactics such as vehicle assaults outside of SOU (Special Operations Unit) operations.

Training and Philosophy

Future training should include stress inoculation and realistic scenario-based simulations such as foot pursuits, vehicle pursuits, barricaded suspects, and other dynamic situations. Training should include assessing supervisory competence in overseeing such events.

Through training and field operations, BPD should continue to emphasize slow tactics, command and control, de-escalation, communication, and use of less lethal tools (where appropriate) during high-risk events.

BPD found that “de-escalation is the national standard and needs to be continually emphasized in training”.

C. OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FINDINGS:
After the review of all available evidence in this incident and governing policies and law, OPA concurs that the use of force was justified and necessary to protect the public and the lives of officers.

OPA finds that officers had a legitimate law enforcement interest in contacting Mr. Garza. After observing the firearm in Mr. Garza’s car, officers determined that Mr. Garza was a convicted felon and was on parole. It was a violation of Idaho law for Mr. Garza to possess a firearm. The on-duty parole officer requested that BPD stop and detain Mr. Garza pursuant to his court-ordered conditions of parole. In addition, the officers continued to observe Mr. Garza and Mr. Wasson as they walked to two bars and engaged in what officers suspected to be drug sales. Thus, officers had a duty to investigate a potential violation of Idaho law and to assist in the enforcement of his parole conditions.

OPA finds that the officers’ decision to allow Mr. Garza and Mr. Wasson to return to the car rather than contacting them beforehand was flawed. During post-incident interviews, the officers said that their primary reason for allowing the men to return to the car prior to contacting them was to strengthen the evidence that Mr. Garza was in possession of the firearm. Officers observed the pistol on the front passenger side floorboard. Officers believed that if they saw Mr. Garza get into car near where the firearm was in plain sight, their observations would be strong evidence that he knew it was there and that he possessed it in violation of the law.

While it is likely that this would have been compelling evidence, their decision increased the risk of an armed encounter when safer options were feasible and more tactically sound. Officers should have prioritized public, officer, and suspect safety over gathering evidence. Deliberately allowing a violent felon access to a handgun during an enforcement action was a poor tactical decision that escalated rather than de-escalated the risk of a violent encounter. Officers should have recognized this risk and intercepted the suspects prior to their arrival at the car.

OPA finds that once Mr. Wasson obtained the firearm and fled, Ofc. Feldner’s decision to pursue him on foot was appropriate and compliant with BPD’s foot pursuit policy.

Officers had seen Mr. Wasson engaging in activity that appeared to be drug sales. Officers had probable cause to detain him for investigation of these offenses. Officers observed him in possession of the firearm. Officers had probable cause to detain him to investigate ownership of the gun, as they saw him remove it from Mr. Garza’s (a convicted felon and parolee) car. When officers initially encountered Mr. Wasson, he refused to obey commands thereby committing the crime of resisting and obstructing officers. He then reached into his waistband toward the gun. When officers commanded him to put his hands up, he replied, “What if I don’t?” By reaching into his waistband where the pistol was located, Mr. Wasson may have committed aggravated assault against the officers. Mr. Wasson then fled toward the downtown crowds. Officer Feldner believed that because he was armed, Mr. Wasson presented an immediate threat to the public. During the first few seconds of the foot pursuit, Mr. Wasson pulled the gun from his waistband and pointed it at a bystander and Ofc. Feldner.

BPD’s foot pursuit policy provides that officers may be justified in initiating a foot pursuit of anyone the officer reasonably believes is about to engage in, is engaging in or has engaged in criminal activity. OPA finds that Ofc. Feldner’s belief that Mr. Wasson was engaging in criminal activity was reasonable and the pursuit was justified under BPD’s policy.

In analyzing Ofc. Feldner’s decision to shoot Mr. Wasson, OPA notes certain relevant factors. When Mr. Wasson arrived back at the car it was after 2 a.m. He armed himself with a pistol and backpack and began walking back toward downtown where crowds of bar patrons were located. Logic follows that he may have armed himself and headed back toward downtown for some criminal purpose, such as illegal drug sales. Seconds later, officers contacted Mr. Wasson. He immediately reached into his waistband where the pistol was located. All four officers said they believed he was about to draw the gun and begin shooting at them.

When he fled, Mr. Wasson ran toward downtown. He would have reached the crowds leaving bars within a few seconds. Ofc. Feldner was concerned that Mr. Wasson may commit a carjacking, take a hostage, or randomly begin shooting people. In fact, he did point the pistol at a bystander and at Ofc. Feldner. Ofc. Feldner feared that at any second, Mr. Wasson would quickly turn and shoot him, and he would be unable to prevent it. Through training and experience, Ofc. Feldner correctly recognized that it takes longer to observe a suspect’s action, assess it as a threat, and react appropriately than it takes for the suspect to complete the action. Thus, Ofc. Feldner believed that Mr. Wasson was about to shoot him and he would be unable to prevent it if he didn’t shoot first. Ofc. Feldner also correctly assessed that if Mr. Wasson reached the corner of the building they were approaching, he could use the corner as cover, turn and ambush Ofc. Feldner.

Faced with the impossible choice of allowing Mr. Wasson to continue to rapidly close the distance toward the crowd, with all those inherent risks, or hesitate and risk being shot himself, Ofc. Feldner chose to shoot Mr. Wasson.

OPA finds that given the totality of the circumstances including arming himself, thrusting his hand into his waistband as officers confronted him, pointing a handgun at a bystander and at Ofc. Feldner, fleeing and ignoring multiple lawful commands to drop the gun, and running toward a crowd while armed with the handgun, Mr. Wasson presented an immediate threat of death or serious injury to Ofc. Feldner and to members of the public who were nearby. Ofc. Feldner’s use of deadly force against Mr. Wasson under these circumstances was reasonable, necessary, and consistent with BPD policy and the applicable legal standard for use of force by law enforcement officers.

Finally, OPA addresses the use of profanity by Ofc. Feldner during the foot pursuit of this incident. While profanity may be a stress response, the excessive use of profanity can escalate rather than de-escalate a situation. It can also adversely affect public perception of police actions, including use of force. The policy in place at the time of this incident prohibits the use profanity in the presence of the public. The current policy, 319.5.9(g), recognizing its potential for use as tactical language, prohibits the use of profane language except when the use is to provide emphasis during a rapidly evolving situation to gain compliance with an uncooperative subject. OPA recognizes Ofc. Feldner’s use of profanity may have been a stress response or for the purpose of achieving compliance in what was clearly a rapidly evolving situation with an uncooperative subject. While this may not rise to the level of a policy violation given the totality of the circumstances, given the frequency with which Ofc. Feldner used profanity in less than a ten second period, OPA recommends to the BPD Chief that this be addressed with Ofc. Feldner.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Several factors contributed to this critical incident.

First and foremost are Mr. Wasson’s actions. Mr. Wasson was observed engaging in suspected illegal drug activity with a suspected gang member and returned to the car to retrieve a handgun and backpack. This elevated officers’ suspicions of illegal activity and escalated the situation. When confronted by officers, he failed to comply with multiple commands to surrender. At any point during this incident, Mr. Wasson could have stopped, put his hands up, or tossed the gun. Instead, he fled from officers, pointed the handgun at a bystander and an officer, and continued to run toward a crowded area while armed. As a result of these and other actions by Mr. Wasson, deadly force was used against him.

Mr. Wasson also displayed behavior consistent with prior acts. Mr. Wasson had previously been convicted of felony eluding/fleeing from police officers and had recently fled from officers in an unrelated incident and was not apprehended. In this incident, rather than complying with officers’ commands, Mr. Wasson again ran from officers, but this time he pulled a firearm out of his waistband and pointed it at an officer.

Autopsy results indicated that Mr. Wasson was under the influence of methamphetamine and fentanyl. It is unknown to what degree these substances influenced or contributed to this incident. There is no evidence any mental health related incidents or any previous violent encounters with law enforcement.

Officers’ overall tactical strategy, supervision and communication in this incident were flawed in some respects. While certainly these decisions and actions influenced the incident, when faced with the immediate threat of death or serious injury to himself and others, and a split second to decide whether to use deadly force in a dangerous, rapidly evolving, and dynamic situation, Ofc. Feldner made a difficult but reasonable and necessary choice. OPA recognizes there were significant risks in both acting and in failing to act.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OPA concurs with BPD’s findings and training and procedural recommendations concerning this incident. OPA recommends BPD balance its dynamic tactics and firearms training with robust and consistent training that prioritizes and emphasizes command and control, slow tactics, de-escalation, communication, and less-lethal tools during high-risk events.

With current updated policy and subsequent training aligned, OPA has no additional recommendations. OPA will review future use of force incidents occurring after the effective date of these policies and will be assessing this training’s impact in the field.

LINK TO DOCUMENTS

REPORT PREPARED BY:

William R. Long, OPA Investigator
Nicole McKay, OPA Director

OPA Use of Force Report - Donithorne, 3/8/2023

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

DATE OF INCIDENT: 03-08-2023
INVOLVED PERSON: Gavin Donithorne
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Nicholas Quintana
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER/WITNESS: Cpl. Brad Griffin
OPA: 023-0023
OIA: 023-0060
DATE OF REPORT: 03-14-2024

CASE SYNOPSIS

On March 8, 2023, Boise Police Department (BPD) officers were actively searching for
Gavin Donithorne. Mr. Donithorne had a history of violent behavior and threats
directed toward his family members and others. Mr. Donithorne was also on felony
parole in Oregon. Family members reported that Mr. Donithorne was traveling to Boise from Oregon to carry out recent threats he had made against them.

An Ada County Sheriff’s Department Deputy spotted Mr. Donithorne’s car in the Boise
area. The deputy attempted to stop the vehicle. Mr. Donithorne fled from the
attempted traffic stop at a high rate of speed. Officers initially pursued Mr. Donithorne’s car. They called off the vehicle pursuit because of Mr. Donithorne’s dangerous driving but continued to search for him.

A short time later, Cpl. Griffin and Ofc. Quintana, riding together in a patrol car, saw Mr. Donithorne in traffic and positioned their car behind him. He pulled into a business
parking lot and stopped his car. Cpl. Griffin and Ofc. Quintana stopped behind him.
As the officers were getting out of their car, Mr. Donithorne got out of his car and
pointed what appeared as a handgun directly at Cpl. Griffin. Ofc. Quintana and an
assisting Ada County Deputy fired several shots from their duty handguns at Mr.
Donithorne. Mr. Donithorne was struck once in the upper torso. He fled on foot for
several blocks then surrendered to officers who were chasing him. He was taken into
custody and provided with medical aid. Mr. Donithorne survived his injuries.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On March 8, 2023, BPD began searching for Gavin Donithorne after family members reported that he was traveling from Oregon by car to carry out recent threats he had made against them. BPD determined that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Donithorne for felony stalking as a result of these threats.

Family members reported that Mr. Donithorne had a history of violent and threatening behavior against them and others. They also reported a history of mental illness. BPD learned that Mr. Donithorne was on parole in Oregon after being convicted of felony assaults there. Mr. Donithorne had allegedly committed parole violations and an Oregon arrest warrant was being issued because of these violations.

At approximately 10:19 am, an Ada County Sheriff’s Department deputy spotted Mr. Donithorne’s car traveling on State Street near Eagle Road. The deputy attempted to stop the car, but Mr. Donithorne refused to comply, and a pursuit ensued. Officers observed Mr. Donithorne driving recklessly at speeds of over 100 mph during the pursuit. After the pursuit entered Boise, Cpl. Griffin and Ofc. Quintana, driving a marked patrol car, positioned themselves ahead of Mr. Donithorne. They attempted to deploy Stop Sticks to flatten his tires. They were unable to get the Stop Sticks in place before Mr. Donithorne sped past them. The active pursuit was called off due to the risks posed by Mr. Donithorne’s excessive speed and dangerous driving.

Officers continued to follow Mr. Donithorne seeking an opportunity to arrest him. Officers observed him driving recklessly as he attempted to avoid them.

At approximately 10:42 am, Cpl. Griffin and Ofc. Quintana saw Mr. Donithorne’s car on Apple Street approaching the intersection of Boise Avenue. Ofc. Quintana’s on-body video camera was activated and captured the incident. A security camera at a nearby business also recorded the shooting portion of the incident. Cpl. Griffin’s on-body video camera was not activated.

As Cpl. Griffin and Ofc. Quintana pulled in behind Mr. Donithorne, he turned into a business parking lot and stopped his car as there was no exit. The officers stopped behind him and got out of their patrol car. Ofc. Quintana gave two clear commands to “show your hands,” as Mr. Donithorne stepped out of his car. Mr. Donithorne then took a shooting stance and pointed what appeared to be a black handgun directly at Cpl. Griffin. Ofc. Quintana then fired several shots from his duty handgun at Mr. Donithorne. Mr. Donithorne also pointed what officers believed to be a gun at Ofc. Quintana. Mr. Donithorne then turned away from officers and began to run towards a nearby fence. He maneuvered around the fence as he fled from officers. Ada County
Sheriff’s Department Sgt. Santucci had arrived and was positioned to assist the BPD officers. Sgt. Santucci fired at Mr. Donithorne who still had the pistol in his hand. Mr. Donithorne ran several blocks down the street with officers chasing him. He dropped or discarded the gun during the foot chase. He then ran onto a nearby lawn, laid down and surrendered to officers. He was taken into custody and provided medical care for a gunshot wound to the left side of his chest below his armpit. He survived his injuries. Mr. Donithorne was later convicted of Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a Police Officer and Aggravated Battery on a Police Officer.

Mr. Donithorne’s handgun was recovered along the route that he ran. It was determined to be a compressed air BB gun that was nearly identical in size and appearance to an actual Beretta handgun. It did not have orange color marking on the muzzle that is typically found on BB guns and airsoft guns that otherwise replicate real firearms.

During the shooting incident, Cpl. Griffin saw Mr. Donithorne point the handgun directly at him. Cpl. Griffin believed it was a real handgun and ducked down to avoid being shot. He then heard sounds he recognized as a BB gun firing. He did not fire at Mr. Donithorne because he then believed Mr. Donithorne had a BB gun as opposed to a real handgun. This occurred while Ofc. Quintana was firing at Mr. Donithorne.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

A. 1.001 USE OF FORCE/AUTHORIZATION
The legal standard for use of force generally by officers.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

A. CRITICAL INCIDENT TASK FORCE FINDINGS:
After the shooting incident, the Ada County Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) was activated, led by the Meridian Police Department. The CITF conducted a forensic investigation of the scene, interviewed witnesses, interviewed the involved officers, collected dispatch records and audio/video evidence, and produced numerous reports. The investigation was detailed and thorough. The Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney reviewed the investigation and determined the officer’s actions were justified under Idaho law.

BPD also concluded that BPD Policy 17.020 (Audio/Video Recording) was violated when Cpl. Griffin did by not timely activate his on-body video camera.

BPD has recommended the following additional training be conducted:

Stop Stick deployment
Felony cars stop tactics
Preplanning communications
Force on force scenarios
Incorporating on-body video activation into training scenarios
Incorporating planning over the radio into training scenarios
Awareness training concerning the effect of on-body video cameras being in sleep mode
Supervisor training in command and control and pre-planning communications

C. OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FINDINGS: |
OPA agrees that Ofc. Quintana was justified in using deadly force against Mr. Donithorne.

At the time he used deadly force against Mr. Donithorne, Ofc. Quintana knew that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Donithorne for felony offenses including stalking and fleeing or eluding an officer. The stalking offense involved threats of violence against his family members. The eluding offense involved endangering the public by driving recklessly and at speeds in excess of 100 mph. Ofc. Quintana also knew that Mr. Donithorne was on felony parole in Oregon, and that an arrest warrant resulting from parole violations was being issued.

It was reasonable for Ofc. Quintana to believe that the weapon Mr. Donithorne pointed at Cpl. Griffin (and Ofc. Quintana) was an actual handgun. It was identical in size and appearance to a real handgun.

Ofc. Quintana could reasonably conclude that based on Mr. Donithorne’s history of making threats and escalating violent behavior, he presented a continuing threat of harm to his family, the public, and to law enforcement if he were to escape. A high school was in session a short distance from the scene of the incident.

When Mr. Donithorne pointed a weapon directly at Cpl. Griffin and Ofc. Quintana, he presented an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury to both officers. Ofc. Quintana correctly assessed that it was reasonable and necessary to use deadly force against Mr. Donithorne in defense of Cpl. Griffin and in self-defense.

As soon as practicable after the shooting, officers rendered medical aid to Mr. Donithorne at the scene. He was quickly transported to the hospital by medical personnel.

Given the imminent nature of the threat of being shot, less lethal force options, such as a taser or pepper spray, were not appropriate or reasonable for the officers to use in this situation.

Based on the OPA review and analysis of the facts and circumstances of this case, OPA concurs with the CITF and BPD investigations that Ofc. Quintana’s actions were reasonable and necessary when officers faced an imminent threat of being shot with a handgun. Ofc. Quintana’s actions were consistent with BPD policy and complied with the applicable legal standard for use of force by law enforcement officers. OPA also concurs with BPD’s finding that BPD policy was violated when Cp. Griffin failed to activate his on-body video as required.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Several factors contributed to this critical incident. First, Mr. Donithorne pointed what appeared to be a handgun directly at an officer, which created an immediate threat to the lives of the officers.

Second, Mr. Donithorne failed to cooperate during every interaction with officers. Mr. Donithorne had numerous opportunities to comply with officers before deadly force was used against him. Rather than fleeing, he could have cooperated during the initial attempted traffic stop. At any point during the pursuit, he could have pulled over and surrendered. When confronted by Ofc. Quintana and Cpl. Griffin, he could have complied with commands and been arrested without further incident.

Third, Mr. Donithorne clearly demonstrated an escalating, imminent threat to his family, the officers and the public. Mr. Donithorne, in a short amount of time, made specific and violent threats toward family members, created a serious risk to the public at large by driving recklessly at high speeds in heavy traffic, and aimed what appeared to be a firearm at officers in front of a high school and in a busy intersection.

It is unknown whether Mr. Donithorne’s escalating dangerous behavior was attributable to the reported mental health crisis, an unidentified factor, or a combination of factors. There is no information in the investigation that indicates substance use contributed to the incident. In addition, while Mr. Donithorne’s threats to family members had been previously reported to BPD, there is no evidence that BPD officers ever had contact with Mr. Donithorne, as he resided in Oregon.

OPA recognizes the effective mitigation efforts by BPD officers in the response to this incident. Officers terminated the active vehicle pursuit after Mr. Donithorne began driving recklessly at high speeds in high volume traffic. They adjusted their plan by maintaining visual contact while seeking an opportune time to arrest him. After the shooting and foot chase, officers slowed their actions down and calmly took Mr. Donithorne safely into custody. They assessed his wound, rendered medical aid at the scene, and enabled a prompt response by emergency medical personnel.

OPA will continue to track data on potential contributing factors for evaluation of community support and response and aggravating or mitigating efforts by officers to inform best policing practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OPA concurs with BPD’s training recommendations and has no additional recommendations. OPA concurs with BPD’s finding that BPD policy was violated when Cp. Griffin failed to activate his on-body video as required.

LINK TO DOCUMENTS

Use the link below to view BPD news releases, officer body worn camera video, and Critical Incident Task Force reports. Documents are under under “2022 Critical Incidents,” “March 8, 2023 – Boise Ave. and Apple St.”.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

William R. Long, OPA Investigator
Nicole McKay, OPA Director

OPA Use of Force Report - Nash, 1/23/2023

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

DATE OF INCIDENT: 01/23/2023
INVOLVED PERSON: Eli Robert Nash
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Cpl. Kip Paporello
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Cpl. Tim Beaudoin
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Adam Crist
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Patrick Ellison
WITNESS BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Trevor Stokes
OPA: 23-0013
OIA: 23-0023
DATE OF REPORT: 07/29/2024

CASE SYNOPSIS

On January 23, 2023, Boise Police Department (BPD) officers were seeking to arrest Eli Nash on a felony warrant for absconding parole and for failing to register as a sex
offender.

BPD and Idaho Parole and Probation officers working in plain clothes located Mr. Nash
in a restaurant parking lot sitting in his car. Officers approached Mr. Nash’s car,
identified themselves as police officers, and ordered Mr. Nash to surrender. Mr. Nash
quickly jumped into the backseat of his car. The car doors were locked. The backseat
driver’s side and passenger side windows were covered with a dark fabric preventing
the officers from seeing what Mr. Nash was doing. BPD Cpl. Paporello moved to the
rear windshield and looked down into the backseat passenger area of the car. Cpl.
Paporello observed Mr. Nash crouching down and pointing a handgun toward other
officers who were standing outside the driver’s side of the car.

Cpl. Paporello then fired his duty handgun four times through the back windshield at
Mr. Nash. Mr. Nash was struck by the officer’s gunfire. Officers were able to break a
side window, open the door and remove Mr. Nash. Officers attempted live-saving
measures. Mr. Nash died at the scene.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

In 2018, Mr. Nash was convicted in Idaho of two felony counts of Sexual Exploitation of a Child by Electronic Means. In that case, Mr. Nash was found in possession of child
pornography involving digital images of very young children being sexually assaulted.
Mr. Nash had served a prison sentence and was on parole in the Boise area.

In the fall of 2022, Idaho Probation and Parole officers conducted a home visit at Mr.
Nash’s residence. They seized two electronic devices from him, which violated conditions of his parole. Officers submitted the devices for digital forensic processing to determine if they contained child pornography. Shortly afterward, Mr. Nash fled parole supervision. Parole officers were unable to locate or contact him. Mr. Nash was charged with Absconding Parole, a felony, and a warrant for his arrest was issued. On November 23, 2022, Idaho Parole and Probation officers assigned to fugitive apprehension began searching for Mr. Nash in the Boise area.

In January of 2023, BPD Cpl. Beaudoin began investigating Mr. Nash for failing to register as a sex offender, a felony offense. BPD and Idaho Parole and Probation officers coordinated their investigations to locate and arrest Mr. Nash.

Officers learned that Mr. Nash may be frequenting an apartment complex near Fairview Avenue in Meridian. Officers believed that Mr. Nash may have had an unidentified girlfriend in the apartment complex who had a young child. Officers also knew that Mr. Nash was suspected of sexually assaulting a 13-year-old girl in a previous incident. Because of the nature of Mr. Nash’s previous offenses, officers were concerned that any child to whom he had access was potentially in danger and may already be a victim of sexual assault. Officers believed it was important to determine where he had been living, identify children he had contact with since absconding parole, and investigate any additional offenses. Officers recognized that any electronic devices in his possession or at his residence could contain photographic or other evidence of unknown victims and crimes. Officers were concerned that potentially valuable evidence on Mr. Nash’s phone might be deleted if they were unable to seize his phone immediately upon contacting him.

On January 23, 2023, BPD Neighborhood Contact Officers (NCOs) and Parole Officers all working in plain clothes began a joint surveillance near the apartment complex. The purpose of the surveillance was to locate Mr. Nash, determine where and with whom he had been residing, and arrest him. During the surveillance, officers located Mr. Nash’s car, a 2012 four-door Toyota Camry sedan. They positively identified Mr. Nash as the driver and sole occupant of the car.

Officers surveilled Mr. Nash for several hours waiting for him to lead them to where he had been residing. They observed him move to several different business parking lots before finally parking near the Texas Roadhouse restaurant. He appeared to be using free wi-fi from the businesses and viewing his phone while sitting in his car. Mr. Nash did not get out of his car at any point during the surveillance.

At approximately 4 pm, Cpl. Beaudoin decided to arrest Mr. Nash before he moved his car again. Cpl. Beaudoin understood the difficulty of conducting surveillance in rush hour traffic and after dark. He was concerned that Mr. Nash would enter traffic flow and evade them if they didn’t act soon.

Using police radios, the officers formed a plan to arrest Mr. Nash while he was seated in his car near the Texas Roadhouse. The plan called for Cpl. Beaudoin to pull into an open parking space directly in front of Mr. Nash’s car, thereby preventing him from escaping by driving forward. Four officers riding in a single unmarked police car would block Mr. Nash’s car from the rear. The four officers would then dismount and approach Mr. Nash’s car from the rear with two officers on the drivers’ side and two officers on passenger’s side of the car. The officers would give commands for Mr. Nash to surrender, remove him from the car, take him into custody, and seize his phone. Cpl. Paporello would follow in his unmarked car to provide support if needed.

At approximately 4:28 pm, officers initiated their plan to arrest Mr. Nash. Officers were wearing external body armor/equipment carriers with “Police” markings clearly displayed on the front and back. Officers were equipped with on-body video cameras which functioned properly and captured the entire incident. The unmarked police car that blocked Mr. Nash’s car from the rear was equipped with emergency police lights that were activated during the incident.

Officers blocked Mr. Nash’s car from the front and rear according to their plan. BPD Officers Stokes and Ellison approached along the drivers’ side of Mr. Nash’s car. BPD Ofc. Crist and an Idaho Parole and Probation Officer approached along the passenger side of Nash’s car. When officers approached, they could see Mr. Nash looking down at his phone. Officers identified themselves as Boise Police Officers, called Mr. Nash by name, stated he was under arrest, and ordered him to put his hands up. Mr. Nash looked left and right and observed the officers’ locations. He did not comply with officers’ commands to put his hands up. He appeared frantic as he tossed his phone into the front passenger seat and briefly grabbed the steering wheel and gear shift as if he wanted to drive away. Officers tried to open the car doors but discovered that they were locked. BPD Ofc Stokes used a punch tool to break the drivers’ window as Mr. Nash quickly jumped from the drivers’ seat over the console and into the backseat where he was out of view. Officers were unable to see into the backseat area because the rear drivers’ side and passenger side windows were covered with what appeared to be dark colored fabric, which they had not previously noticed.

Cpl. Paporello moved to the rear of Mr. Nash’s car and leaned over the trunk so that he could peer through the rear windshield down into the backseat area. He then saw Mr. Nash in the backseat with his back against the passenger side door, his legs on the seat, facing the rear driver’s side door and window. He was crouching down so that his head was below the top of the rear seat. Cpl. Paporello observed Mr. Nash pointing a handgun toward the rear driver’s side window and door where Officers Stokes and Ellison were positioned. Cpl. Paporello then fired his duty handgun four times through the back windshield into the backseat at Mr. Nash. Officers then broke away some of the rear windshield glass and saw that Mr. Nash had dropped the handgun into his lap. His right hand was next to the gun. Mr. Nash appeared unresponsive. Officers then used the punch tool to break the passenger side rear window and unlocked the door. Officers then removed the fabric from the window and the handgun from Mr. Nash’s lap. Officers then placed Mr. Nash on the ground where they attempted life saving measures until emergency medical personnel arrived. Mr. Nash died at the scene.

The Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) investigation determined that the pistol Mr. Nash had been pointing toward officers was a 9 mm CZ handgun with 14 rounds loaded in the magazine and a round in the chamber. The pistol had an exposed hammer, which was cocked and ready to fire.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

A. 1.001 USE OF FORCE/AUTHORIZATION
The legal standard for use of force generally by officers.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

A. CRITICAL INCIDENT TASK FORCE FINDINGS:
After the shooting incident, the Ada County Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) was activated, led by the Garden City Police Department. The CITF conducted a forensic investigation of the scene, interviewed witnesses, interviewed the involved officers, collected dispatch records and audio/video evidence, and produced numerous reports. The investigation was detailed and thorough. The Blaine County Prosecuting Attorney reviewed the CITF investigation and determined that Cpl. Paporello’s actions were justified under Idaho law.

B. BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT FINDINGS:
BPD conducted an administrative review of this critical incident, which included reviewing the CITF investigation in its entirety and administrative interviews with each involved officer. BPD’s administrative review concluded that by pointing a handgun at officers, Mr. Nash presented an immediate threat to their lives and that Cpl. Paporello’s use of lethal force in response to that immediate threat was reasonable and did not violate applicable law. BPD found that Cpl. Paporello’s actions were compliant with existing BPD policies. BPD identified no additional training recommendations specific to the individual officers involved in this incident.

BPD found that additional department-wide training and a review of procedures was warranted as a result of this incident.

BPD found there were deficiencies in procedures utilized during this incident including:

Supervision and Planning

No supervisor was present during the incident. BPD noted that supervisors are specifically trained to consider the totality of the circumstances, slow down the pace, mitigate risk, ensure thorough planning, and obtain proper resources.
The officers were all very experienced, but there was no designated leader for the operation.
Planning was conducted hastily and over the radio.
There was no plan for logical contingencies such as a barricaded suspect. Officers did not plan to back away, contain the suspect, and attempt to de-escalate in the event of a barricaded suspect.
Marked police vehicles and uniformed officers were not used. BPD noted that they should be incorporated into planned operations to ensure that suspects and the general public are certain about the presence of police.

Communications

Officers used a radio side channel not monitored by dispatch to conduct the operation.
Officers did not advise Meridian Police Department (jurisdiction where the operation was taking place) or Ada County Dispatch that they were conducting a planned operation.

De-escalation

From the outset, officers should have considered a plan to block the suspect vehicle and then attempt to call the suspect out of his car while officers utilized positions of cover. Additional time and distance would enhance officer safety, suspect safety, and maximize the opportunity to de-escalate.
Securing evidence should not be prioritized higher than officer and suspect safety.

Training

Officers should not conduct operations with personnel from outside agencies unless they have trained with those personnel in the specific types of operations being conducted.
Except for the Special Operations Unit (SOU), BPD officers have not had specific training for conducting vehicle assaults. If BPD leadership determines that NCOs should be capable of conducting vehicle assaults, they should be provided specific training for this purpose.

BPD’s findings noted that protocols are now in place to ensure that a supervisor will oversee any such operations in the future.
BPD recommended additional training to mitigate the issues noted above.\

C. OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FINDINGS:
In addressing the arrest of Mr. Nash, OPA finds officers had a legitimate public safety interest in arresting Mr. Nash in the parking lot rather than attempting to continue the surveillance any further. BPD recognized that Mr. Nash was likely a danger to the community, especially to children. By conducting surveillance of Mr. Nash, they hoped to learn where he resided and if he had access to any children since absconding parole. During the surveillance, Mr. Nash did not lead officers to any residence. Officers recognized the difficulty of conducting surveillance in heavy rush-hour traffic and after dark. They did not want him to evade their surveillance and then return to his girlfriends’ home where he might victimize a child.

Given these circumstances, officers reasonably decided to arrest Mr. Nash on his outstanding warrant. While there was a legitimate urgency to arrest Mr. Nash before he left the parking lot, and the officer’s plan to block Mr. Nash’s car in place was effective at preventing his escape, there was no exigent circumstance that required officers to utilize a vehicle assault type arrest plan. By approaching Mr. Nash’s car on foot, officers were forced to respond to his actions and permitted him to drive the tempo of the operation. Officers were at greater risk than necessary when they left positions of cover and concealment and walked alongside Mr. Nash’s car where he had a concealed a firearm, which he pointed at and could have readily fired at them.

OPA recognizes and appreciates that officers approached the arrest with the intent to secure evidence (Mr. Nash’s phone). However, this decision increased the risk of an armed confrontation when safer options were feasible and more tactically sound. Officers should have pre-planned to contain Mr. Nash and attempted to call him back to them in a controlled manner from positions of cover and tactical advantage. This would have provided the officers with a greater degree of safety, distance, time to assess, and opportunity to de-escalate the situation. While Mr. Nash may have been able to delete any evidence on his phone, officer safety and safety of the suspect outweighs the potential loss of evidence. If Mr. Nash had chosen not to comply and barricaded himself in the car, officers, with time and tactical advantage in their favor, may have had opportunities to negotiate, consider less lethal options, and possibly resolve the situation without the necessity to use deadly force.

Addressing the use of force by Cpl. Paporello, OPA finds that by pointing a handgun towards the officers, Mr. Nash presented an imminent threat of death or serious injury to the officers standing outside the car. Because the rear windows were covered, the officers were unable to see that they were in Mr. Nash’s potential line of fire. It was reasonable and necessary for Cpl. Paporello to use deadly force against Mr. Nash in these circumstances. OPA concurs with BPD and the CITF that Cpl. Paporello’s actions were consistent with BPD policy and complied with the applicable legal standard for use of force by law enforcement officers.

It should be noted that since this incident, BPD has updated its Policy Manual, effective April 1, 2024. Policy 300 “Use of Force” and its subparts prescribe a detailed and robust set of standards for safeguarding the sanctity of life, use of force, duty to intervene, and employment of de-escalation tactics. An analysis of this critical incident under these updated policies would have required a demonstration of tactics to thoroughly preplan, obtain appropriate resources, designate roles and tactics to allow time, distance, and flexibility for the situation to resolve, and if unfeasible, documentation of the justification.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Several factors contributed to this critical incident.

Mr. Nash failed to cooperate with law enforcement. When confronted by officers, Mr. Nash refused to comply with multiple commands to surrender. Instead, he quickly jumped into the backseat of his car and armed himself with a pistol. He then pointed the pistol at officers resulting in deadly force being used against him.

Mr. Nash continued to engage in criminal conduct. Mr. Nash could have complied with his parole conditions and not fled from parole supervision. Mr. Nash acquired a handgun while on parole. As a convicted felon, he was not legally able to possess a firearm. This act violated his parole and constituted an additional felony offense. Mr. Nash could have turned himself in at any point while he was a fugitive.\There is no indication of any presence of illegal substances nor history of substance abuse, mental health related incidents or interactions with law enforcement involving a weapon.

OPA recognizes BPD’s diligent efforts to locate and arrest Mr. Nash, a convicted sex offender and parole violator who presented a substantial threat to the community, especially to children. Officers accurately assessed the added risk to the community if he was not arrested on the day of this incident, creating a sense of urgency to take him into custody.

OPA will continue to track data on potential contributing factors for evaluation of community support and response and aggravating or mitigating efforts by officers to inform best policing practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OPA concurs with BPD’s findings and training and procedural recommendations concerning this incident.

OPA recognizes the proactive policy development and training by BPD since this incident. BPD is training all sworn officers on the new polices, which emphasizes pre-planning, gathering appropriate resources, controlling the pace, constant communication between officers, supervisors and involved individuals, de-escalation, and report documentation. This training is conducted through classroom instruction and participation in live-action scenarios with role players.

With policy updates and subsequent training aligned, OPA has no additional recommendations. OPA will review future use of force incidents occurring after the effective date of these policies accordingly and specifically looking to this training’s impact in the field.

LINK TO DOCUMENTS

Use the link below to view the Critical Incident Task Force report, the officer body worn camera video, and BPD news releases of this critical incident. Documents are under under “2023 Critical Incidents” and “January 23, 2023.”

REPORT PREPARED BY:

William R. Long, OPA Investigator
Nicole McKay, OPA Director

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT REFERENCED POLICIES
1.000 Use of Force

1.001 Use of Force/Authorization
Force is a deliberate and intentional application of effort by a police officer on another person.

Immediate threat of the suspect to the officer/(s) or public
Level of resistance offered
The severity of the crime.

Force intentionally applied in excess of what is reasonably necessary, or in circumstances where there is no justification for its use, is an excessive application of force.

Examples of de-escalation techniques include but are not limited to:

Utilizing verbal skills and providing a warning prior to the use of force.
Determining whether the officer may be able to stabilize the situation through the:
- use of time, distance, or positioning to isolate and contain a subject,
- request of additional personnel to respond or make use of specialized units or equipment and alternate resources including crisis-intervention team trained officers.

In the discharge of their duties an officer may encounter a dynamic situation requiring immediate action where time does not allow for the de-escalation techniques listed above.

1.003 Use of Firearms in the Line of Duty
An officer shall be authorized to discharge firearms in the line of duty under the following conditions:

To use their firearm to protect themselves or others from what they reasonably believe to be an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.
To use their firearm to affect the capture or prevent the escape of a felony suspect whose freedom is reasonably believed to represent a significant threat of serious bodily injury or death to the officer or other persons.
During firearms training sessions as directed by the firearms instructors.
To shoot an animal as outlined in Treatment of Animals.
An officer shall not discharge firearms:
As a warning
When the discharge of the weapon may unreasonably endanger the lives of persons not involved in the commission of the crime in progress.

OPA Use of Force Report - Andrews, 1/3/2023

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

DATE OF INCIDENT: 01/03/2023
INVOLVED PERSON: Harry Chester Andrews
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Sgt. Kirk Rush
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER/WITNESS: Ofc. Andrew Morlock
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER/WITNESS: Ofc. Justin Bromgard
OPA: 23-0002
OIA: 23-0001
DATE OF REPORT: 04/10/2024

CASE SYNOPSIS

On January 3, 2023, BPD Sgt. Rush responded to a dispatched call of a man walking in the westbound traffic lanes of I-184 east of the “Flying Wye.” A second dispatched call reported the man walking on the right shoulder of the “Flying Wye.” Sgt. Rush located and contacted the man walking on the shoulder.

The man, later identified as Harry Chester Andrews, immediately drew a knife and charged towards Sgt. Rush. Sgt. Rush used his duty handgun to fire at Mr. Andrews, striking him twice. Upon being shot, Mr. Andrews dropped his knife and fell to the ground.

This occurred as BPD Officers Morlock and Bromgard were arriving at the scene. Both officers observed the incident. Officers Morlock and Bromgard took Mr. Andrews into custody and provided him with medical aid. Mr. Andrews survived his injuries.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On January 3, 2023, at approximately 9:45 am, BPD Sgt. Rush responded to a dispatched call reporting a man walking in the westbound traffic lanes of I-184 east of the “Flying Wye.” A second 911 call reported the man walking on the shoulder of the “Flying Wye.”

Sgt. Rush located the man in the shoulder of I-184, later identified as Harry Chester Andrews. Sgt. Rush activated his emergency lights, blocked the third (outside) traffic lane and exited his patrol vehicle. Sgt. Rush was wearing full police uniform and was equipped with an on-body video camera. The camera was operating and captured the incident.

As Sgt. Rush exited his patrol vehicle to approach Mr. Andrews, he called out to Mr. Andrews in a friendly manner: “Hey brother.” Mr. Andrews, who was facing away from the officer, looked over his shoulder towards Sgt. Rush and then reached into the pocket of his hoodie with his left hand. This gesture is visible in the on-body video footage. Because Sgt. Rush believed that Mr. Andrews might be reaching for a handgun, Sgt. Rush drew his handgun but kept it down out of Mr. Andrews’ sight. Sgt. Rush then stated: “Hands up.”

Mr. Andrews turned towards Sgt. Rush and put both hands in the air above his head. The on-body video shows that, upon turning, Mr. Andrews had a knife in his left hand, blade pointed up. Sgt. Rush evidently did not see the knife at this point, because Sgt. Rush said, “You’re alright. Come here.” Mr. Andrews then put both hands in front of his chest and switched the knife to his right hand. While holding the knife in an ice pick style grip above his shoulder, with the blade oriented towards the officer, Mr. Andrews advanced towards Sgt. Rush.

Sgt. Rush then saw the knife, moved backwards several steps, pointed his handgun towards Mr. Andrews and said: “Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa, drop it now.” Mr. Andrews then squatted down and rolled backward onto his buttocks and back before immediately beginning to stand up. Sgt. Rush commanded, “on the ground now, on the ground.” As Mr. Andrews came to a standing position, he was still holding the knife in an icepick grip raised above shoulder level. The knife blade was oriented towards Sgt. Rush who was approximately 15-20 feet away. Sgt. Rush then told Mr. Andrews, “On the ground or I will shoot you.” Mr. Andrews then took approximately two steps forward towards Sgt. Rush. Sgt. Rush then fired two shots at Mr. Andrews, striking him in the wrist and shoulder. Mr. Andrews dropped the knife and fell backwards to the ground.

BPD Officers Morlock and Bromgard arrived at the scene as the incident unfolded. Both officers observed Mr. Andrews’ actions and were moving up to assist Sgt. Rush as the shooting occurred. After the shooting, Officers Morlock and Bromgard took Mr. Andrews into custody and provided him with medical aid. As they were taking him into custody, Ofc. Bromgard asked Mr. Andrews his name. Mr. Andrews answered, “Kill you. I wanted to kill you.”

BPD Cpl. Kane arrived after the incident and assisted the emergency medical personnel treating Mr. Andrews. Cpl. Kane asked Mr. Andrews his name. Mr. Andrews said, “My name’s kill you.” Cpl. Kane asked, “What is it?” Mr. Andrews answered, “My name’s wanting to kill you.”

Mr. Andrews survived his injuries. He was later convicted of Assault and Battery on Certain Personnel (Police Officer).

The entire incident, from Sgt. Rush’s initial contact with Mr. Andrews until the shooting occurred, took place within approximately 16 seconds.

The ensuing Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) investigation determined that Mr. Andrews had been released from the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC)approximately 4 months prior to the shooting incident. Mr. Andrews had served an 11-year sentence after being convicted of Assault with Intent to Murder for attacking a family member with an axe in Custer County, Idaho. It was reported to law enforcement in the Custer County case that Mr. Andrews had a history of aggressive behavior towards others and mental illness. While incarcerated, Mr. Andrews was convicted of 2 separate felony assaults on Idaho Department of Correction Officers, which added 7 years to his original 11-year sentence. Because Mr. Andrews completed the full term of his sentences (18 years), he was not released on parole or probation.

When Mr. Andrews was released from custody, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare Mobile Crisis Unit and the Boise Police Department Crisis Intervention Team attempted to locate Mr. Andrews to offer him services. After these teams were unable to locate him, the Ada County Sheriff’s Department Crime Analysis Unit issued an Officer Awareness bulletin to advise area law enforcement agencies that Mr. Andrews had been released from custody. The bulletin also advised of Mr. Andrews’ criminal history, history of mental illness, and that Mr. Andrews had refused pre-release planning, services, and housing assistance from IDOC.

When Sgt. Rush initially contacted Mr. Andrews, he did not know Mr. Andrews’ identity or that he was the subject of the previously issued Officer Awareness bulletin.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

A. 1.001 USE OF FORCE/AUTHORIZATION
The legal standard for use of force generally by officers.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

A. CRITICAL INCIDENT TASK FORCE FINDINGS:
After the shooting incident, the Ada County Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) was activated, led by the Ada County Sheriff’s Department. The CITF conducted a forensic investigation of the scene, interviewed witnesses, interviewed the involved officers, collected dispatch records and audio/video evidence, and produced numerous reports. The investigation was detailed and thorough. The Gem County Prosecuting Attorney reviewed the CITF investigation and determined that Sgt. Rush’s actions were justified under Idaho law.

A. BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT FINDINGS:
BPD conducted an administrative review of this critical incident, which included reviewing the CITF investigation in its entirety and administrative interviews with each involved officer. BPD’s administrative review concluded that Sgt. Rush was faced with an immediate threat to his life and that his use of lethal force in response to that immediate threat did not violate applicable law or BPD policy. BPD noted positive performance by each officer present and had no additional training recommendations for the individual officers involved based upon this incident.

BPD recommended that department wide in-service training continue to emphasize:

Contact and cover principles when contacting suspects.
Pre-planning and designating roles when contacting suspects.
Incident management training for supervisors.

C. OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FINDINGS:
OPA agrees that Sgt. Rush was justified in using deadly force against Mr. Andrews. OPA also concurs with BPD’s training recommendations.

When Sgt. Rush initially contacted Mr. Andrews, Andrews immediately reached into his pocket and drew a knife. He advanced towards Sgt. Rush holding the knife in an ice pick style grip, raised above his shoulders, with the blade oriented towards Sgt. Rush.

Upon seeing the knife, Sgt. Rush backed up several steps towards the rear of his patrol vehicle. Sgt. Rush gave numerous commands instructing Mr. Andrews to stop advancing and drop the knife.

Mr. Andrews then sat down and rolled onto his back just in front of the patrol car, facing Sgt. Rush at approximately 15-20 feet away. He did not comply with Sgt. Rush’s command to drop the knife. He continued to hold the knife with the blade oriented towards Sgt. Rush. Mr. Andrews then immediately stood up, ignoring Sgt. Rush’s commands to get “on the ground or I will shoot you.” Sgt. Rush fired his weapon when Mr. Andrews took approximately 2 steps additional steps towards him, still holding the knife above shoulder height with the blade pointed towards Sgt. Rush.

When interacting with Mr. Andrews, Sgt. Rush knew that his patrol car was parked blocking the third (outside) traffic lane. Sgt. Rush’s back was towards oncoming freeway traffic traveling in the first and second lanes. Sgt. Rush was aware that if he continued to move backwards, he could be struck by oncoming traffic. Sgt. Rush was aware that Mr. Andrews could easily move into freeway traffic lanes causing a crash and potentially injuring or killing members of the public.

Sgt. Rush was aware that his patrol car was unlocked and had a patrol rifle inside. He knew that if he backed away any further and Mr. Andrews advanced only a few feet, he may not be able to prevent Mr. Andrews from getting into the patrol car, stealing it, and/or accessing the rifle.

Given these circumstances and his proximity to the imminent and lethal threat of being stabbed with a knife, it was reasonable for Sgt. Rush to conclude that it was necessary to use deadly force against Mr. Andrews in self-defense and defense of others.

Immediately after the shooting, officers rendered medical aid to Mr. Andrews at the scene. He was quickly transported to the hospital by medical personnel. During this process, Mr. Andrews made statements evidencing his intent to kill the officers.

Given the speed at which the incident developed, the officers had no time to consider using less lethal force options, such as a taser or pepper spray.

OPA notes that in on-body video footage, events typically appear further away than they are due to the camera perspective. In this case, the distance between Sgt. Rush and Mr. Andrews when Sgt. Rush fired his weapon is approximately 15-20 feet based on the length of the patrol car and other indications from scene photography.

Based on the OPA review and analysis of the facts and circumstances of this case, OPA concurs with the CITF and BPD investigations that Sgt. Rush’s actions were reasonable and necessary when faced with an imminent threat of being stabbed with the knife by Mr. Andrews. Sgt. Rush’s actions were consistent with BPD policy and complied with the applicable legal standard for use of force by law enforcement officers.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Several factors contributed to this critical incident.

Mr. Andrews immediately pulled a knife on a police officer during a routine contact. Mr. Andrews failed to obey multiple commands to drop his knife and continued to move aggressively towards the officer while holding the knife in a threatening manner. He refused numerous opportunities to comply with the officer before deadly force was used against him.

Mr. Andrews repeatedly stated his intent to kill the officers immediately following the incident. His criminal history indicates a long-standing pattern of violent assaults directed towards others, including a member of his family and Idaho Department of Correction officers.

The CITF investigation revealed that Mr. Andrews has a history of violent and aggressive behavior and mental illness. While Mr. Andrews had access to programs and services while incarcerated and upon release, there is no indication that he accepted any assistance. It is unknown whether Mr. Andrews was experiencing a mental health crisis at the time of this incident. There was no indication at the time of the incident or information revealed during the investigation of substance abuse.

OPA recognizes the mitigation efforts used by BPD officers in the response to this incident. Officers quickly responded to a call of a person walking in the traffic lanes of a busy freeway. Sgt. Rush contacted Mr. Andrews in a courteous manner and attempted to engage him in conversation. When threatened with a knife, Sgt. Rush attempted to move away. When Mr. Andrews ignored commands to drop the knife and continued to advance, Sgt. Rush used the amount of force necessary to mitigate the risk posed by Mr. Andrews. The officers then rendered medical aid at the scene and enabled a prompt response by emergency medical personnel.

OPA will continue to track data on potential contributing factors for evaluation of community support and response and aggravating or mitigating efforts by officers to inform best policing practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OPA concurs with BPD’s training recommendations and makes no additional recommendations.

LINK TO DOCUMENTS

Us the link below to view the Critical Incident Task Force report, the officer body worn camera video, and BPD news releases. Documents are under “2023 Critical Incidents” and “January 3, 2023.”

REPORT PREPARED BY:

William R. Long, OPA Investigator
Nicole McKay, OPA Director

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT REFERENCED POLICIES

1.000 Use of Force

1.001 Use of Force/Authorization

Force is a deliberate and intentional application of effort by a police officer on another person.

A police officer shall never employ unnecessary force or violence and shall use only such force in the discharge of duty as is objectively reasonable in all circumstances.

Immediate threat of the suspect to the officer/(s) or public
Level of resistance offered
The severity of the crime.

Force intentionally applied in excess of what is reasonably necessary, or in circumstances where there is no justification for its use, is an excessive application of force.

Examples of de-escalation techniques include but are not limited to:

Utilizing verbal skills and providing a warning prior to the use of force.
Determining whether the officer may be able to stabilize the situation through the:

o use of time, distance, or positioning to isolate and contain a subject,

o request of additional personnel to respond or make use of specialized units or equipment and alternate resources including crisis-intervention team trained officers.

In the discharge of their duties an officer may encounter a dynamic situation requiring immediate action where time does not allow for the de-escalation techniques listed above.

…

1.003 Use of Firearms in the Line of Duty

An officer shall be authorized to discharge firearms in the line of duty under the following conditions:

To use their firearm to protect themselves or others from what they reasonably believes to be an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury.
To use their firearm to affect the capture or prevent the escape of a felony suspect whose freedom is reasonably believed to represent a significant threat of serious bodily injury or death to the officer or other persons.
During firearms training sessions as directed by the firearms instructors.
To shoot an animal as outlined in Treatment of Animals.

An officer shall not discharge firearms:

As a warning
When the discharge of the weapon may unreasonably endanger the lives of persons not involved in the commission of the crime in progress.

[1] This policy manual has been updated effective April 1, 2024, See www.cityofboise.org/media/16346/bpd-policy-manual-4124.pdf. The referenced policies in effect at the time of this incident are attached to this report.

2022

OPA Use of Force Report - Waste, 11/21/2022

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

DATE OF INCIDENT: 11-21-22
INVOLVED PERSON: Jeremy Brian Waste
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Cpl. Kip Paporello
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER/WITNESS: Cpl. Robert Gibson
OPA: 022-0106
OIA: 022-0280
DATE OF REPORT: 03-14-24

CASE SYNOPSIS

On November 21, 2022, Boise Police Department (BPD) officers were conducting a surveillance operation to apprehend Jeremy Waste, who had been charged with Aggravated Battery in the stabbing of a family member three days earlier. He was also a suspect in an attempted bank robbery. BPD Cpl. Paporello saw Mr. Waste riding a bicycle through an apartment complex and attempted to arrest him. Mr. Waste fled from Cpl. Paporello on his bicycle. Cpl. Paporello pursued him on foot.

Mr. Waste rode a short distance downhill from the apartment complex to a bike path where he crashed his bicycle in the snow. There he encountered BPD Cpl. Gibson who was assisting in the search. Cpl. Gibson approached Mr. Waste and gave him verbal commands to surrender. Mr. Waste aggressively charged at Cpl. Gibson. Cpl. Gibson ran back to his patrol vehicle and used it as a barrier between himself and Mr. Waste. Mr. Waste drew a knife from his coat pocket as he pursued Cpl. Gibson.

Cpl. Paporello arrived and observed Mr. Waste pursuing Cpl. Gibson. Both officers saw that Mr. Waste was armed with a knife. Mr. Waste then turned towards Cpl. Paporello with the knife. Cpl. Paporello fired two times with his service pistol striking Waste. Mr. Waste fell to the ground and dropped the knife. Officers provided medical aid to Mr. Waste, and he survived his injuries.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On November 18, 2022, BPD responded to a 911 call reporting that Jeremy Waste had stabbed a family member at a residence in east Boise. Responding officers found the victim had multiple stab wounds and lacerations to the head and neck. The victim and an eyewitness reported that Mr. Waste had committed the battery. Officers
investigated the incident and made unsuccessful efforts to locate and arrest Mr. Waste.

Individuals known to Mr. Waste reported to investigators that Mr. Waste has a history of mental illness and that his mental health had been deteriorating for several weeks prior to the stabbing. They also reported that he had access to firearms. It was also alleged that in a previous incident Mr. Waste had pointed a rifle from a concealed location at Garden City Police officers when they were on a call near his residence. The Garden City officers were not aware this had happened until BPD learned of it during their investigation into the stabbing incident on November 18.

On November 21, 2022, at 8:59 am, employees at Washington Federal Bank on S. Federal Way in Boise called 911 and reported an apparent robbery attempt. As they were about to open the doors for business, a man wearing a ski mask and carrying a bag ran up and violently pulled on the doors attempting to enter. After noticing employees watching him through the glass doors, the man fled in a van that had distinctive markings. Mr. Waste was quickly identified as a suspect in the robbery attempt when police linked him to the getaway van.

Based on the ongoing investigation, BPD became concerned about Mr. Waste’s escalating violent behavior, reported access to firearms, and reported deteriorating mental health.

On November 21, 2022, at approximately 2 pm, BPD began an organized effort involving multiple uniformed and plain clothes officers to locate and arrest Mr. Waste, focusing on the east Boise area where Mr. Waste was known to frequent. He had been charged with Aggravated Battery as a result of the stabbing incident and an arrest warrant had been issued.

At approximately 5:30 pm, Cpl. Paporello, working in plain clothes, saw Mr. Waste riding a bicycle through the parking lot of an apartment complex near the 2500 Block of Red Cedar Lane. Cpl. Paporello notified other officers by radio and then attempted to arrest Mr. Waste. Cpl. Paporello identified himself as a police officer and ordered Mr. Waste to “get on the ground.” Mr. Waste immediately fled downhill on his bicycle towards a bike path behind the apartment complex. Cpl. Paporello chased him on foot.

Cpl. Paporello was working in plain clothes as a neighborhood contact officer (NCO) and was not wearing his police equipment carrier vest when he encountered Mr. Waste. Cpl. Paporello’s police badge was visible in a case hanging around his neck. Because his on-body video camera was mounted on his equipment carrier, this initial contact with Mr. Waste at the apartment complex was not recorded on police video. When Cpl. Paporello attempted to arrest Mr. Waste, he threw his radio at Mr. Waste to distract him from fleeing.

Cpl. Gibson, working in full police uniform and driving a marked patrol vehicle, was on the bike path below the apartment complex. He saw Mr. Waste fleeing down the hill towards the path and ran towards Mr. Waste. Cpl. Gibson was wearing an on-body video camera that captured this and the remainder of the incident.

Cpl. Gibson saw Mr. Waste cross the path and crash his bicycle in the snow. Cpl. Gibson ran toward Mr. Waste and shouted, “Stop, police!” Mr. Waste then left his bicycle and aggressively ran towards Cpl. Gibson while shouting at him “I want to get shot I want to go to heaven”. Cpl. Gibson saw Mr. Waste reach into his coat pocket and remove an object that he could not initially identify. Cpl. Gibson turned and ran back to his patrol vehicle, using it as a barrier between himself and Mr. Waste. Cpl. Gibson ran around his patrol vehicle two times as he was being pursued by Mr. Waste. Cpl. Gibson gave Mr. Waste four separate commands to, “Let me see your hands” as Mr. Waste chased after him. During this time Cpl. Gibson saw that the object in Mr. Waste’s right hand was a knife.

Cpl. Paporello ran down the hill to assist Cpl. Gibson. Cpl. Paporello saw Mr. Waste chasing Cpl. Gibson around the patrol car. Cpl. Paporello observed that Mr. Waste appeared to have an object in his hand. He yelled to Cpl. Gibson, “Does he have a knife?” Cpl. Gibson responded, “Yes, get down here.” Cpl. Paporello ran closer and stopped on a steep slope that was covered with snow, approximately 21 feet uphill from Mr. Waste. Mr. Waste then changed direction and began to run toward Cpl. Paporello with the knife in his hand. Cpl. Paporello fired two shots from his service pistol, striking Mr. Waste. Mr. Waste fell to ground, still holding the knife. He dropped the knife after the officers gave him additional commands. Other officers arrived within moments and gave medical aid to Mr. Waste. He was later transported to the hospital where he was treated for a gunshot to the upper left shoulder and a grazing wound to the hip. Mr. Waste survived his injuries. Mr. Waste was charged and convicted with Assaulting an Officer with a Deadly Weapon. He was also convicted of Aggravated Battery in the stabbing of his family member.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Boise City Code Title 2 Chapter 10 defines the authority and duties of the Office of Police Accountability (OPA). As the City’s police oversight entity, the OPA is authorized to investigate and evaluate the conduct of police officers involved in critical incidents. Critical incidents include the use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission. OPA is also authorized to make BPD policy, procedure, practice, and training recommendations to the Mayor, the City Council, and the Chief of Police.

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

A. 1.001 USE OF FORCE/AUTHORIZATION
The legal standard for use of force generally by officers.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

A. CRITICAL INCIDENT TASK FORCE FINDINGS:
After the shooting incident, the Ada County Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) was activated, led by the Meridian Police Department. The CITF conducted a forensic investigation of the scene, interviewed witnesses, interviewed the involved officers, collected dispatch records and audio/video evidence, and produced numerous reports. The Twin Falls County Prosecuting Attorney reviewed the investigation and determined the officer’s actions were justified under Idaho law.

B. BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT FINDINGS:
BPD conducted an administrative review of this critical incident, which included reviewing the CITF investigation in its entirety, an administrative interview with both officers, a review of all applicable training, equipment, and tactical standards, and made the following findings and recommendations:

1. Policy Findings:
Cpl. Paporello was faced with an immediate threat to his life as well as to the life and safety of Cpl. Gibson and that Cp. Paporello’s use of lethal force in response to that immediate threat did not violate applicable law or policy.

2. Tactical Findings:

a. Cpl. Paporello was working in a plain clothes assignment when he attempted to stop a wanted, violent suspect by himself. He was at a disadvantage because he did not utilize or was not provided with all necessary equipment, including a car mounted radio, body armor, less lethal use-of-force options, on-body video, and other equipment while in a plain clothes role.

b. Cpl. Paporello threw his handheld radio at Mr. Waste in an effort to distract him as he was attempting to take him into custody prior to the foot chase. BPD recommended that Cpl. Paporello have refresher training regarding strike techniques.

c. Supervisors should be present during enforcement operations. Supervisors should develop and manage an operational plan, and ensure all officers understand the plan and their role.

3. Equipment Findings:

a. All NCO and unmarked vehicles used in covert operations should be equipped with car mounted radios. This will allow officers to maintain their handheld mobile radio on their person for hands-free use, including when exiting the vehicle quickly.

b. All NCOs working in a plain clothes capacity should be provided with and utilize body armor/carriers appropriate for their assignment. They should also be provided with and utilize carriers/pouches to enable them to carry all necessary equipment while in a plain clothes role.

c. All NCOs and detectives working in a plain clothes capacity should possess and carry standardized minimum equipment on their person when in contact with the public to enable officer safety, communications, and taking suspects into custody.

d. All NCO officers should wear tactical or raid vests with clear police markings and containing all necessary equipment when there is a possibility of enforcement action.

4. Training Findings:
The NCO Unit should preform team training on a quarterly basis. The training should include supervisor command and control, operational planning and best practices, open air arrests, plain clothes firearm use, vehicle and foot surveillance techniques, less lethal and de-escalation techniques, high risk vehicle stops and apprehension, and other topics deemed necessary by NCO command. Incident management training for supervisors should be implemented. Trainings must be conducted quarterly by POST certified instructors using prepared lesson plans and recorded attendance.

C. OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FINDINGS:
Cpl. Paporello and Cpl. Gibson handled the situation in a professional and effective manner.

BPD officers recognized the threat to the public posed by Mr. Waste’s escalating violent behavior, possible access to firearms, and deteriorating mental health. BPD initiated a multi-officer organized effort to locate and take Mr. Waste into custody on an outstanding arrest warrant for a violent felony.

Cpl. Paporello saw Mr. Waste and recognized him as the wanted person they were seeking to arrest. Cpl. Paporello attempted to take him into custody. Cpl. Paporello identified himself as a police officer and gave commands for Mr. Waste to get on the ground. When Mr. Waste fled on a bicycle, Cpl. Paporello chased him on foot.

Cpl. Gibson saw Mr. Waste crash his bicycle while fleeing from Cpl. Paporello. Cpl. Gibson identified himself as a police officer and gave clear commands for Mr. Waste to stop and to show his hands. Mr. Waste aggressively ran towards Cpl. Gibson, who attempted to de-escalate the situation by running over 70 feet back to his patrol car. He used the car as a barrier between himself and Mr. Waste to gain time and to assess whether Mr. Waste was armed with a weapon. Mr. Waste continued to pursue Cpl. Gibson and chased him around the car two times. During this time Cpl. Gibson saw that Mr. Waste was armed with a knife. He informed Cpl. Paporello that Mr. Waste was armed with a knife.

While moving to assist Cpl. Gibson, Cpl. Paporello stopped on a steep slope approximately 21 feet from Mr. Waste. Mr. Waste turned towards Cpl. Paporello with the knife. Given the steep slope, wet, icy footing, and his proximity to a lethal threat, it was not reasonable for Cpl. Paporello to move backwards up the slope where he might lose his footing and fall while being pursued. The time elapsed from when Mr. Waste began running toward Cpl. Gibson until the shots were fired by Cpl. Paporello was eighteen seconds.

Mr. Waste presented an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury to Cpl. Gibson when he pulled a knife and aggressively pursued him. Mr. Waste presented an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury to Cpl. Paporello when he turned on him with a knife at a close distance. Cpl. Paporello correctly assessed that it was reasonable and necessary to use lethal force (firearm) against Mr. Waste in self-defense and in defense of Cpl. Gibson.

Cpl. Paporello ceased firing at Mr. Waste as soon as Mr. Waste fell to the ground, dropped his knife, and no longer presented a lethal threat to the officers.

As soon as practicable after the shooting, medical equipment was retrieved from a police vehicle and the officers rendered aid to control bleeding from Mr. Waste’s gunshot wound.

Given the imminent nature of the threat of being stabbed, less lethal force options, such as a taser or pepper spray, were not appropriate or reasonable for the officers to use in this situation.

Based on the OPA review and analysis of the facts and circumstances of this case, OPA concurs with the CITF and BPD investigations that Cpl. Paporello’s actions in shooting Mr. Waste were reasonable and necessary when officers faced an imminent threat of being stabbed or assaulted with a knife. Cpl. Paporello’s actions were consistent with BPD policy and complied with the applicable legal standard for use of force by law enforcement officers.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Two factors directly contributed to this critical incident: Mr. Waste’s aggressive pursuit of an officer, and Mr. Waste’s threatened use of a knife against two law enforcement officers. Indirect contributing factors include Mr. Waste’s escalating violent behavior towards family members and the public, as well as his stated desire to be shot by the officers. It is unknown whether the escalating aggressive behavior was a result of the reported mental health crisis or other unknown factors. There is no indication in the investigation of substance abuse contributing to this incident.

Cpl. Paporello attempted to mitigate the potential risks associated with the arrest of Mr. Waste. He attempted to take Mr. Waste into custody without using force. He approached Mr. Waste, identified himself, and gave commands to get on the ground. Instead of complying with commands, Mr. Waste fled. Cpl. Gibson also attempted to arrest Mr. Waste without using force. Cpl. Gibson gave Mr. Waste a command to stop and several commands to show his hands. Instead of complying, Mr. Waste responded aggressively by running toward the officer while shouting. Cpl. Gibson attempted to de-escalate the situation by running back to his patrol car and using it as a barrier between himself and Mr. Waste. He continued to move around the vehicle and attempt to mitigate the threat posed by Mr. Waste pursuing him. After the shooting, officers slowed down their actions, calmly talked to Mr. Waste about his injuries, and implemented an effective apprehension plan. BPD officers assessed Mr. Waste’s wounds and rendered medical aid at the scene as soon as it was feasible.

OPA will continue to track data on potential contributing factors for evaluation of community support and response and aggravating or mitigating efforts by officers to inform best community policing practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OPA finds the CITF and BPD investigations and findings to be thorough, objective, and fair.

OPA recognizes that officers are often called upon to make split-second decisions, weighing the risks and benefits of either acting immediately or waiting to act until more ideal circumstances are present. Based on the information available to OPA, it appears that Cpl. Paporello assessed that he needed to act immediately to prevent Mr. Waste from escaping. In making this decision, Cpl. Paporello had to consider several factors. He knew that Mr. Waste was wanted for a recent violent felony and that his violent behavior was escalating. Mr. Waste had a bicycle and was readily mobile when Cpl. Paporello spotted him at a close distance from his position. At least two officers were nearby. Those officers were in positions to potentially block Mr. Wastes’ escape if he fled from Cpl. Paporello. If Cpl. Paporello called those officers to his location, they might lose the blocking positions that were in place. If he took time to don his tactical vest containing additional equipment, he might lose the element of surprise that he had at that moment. Given these circumstances, Cpl. Paporello decided to attempt to apprehend Mr. Waste alone and without his tactical vest containing additional equipment. While Cpl. Paporello’s decisive action was reasonable under the circumstances, it is noted that it created additional risk to officer safety. After-action analysis of such events presents the opportunity to mitigate those risks and identify best practices through additional training, refining unit protocols, and procuring equipment specifically suited for the NCO unit’s mission.

OPA concurs with BPD’s recommendations for specific additional training and equipment to enhance operations, public, and officer safety. OPA recommends that NCO unit training include scenario-based training incorporating reasonably foreseeable situational contingencies and post-scenario de-briefs to help identify team best practices and protocols.

LINK TO DOCUMENTS

Use the link below to view BPD news releases and the officer body worn camera video. Documents are under “2022 Critical Incidents,” “November 18, 2022 – 2000 block of E. Red Cedar Way”. While Critical Incident Task Force reports are now posted for all critical incidents occurring after January 1, 2023, this 2022 critical incident report is not posted but is available upon public records request to BPD.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

William R. Long, OPA Investigator
Nicole McKay, OPA Director

OPA Use of Force Report - Cottrell, 6/9/2022

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

DATE OF INCIDENT: 06/09/22
INVOLVED PERSON: Jake Joseph Cottrell
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Sgt. Kirk Rush
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Cpl. Brek Orton
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Ofc. Connor Burch
OPA: 23-0065
OIA: 23-0132
DATE OF REPORT: 03/14/24

CASE SYNOPSIS

On June 9, 2022, Idaho Department of Corrections Parole and Probation Officers conducted a residence check in Boise on Jake Joseph Cottrell, who was on felony parole. During the residence check, Mr. Cottrell produced a handgun and fired at one of the Parole Officers. Mr. Cottrell then fled on foot and stole a car from a nearby house. Shortly afterward, he abandoned the car and stole a truck from its owner at gunpoint.

Multiple BPD officers responded and located Mr. Cottrell in the stolen truck. During the ensuing pursuit, Mr. Cottrell reached speeds of over 80 miles per hour while driving recklessly to evade apprehension.

BPD Cpl. Orton performed a Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT) maneuver on the stolen truck, which caused it to spin out and stop. Mr. Cottrell then used 3 different handguns to fire multiple shots at officers who were blocking his escape.

BPD officers Sgt. Rush, Cpl. Orton, and Ofc. Burch, along with two Meridian Police Department officers, fired their weapons at Mr. Cottrell striking him several times. Mr. Cottrell fell from the truck onto the street where he was taken into custody. Officers provided medical aid to Mr. Cottrell at the scene. He survived his injuries.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On June 9, 2022, at approximately 1:20 pm, two Idaho Department of Corrections Parole and Probation officers conducted a residence check in Boise on Mr. Cottrell, who was on felony parole. The parole officers had received information that Mr. Cottrell had been evicted from his residence for non-payment of rent but had refused to vacate. He had also missed a scheduled office visit with his parole officer. During the residence check, Mr. Cottrell produced a handgun from his pocket and fired at least one round at a parole officer. He ran to a nearby house where he stole a car.

The car’s hood was up and its engine running while the owner showed it to a prospective buyer. Mr. Cottrell fled in the stolen car with the hood still open. Approximately 4 minutes later, he used the car to block the path of a Dodge truck that was pulling a trailer near the intersection of E. Lone Cove Drive and E Riverside Drive in Eagle. After stopping the truck, Mr. Cottrell pointed a pistol at the driver and forced him out. Mr. Cottrell stole the truck, abandoning the trailer nearby. The driver of the truck called 911 and reported the incident. The driver also reported that two handguns and two rifles were in the truck when Mr. Cottrell stole it. Dispatch informed responding officers that Mr. Cottrell was now in possession of additional firearms.

BPD officers located Mr. Cottrell in the stolen truck on S. Eagle Road near Island Woods Drive and a pursuit ensued. During the pursuit Mr. Cottrell reached speeds of over 80 mph, ran red lights, drove over medians, curbs, and into oncoming traffic. The responding officers included Sgt. Rush, Cpl. Orton, and Ofc. Burch, who were each in marked police cars and wearing full police uniform. Their on-body video cameras were activated and captured the incident.

At the intersection of W. Broadway Ave and NW 1st St in Meridian, Cpl. Orton performed a Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT) maneuver on the stolen truck which caused it to spin out and stop. When the truck came to rest, Cpl. Orton’s patrol car was positioned behind the truck. Within seconds, Sgt. Rush and Ofc. Burch arrived. Their patrol cars were positioned in front of the truck facing towards it.

Cpl. Orton exited his patrol car and moved to his left to avoid potential crossfire from the officers positioned in front of the truck. As Cpl. Orton exited his car, the driver’s side door of the truck was opening. Mr. Cottrell was seated in the truck and had a handgun in his hands. Cpl. Orton gave commands for Mr. Cottrell to drop his gun. At nearly the same time Sgt. Rush and Ofc. Burch were exiting their patrol cars, drawing their weapons, and using their car doors as cover.

A review of Cpl. Orton’s on-body video shows Mr. Cottrell fired at the officers from inside the truck. Cpl. Orton, Sgt. Rush, Ofc. Burch, and two Meridian officers each fired several rounds at Mr. Cottrell striking him multiple times. Mr. Cottrell fell out of the driver’s side of the truck onto the street. He dropped two pistols to the ground as he fell. Officers stopped firing when Mr. Cottrell dropped his weapons and no longer presented an imminent threat to the officers.

Officers then took Mr. Cottrell into custody and provided medical aid at the scene to control his bleeding. Mr. Cottrell survived his injuries and was later convicted of Assault and Battery on Certain Personnel (Police Officers) and Robbery.

A forensic scene investigation determined that Mr. Cottrell fired a total of 14 rounds from 3 different handguns at the officers. The entire incident, including the parole residence check, “carjacking,” vehicle pursuit, and shooting incident involving BPD, occurred within a 20-minute time frame.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

A. 1.001 USE OF FORCE/AUTHORIZATION
The legal standard for use of force generally by officers.

C. 4.001 VEHICLE PURSUITS
A vehicular pursuit is recognized as a valid law enforcement activity to attempt to
apprehend a fleeing subject, under limited circumstances.

D. 4.005 EXTREME MEASURES
The use of extreme measures will have prior authorization by the Incident Commander and is warranted only when other means of termination have failed or are impractical. The danger shall be clearly imminent, and the officer shall be able to articulate the suspect’s/driver’s actions are life threatening to another person.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

A. CRITICAL INCIDENT TASK FORCE FINDINGS:
After the shooting incident, the Ada County Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) was activated, led by the Garden City Police Department. The CITF conducted a forensic investigation of the scene, interviewed witnesses, interviewed the involved officers, collected dispatch records and audio/video evidence, and produced numerous reports. The investigation was detailed and thorough. The Owyhee County Prosecuting Attorney is reviewing the CITF investigation to determine whether the officer’s actions were justified under Idaho law. As of the date of this report, that review remains outstanding.

BPD recommended the following additional training be conducted for BPD generally:

Pursuit training that includes force-on-force scenarios at the conclusion of a pursuit.
Implementing the use of PPE (protective personal equipment – latex gloves) into scenario-based training to build the habit of officers using PPE following critical incidents to protect officers from bloodborne health risks.
Continue to emphasize pre-planning for contingencies, the use of custody teams, and supervisor led incident management during department-wide training.

C. OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FINDINGS:
OPA agrees that Sgt. Rush, Cpl. Orton, and Ofc. Burch were each justified in using deadly force against Mr. Cottrell.

At the time that the officers used deadly force against Mr. Cottrell, each officer knew that Mr. Cottrell had fired a weapon at a Parole Officer, stolen two cars (including one at gunpoint), and that he possessed multiple firearms. The officers knew that Mr. Cottrell was actively fleeing from officers, driving recklessly, and in a manner that was endangering the public. The officers knew that during a short span of time, Mr. Cottrell had engaged in a pattern of rapidly escalating violent actions towards officers and members of the public.

The officers knew that probable cause existed to arrest Mr. Cottrell for several felonies, including Aggravated Battery on Officers, Armed Robbery, Grand Theft, Eluding, as well as parole violations.

Cpl. Orton saw Mr. Cottrell point a pistol directly at him before he used deadly force against Mr. Cottrell. Ofc. Burch saw Mr. Cottrell shoot several rounds directly at him and other officers through the windshield of the stolen truck. Sgt. Rush saw Mr. Cottrell shoot at him and towards other officers. Sgt. Rush saw “pock marks” appearing in the windshield glass blowing out towards him which he knew meant that Mr. Cottrell was shooting at him from inside the truck.

It was reasonable for each officer to believe that by pointing a firearm and shooting at them, Mr. Cottrell presented an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury to them, other officers, and members of the public who were nearby or inside numerous homes that surrounded the scene. Each officer correctly assessed that it was reasonable and necessary to use deadly force against Mr. Cottrell in self-defense and defense of others in these circumstances.

As soon as practicable after the shooting, officers rendered medical aid to Mr. Cottrell at the scene. He had several wounds including severe bleeding from a gunshot to his leg. By quickly assessing this wound and properly applying a tourniquet, officers likely saved his life. He was quickly transported to the hospital by medical personnel.

Given the imminent nature of the threat of being shot, less lethal force options, such as a taser or pepper spray, were not appropriate or reasonable for the officers to use in this situation.

Based on the OPA review and analysis of the facts and circumstances of this case, OPA concurs with the CITF and BPD investigations that each officers’ actions were reasonable and necessary when officers faced an imminent threat of being shot with a handgun. Each officers’ actions were consistent with BPD policy and complied with the applicable legal standard for use of force by law enforcement officers.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Several factors contributed to this critical incident. First, Mr. Cottrell fired at least 15 shots from three different firearms at officers during two separate shooting incidents.
Second, Mr. Cottrell failed to cooperate during every interaction with officers. Mr. Cottrell had numerous opportunities to comply with officers before deadly force was used against him. Mr. Cottrell could have cooperated with Parole Officers rather than shooting at them and fleeing in a stolen car. He could have chosen not to point a firearm at and “carjack” an uninvolved civilian. At any point during the pursuit, he could have pulled over and surrendered. When forced to stop by officers, he could have complied with commands and been arrested without further incident.

Third, Mr. Cottrell demonstrated a pattern of escalating violence and imminent threats to the officers and the public. In a short span of time, Mr. Cottrell shot at a Parole Officer during a routine residence check, stole a neighbor’s car, “carjacked” a second vehicle, drove recklessly at high speeds in heavy traffic while attempting to elude officers, and shot numerous times at officers who finally interdicted his efforts to escape.

While Mr. Cottrell clearly exhibited escalating dangerous behavior, it is unknown whether this was solely attributable to a deeply engrained pattern of criminal thinking, or other additional unidentified factors. This investigation did not reveal any information linking this incident to acute substance use or a mental health crisis.

OPA recognizes the effective mitigation efforts by BPD officers in the response to this incident. Officers quickly assessed the risk that Mr. Cottrell presented to officers and the public at large. Officers effectively pursued and used a PIT maneuver to stop Mr. Cottrell at an opportune time and location. They used the amount of force necessary to mitigate the risk presented by Mr. Cottrell, then slowed down, rendered medical aid at the scene, and enabled a prompt response by emergency medical personnel.

OPA will continue to track data on potential contributing factors for evaluation of community support and response and aggravating or mitigating efforts by officers to inform best policing practices.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OPA concurs with BPD’s training recommendations and makes no additional recommendations.

LINK TO DOCUMENTS

Use the link below to view BPD news releases of this critical incident. Documents are under “2022 Critical Incidents” “June 9 2022.” Once the Owyhee County Prosecuting Attorney releases its review of this matter, the Critical Incident Review report and the officer body worn camera video will be linked to this incident.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

William R. Long, OPA Investigator
Nicole McKay, OPA Director

OPA Use of Force Report - Manee, 2/22/2022

USE OF FORCE INVESTIGATIVE REPORT

DATE OF INCIDENT: 02-22-22
INVOLVED PERSON: Jonathan Manee
INVOLVED BPD OFFICER: Corporal Evans
OPA: 022-0114
OIA: 022-0043
DATE OF REPORT: 01-08-24

CASE SYNOPSIS

On February 22, 2022, Boise Police Department (BPD) Cpl. Evans was assigned to respond to 911 calls for a stalled vehicle in traffic. Cpl. Evans arrived at the scene and observed a male driver (later identified as Jonathan Manee) out of the vehicle and in the roadway, attempting to talk to passing motorists. Observing Mr. Manee’s erratic behavior, Cpl. Evans amended the call to a crisis call. After numerous attempts by Cpl. Evans to verbally persuade Mr. Manee to move out of the lanes of traffic, Cpl. Evans engaged Mr. Manee in a handshake to pull Mr. Manee out of the traffic lane and towards Mr. Manee’s vehicle. Mr. Manee became agitated and physically aggressive, striking Cpl. Evans twice. Mr. Manee pulled a handgun from the pocket of his jacket and pointed it directly at Cpl. Evans. Cpl. Evans responded by firing two shots at Mr. Manee. On impact, Mr. Manee dropped his handgun and fell to the ground. Cpl. Evans called for assistance and provided medical aid to Mr. Manee, who survived his injuries.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On February 22, 2022, at approximately 9:50 a.m., BPD Officer Cpl. Evans was dispatched in response to 911 calls reporting a man standing in the intersection at Fairview and Liberty near a possible stalled vehicle. A 911 caller reported a man was walking in traffic, stopping vehicles, and saying, “to live is life.” One of the callers expressed concern that the man might be struck by a passing vehicle.

Cpl. Evans arrived at the call and activated his body worn video/audio camera. The camera functioned properly and recorded the incident. Cpl. Evans located the man, who was standing in a traffic lane next to his truck, which was parked in the turn lane.

Cpl. Evans asked the man if his vehicle was broken down or out of gas. The man responded in a manner that caused Cpl. Evans to question whether the man was experiencing a mental health crisis. Cpl. Evans used his radio to request dispatch change the classification of the call to a crisis call.

Cpl. Evans tried to persuade the man to move to the curb with him so that he would be out of the flow of traffic. Cpl. Evans offered to assist him with getting gasoline for his vehicle. The man became argumentative and did not comply with Cpl. Evans’s request to move out of traffic. Cpl. Evans then asked the man his name, who identified himself as Jonathan. Cpl. Evans introduced himself and shook hands with him, holding on to his hand to slowly pull him out of traffic while engaging him in conversation. Mr. Manee instantly became combative. Cpl. Evans let go of his hand and began moving backwards away from Mr. Manee. Mr. Manee stepped forward towards Cpl. Evans and punched him. As Cpl. Evans backed away, Mr. Manee reached into the pocket of his jacket and produced a handgun. Mr. Manee immediately took a shooting stance and pointed the handgun, later identified as a .22 caliber Ruger SR22 pistol, directly at Cpl. Evans from a distance of a few feet. Cpl. Evans drew his handgun and fired two shots at Mr. Manee.

One of the shots fired by Cpl. Evans struck Mr. Manee in the upper torso/clavicle area. Upon impact by Cpl. Evans’s gunfire, Mr. Manee fell to ground, and dropped his handgun, later determined to be fully loaded. The second shot fired by the Officer struck a vehicle that was passing through the intersection at the time of the shooting. No one was injured by that shot.

Cpl. Evans used his radio to report that shots had been fired and requested medical assistance for Mr. Manee. Within seconds BPD Officer Hilton arrived at the scene. Officers handcuffed Mr. Manee and provided medical aid until other officers and medical personnel arrived.

Mr. Manee survived his injuries. He was charged and convicted of assaulting Cpl. Evans with a firearm.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Boise City Code Title 2 Chapter 10 defines the authority and duties of the Office of Police Accountability (OPA). As the City’s police oversight entity, the OPA is authorized to investigate and evaluate the conduct of police officers involved in critical incidents. Critical incidents include the use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission. OPA is also authorized to make BPD policy, procedure, practice, and training recommendations to the Mayor, the City Council, and the Chief of Police.

BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT POLICY

A. 1.001 USE OF FORCE/AUTHORIZATION
The legal standard for use of force generally by officers.

INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS

A. CRITICAL INCIDENT TASK FORCE FINDINGS:
After the shooting incident, the Ada County Critical Incident Task Force (CITF) was activated. The CITF conducted a forensic investigation of the scene, interviewed multiple witnesses, interviewed the involved officer, collected dispatch records and audio/video evidence, and produced numerous reports. The investigation was detailed and thorough. The Gem County Prosecuting Attorney reviewed the investigation and determined the officer’s actions were justified under Idaho law.

B. BOISE POLICE DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS FINDINGS:
BPD Internal Affairs (IA) conducted an administrative review of this critical incident, which included reviewing the CITF investigation in its entirety and an administrative interview with Cpl. Evans. IA concluded Cpl. Evans was faced with an immediate threat to his life as well as the lives and safety of motorists and bystanders and that Cpl. Evans’ use of lethal force in response to that immediate threat did not violate applicable law or policy. This investigation was detailed and thorough.

C. OFFICE OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FINDINGS:
Evans handled the call in a professional manner. Cpl. Evans was respectful and calm as he offered solutions for Mr. Manee to move out of traffic and address the stalled vehicle. Mr. Manee refused reasonable requests to resolve a threat to his and the public’s safety and became agitated. Cpl. Evans continued to attempt to deescalate the situation by engaging Mr. Manee in dialogue. Despite these efforts, Mr. Manee became aggressive and moved forward towards Cpl. Evans as he attempted to back away.

Mr. Manee presented an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury to Cpl. Evans and civilians (who were behind the officer in traffic) when he pulled a fully loaded handgun from his pocket and pointed it directly at the Cpl. Evans at close range. Cpl. Evans correctly assessed that it was reasonable and necessary to use lethal force (firearm) against Mr. Manee in self-defense and in defense of others.

Cpl. Evans ceased firing at Mr. Manee as soon as Mr. Manee dropped his gun, fell to the ground, and no longer presented a lethal threat to Cpl. Evans and others.

Given the imminent nature of the threat of being shot, less-than-lethal force options, such as a taser or pepper spray, were not appropriate or reasonable for the officer to use in this situation.One of the shots fired by Cpl. Evans struck Mr. Manee in the upper torso/clavicle area. The second shot fired by Cpl. Evans struck a vehicle that was passing through the intersection at the time of the shooting. No one was injured by that shot.

Immediately after the shooting, medical equipment was retrieved from a police vehicle and the officers took measures to control bleeding from Mr. Manee’s gunshot wound.

Overall, Cpl. Evans responded commendably to an event that evolved rapidly from assistance for a stalled vehicle to a critical incident. Based on the OPA review and analysis of the facts and circumstances of this case, OPA concurs with the CITF and IA investigations that Cpl. Evan’s actions were reasonable and necessary when faced with an imminent threat of being shot with a firearm. The officer’s actions were consistent with BPD policy and complied with the applicable legal standard for use of force by law enforcement officers.

POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND MITIGATION EFFORTS

Several factors contributed to this critical incident. First and foremost is Mr. Manee’s threatened use of a firearm against a law enforcement officer. Second is Mr. Manee’s unwillingness to cooperate to mitigate the public safety hazards created by both Mr. Manee and his vehicle being in traffic. Third is Mr. Manee’s apparent altered thinking and observable irrational behavior. It is unknown whether his exhibited behavior was attributable to a mental health crisis, substance abuse, an unidentified factor, or a combination of these factors.

While Mr. Manee had been involved in several incidents since 2018, there is no local record of Mr. Manee having any prior confrontations with law enforcement officers. Mr. Manee has no record of serious criminal offenses and was not on probation or parole.

Mitigation efforts by Cpl. Evans include the employment of community policing best practices. Cpl. Evans approached Mr. Manee in a respectful and calm manner, offered personal and vehicle assistance, recognized Mr. Manee’s irrational state of mind, and continually worked to de-escalate the situation. Cpl. Evans also rendered medial aid when safe to do so, while continuing to converse with Mr. Manee.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OPA has no recommendations for training, policy, or procedure for BPD based on this critical incident. However, OPA will continue to track data on potential contributing factors for evaluation of community support and response and aggravating or mitigating efforts by officers to inform best community policing practices.

LINK TO DOCUMENTS

Use the link below to view BPD news releases, officer body worn camera video, and Critical Incident Task Force reports. Documents are under “2022 Critical Incidents” “February 22, 2022 – Fairview Ave. and Liberty St.”. When the Critical Incident Task Force Report and reviewing Prosecuting Attorney review reports are posted, links will be provided.

This manual has since been updated but no substantive changes have been made to the referenced policies, See BPD Legacy Manual pages 28 and 29 and Updated Manual pages 160 and 161.

REPORT PREPARED BY:

William R. Long, OPA Investigator
Nicole McKay, OPA Director

2021

OPA Use of Force Report - Snow, 10/27/2021

OPA Use of Force Report - Snow

CASE REVIEW
OPO21-0042
OIA21-0363
MAY 2022

Prepared by: John Meyer, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Fall of 2021

During the afternoon in the late Fall of 2021, several Boise Police Officers (herein referred to as BPD) were attempting to locate an adult male subject who had an arrest warrant and was believed to be suicidal. Based on the information BPD had received, the male subject was allegedly looking to jump off a building or overpass. BPD officers were looking for the male to conduct a welfare check and take him into custody for the warrant. Additional information received ultimately led BPD officers to a location downtown where they found the subject seated behind a building. As BPD officers approached the subject and attempted to have a dialogue with him, the subject immediately stood up and began backing away from them while reaching behind his back around his waistband. BPD officers identified themselves and gave the subject commands to show his hands. However, the subject did not comply. While facing one of the officers, the subject quickly presented himself in a shooting stance with a dark object in his right hand outstretched in the direction of one of the officers. Two BPD officers reacted to this threat and discharged their weapons, striking the subject with gunfire. BPD officers and responding paramedics performed lifesaving efforts on the subject who was transported to the hospital by ambulance. The subject ultimately succumbed to his injuries at the hospital.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

Boise City Code defines the authority and duties of the Office of Police Accountability (OPA). It grants the Office the authority to investigate and evaluate the performance of Officers whenever certain criteria are met.

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

If a BPD Officer or employee is involved in a critical incident, defined below, as a principal, victim, witness or custodial Officer, BPD shall immediately notify the Office of Police Accountability. The Director may provide on-scene monitoring of critical incidents and may act as a real-time observer to any criminal, administrative, or civil investigation conducted by or on behalf of BPD (e.g., the Critical Incident Task Force). The Director shall be given full access to observe interviews or any other aspects of the investigation. If the Director believes additional investigation is necessary, the Director may employ an outside investigator who will perform investigatory functions at the discretion of the Director. Critical incidents include:

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on-duty or off-duty) or a private vehicle while on-duty.

FOCUS OF THE INVESTIGATION

This investigation had, as its primary focus the deadly force used by officers, and the related sections of the BPD Policy and Procedures Manual (herein referred to as PM) in force at the time of this incident.

PM § 1.001 Use of Force / Authorization

PM § 1.003 Use of Firearms in the Line-of Duty

THE INVESTIGATION

The Office of Police Accountability opened an independent administrative investigation. The following steps were taken during that investigation.

Review of BPD records, including reports, statements, audio, video, and photographs.
Review of footage from cameras positioned on buildings in the immediate area.
Review of Ada County dispatch records and reports.
Review of BPD Internal Affairs (herein after referred to as IA) investigative documents, including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams.
Review of the Critical Incident Task Force (herein after referred to as CITF) investigation, including reports, statements, medical records, photos, records, and audio.
Review of the Ada County Coroner's report.
OPA Investigator participation in the interviews of Officers #1, and #2, in conjunction with BPD IA.

WHAT THE INVESTIGATION FOUND

Based on the preponderance of the evidence obtained and reviewed during this investigation, I issued the following findings of fact:

Several BPD officers attempted to locate this subject at various locations throughout the city as they followed up on the information they were receiving.
Information being received by BPD officers included the subject's desire to commit suicide by jumping off a building or freeway overpass.
BPD officers checked area buildings and overpasses to locate the subject.
Additional information received eventually led BPD officers to a more specific location where the subject was observed by a BPD officer working in an undercover capacity.
The subject was seated in a vacant open space area surrounded by buildings on three sides, limiting his ability to flee when officers arrived to contact him.
Officers developed a plan to arrive simultaneously with two officers in an unmarked vehicle to maintain the element of surprise when contacting the subject and further limit his ability to flee successfully.
Additional BPD officers were staged in the area to form a perimeter for further containment should the subject successfully flee the officers approaching him.
Officer #1 and Officer #3 approached the location in Officer #1's unmarked police vehicle, stopping near the center of the open area where the subject was seated.
Officer #2 followed behind Officers #1 and #3 in his marked police vehicle and stopped adjacent to the South corner of the opening.
Officer #4 parked his marked police vehicle in the adjacent parking lot and approached the North corner of the opening on foot as the other officers were arriving.
When Officer #1 stopped his unmarked police vehicle, he and Officer #3 exited.
Officer #3 moved to a position at the South corner of the opening, and Officer #1 advanced to the North corner of the opening.
Officer #2 exited his police vehicle adjacent to the South corner and quickly took up a position next to Officer #3.
As Officer #3 was moving to the South corner, he yelled to the subject, "Boise Police, you are under arrest… show me your hands."
Immediately as Officer #3 was yelling this command, the subject stood up and began to back up while placing his right hand behind his back near his waistband area.
Officer #1 then yelled, "Show me your hands, I don't want to do this."
The subject then abruptly got into a crouched shooting stance facing toward Officer #1 with his arms outstretched in a shooting position with a black object in his right hand pointed directly at Officer #1.
Officer #2, who was standing next to Officer #3, observed this action and discharged his weapon at the subject.
Officer #1 discharged his weapon at the same time as Officer #2.
The subject was struck by gunfire and was immediately immobilized, falling to the ground.
Officers obtained a ballistic shield, approached the subject, and began lifesaving first aid efforts.
Officers learned that the subject did not have a firearm but had been holding a dark-colored speaker device.
The subject was transported to St. Alphonsus hospital, where he eventually succumbed to injuries.

DIRECTOR'S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

Pursuant to PM § 1.003
BPD policy permits an officer to use deadly force in defense of his life or the life of another when he or she, "reasonably believes that imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury exists" (PM § 1.003). Officers #1 and #2 observed the subject pointing a dark-colored object at Officer #1 while in a crouched shooting stance. Based on the totality of the subject's actions, Officers #1 and #2 reasonably believed that the subject was about to shoot Officer #1 with what appeared to be a weapon in his hand. Officers #1 and #2 discharged their weapons at the subject in defense of Officer #1 and others in the area who may have been struck by gunfire.

Pursuant to PM § 1.001
The decision to use force "should be based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime, whether the subject poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether the subject is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." The facts and totality of the circumstances demonstrate the appearance of imminent danger to Officer #1. Officers #1 and #2 reasonably believed that it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm to Officer #1 and anyone else in the area that may have been hit by gunfire from the subject.

A finding of EXONERATED has been issued with respect to Officer #1 use of deadly force in the matter in question. Exonerated is defined as a specific act or omission of the police officer or police employee that was justified, lawful, and proper.

A finding of EXONERATED has been issued with respect to Officer #2 use of deadly force in the matter in question. Exonerated is defined as a specific act or omission of the police officer or police employee that was justified, lawful, and proper. The Director also finds that the BPD, IA, and the CITF investigations were thorough, objective, and complete. Finally, the Director finds no need to conduct any additional investigation of this incident.

CRISIS INTERVENTION

Of note, during the OPA investigation – the office learned that a Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) member was a part of the group of officers that contacted the subject. However, due to the subject response upon seeing the officers – there was no opportunity for dialogue. The subject reached for his waistband within two seconds of the officers making contact, and nine seconds later simulated the raising of a weapon from a shooting stance. The entire incident lasted a total of thirteen seconds from the arrival of officers to the scene.

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email – jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

OPO Use of Force Report - Bergquist, 10/25/2021

OPO Use of Force Report - Bergquist

CASE REVIEW
OPO21-0041
OIA21-0358
NOVEMBER 2022

Prepared by: John Meyer, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Fall of 2021

In late October of 2021, during the afternoon, a subject in their 20's entered the Boise Towne Center Mall carrying a backpack armed with several loaded firearms. While inside the mall, the subject shot and killed a uniformed mall security officer and a mall customer. The subject also shot at other innocent people inside the mall before eventually exiting the mall, fleeing west on foot through the parking lot.

Boise Police Officers (herein referred to as BPD) were dispatched to the Boise Towne Center Mall regarding reports received of an active shooter. During BPD's response to the scene, dispatch advised the responding officers that individuals had been shot inside the mall and provided officers with a physical description of the shooter. BPD officers #1 and #2 were riding together in a patrol vehicle. They were first to arrive along the north side (rear) of the Dave & Busters (a short distance west of the mall) where they observed a subject carrying a backpack fitting the description given earlier.

In a solo patrol vehicle, BPD Officer #3 entered the parking lot behind Officers #1 and #2. Officer #3 stopped along the left side of a landscaped median north of the Dave & Busters and south of Mod Pizza. Officers #1 and #2 stopped on the right side of the landscaped median in the same area as they prepared to confront the subject carrying a backpack walking on foot away from their patrol car. BPD Officer #2 was holding their patrol rifle as they exited the patrol vehicle from the passenger side. As they got out of the vehicle, they observed the subject reach into their backpack and pull out a handgun. The subject pointed the gun in their direction, and Officer #2, realizing they did not have a live round chambered in the patrol rifle, felt that they were going to be shot. Being unable to immediately engage the subject due to an unchambered round of ammunition, Officer #2 quickly sought cover by rapidly moving to the rear of the patrol vehicle and then to the rear of the patrol vehicle driven by Officer #3, where they could chamber a round and have the protection of the patrol vehicle. BPD Officer #1 also observed the subject pulling a weapon from their backpack, and as Officer #1 drew their weapon, they felt a concussive blast against the windshield and thought that they had been shot. The subject rapidly fired their weapon at the officers approximately 16 times.

Officer #1 exited the patrol vehicle and fired their weapon once at the subject; however, they was unable to continue firing as the ammunition magazine became separated from the weapon. After the subject fired at the officers, the subject turned and began to run away. Officer #1, knowing that they could not fire their weapon, feared the subject might escape and likely shoot more people. Hence, they attempted to strike the subject with their patrol vehicle by accelerating rapidly toward the subject. The subject was able to jump behind a large trash dumpster that was in the alley a few feet from the rear of Dave & Busters and avoid being hit by the patrol vehicle. The subject, still concealed behind the dumpster, shot themselves in the head, causing a catastrophic head injury. Officer #1 stopped the patrol vehicle adjacent to the dumpster on the opposite side and was still unable to see the subject who was behind the dumpster. Officer #1 loaded a new magazine into their weapon and remained by their driver's door, where they could observe the subject if the subject moved from behind the dumpster. Officer #1 felt they might have been struck by one of the rounds fired by the subject as their face was bleeding around the eye.

Officers #2 (with their patrol rifle deployed) and #3, hearing the multiple gunshots ran toward Officer #1. Officer #3 quickly assessed their condition. Officer #3 could see that Officer #1 had a visible injury to their face that was bleeding, but it was unknown if Officer #1 had any additional injuries at that time. Officer #3 removed Officer #1's Body Worn Camera, turned it on, and attached it to their uniform as they did not have one. Officer #3 walked Officer #1 away from the immediate area and to a safer location, where they physically checked Officer #1 for additional injuries and administered first aid. Officer #2 was by the dumpster watching for the subject. They maintained their position until additional officers arrived and determined that the subject had shot themselves in the head, causing a massive head injury. Officer #3 returned to the subject's location and performed life-saving efforts to stop their bleeding until the arrival of paramedics who transported the subject to the hospital. The subject later succumbed to their injuries at the hospital. Officer #1 was also transported to the hospital for treatment of their injuries. The officer survived their injuries.

A mall customer fled in their vehicle from the west parking lot of the mall when they were told by people running that there was a shooter inside the mall. The customer left the parking lot turning North on Milwaukee and headed toward Emerald. As they were stopped in their vehicle on Milwaukee just south of Emerald, a bullet fragment from one of the shots the subject fired at the officers went through their passenger window and struck them, causing injury. They remained by their vehicle after being injured, and responding officers/paramedics rendered first aid and transported them to the hospital. They recovered from the injuries.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on-duty or off-duty) or a private vehicle while on-duty.

FOCUS OF THE INVESTIGATION

This investigation had, as its primary focus, the deadly force used by officers and the related sections of the BPD Policy and Procedures Manual (herein referred to as PM) in force at the time of this incident.

PM § 1.001 Use of Force / Authorization
PM § 1.003 Use of Firearms in the Line-of Duty
PM § 17.020 Audio / Video Recordings

THE INVESTIGATION

The Office of Police Accountability opened an independent administrative investigation. The following steps were taken during the review.

Review of BPD records including reports, statements, audio, video, and photographs.
Review of available body-cam footage from officers #1, #2 and #3
Review of Ada County dispatch records, reports and Coroner’s report.
BPD Internal Affairs (herein after referred to as IA) investigative documents including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams.
Critical Incident Task Force (herein after referred to as CITF) investigations including reports, statements, medical records, photos, records, and audio.
OPA Investigator participation in the interview of officers #1, #2 and #3 with IA.

WHAT THE INVESTIGATION FOUND

Based on the preponderance of the evidence obtained and reviewed during this investigation, I issued the following findings of fact:

At about 1350 hours, BPD Officers #1, #2, #3, and numerous other officers responded to the Boise Towne Square Mall in response to a report of an active shooter.
BPD Officers #1, #2, and #3 were the first to observe and have contact with the subject, who was later determined to be the shooter west of the mall adjacent to the Dave & Buster's business.
Officers #1 and #2 were riding together and stopped their patrol vehicle behind the subject who was on foot.
Officer #3 was driving solo in a patrol vehicle and stopped their vehicle adjacent to Officer #1's vehicle on the other side of a landscaped median on the north side of Dave & Busters.
As the subject observed the patrol vehicle behind them, they pulled out a weapon from their backpack and began firing multiple shots at Officers.
Officer #2 exited the vehicle's passenger side and quickly moved to the rear, where they could chamber a round into the rifle.
Officer #1 drew their weapon from a seated position in the driver's seat and felt a concussive blast from the windshield.
Officer #1 stepped out of the vehicle and fired one shot at the suspect.
After firing one shot, Officer #1 could not fire additional rounds as their ammunition magazine was dislodged from their weapon.
The subject continued firing at officers, approximately 16 shots.
After firing shots at officers, the subject turned and began running away, still holding their weapon.
Officer #1, fearing the subject may escape and shoot more people, accelerated the patrol vehicle in an attempt to strike the subject to incapacitate them and stop the threat to the public.
The subject was able to run behind a trash dumpster before being struck by the patrol vehicle.
The subject shot themselves in the head, causing a catastrophic head injury that was ultimately fatal.
Officer #1 stopped the patrol vehicle adjacent to the trash dumpster where the subject was last seen.
Officer #1 loaded a new ammunition magazine into their weapon and maintained their position of cover by the patrol vehicle.
Officer #3 activated and removed the body-worn camera of Officer #1 and attached it to their uniform because they did not have one.
When they activated Officer #1's camera, the recording began retroactively for 30 seconds, capturing some of Officer #1's earlier actions.
They assisted Officer #1 away from the area where the subject was last seen and assessed them for additional injuries.
Officer #2 took up a position behind the patrol vehicle by the dumpster with is patrol rifle deployed.
Officer #3 returned to the area of the dumpster along with additional responding officers who determined the suspect had shot themselves in the head.
Officer #3 began life-saving efforts on the subject to stop their bleeding until they could be transported to the hospital.
The subject was transported by paramedics to the hospital and later succumbed to their injuries.
One of the shots fired by the subject at Officer #1 struck the lower portion of the windshield and continued in an upward path through the windshield, hitting the underside of the BPD baseball cap brim worn by Officer #1.
A bullet fragment also struck the eyelid of Officer #1, causing injury.
A mall customer fled from the parking lot in their vehicle, heading north on Milwaukee. While stopped in the vehicle on Milwaukee just south of Emerald, a bullet fragment fired by the subject at the officers passed through their passenger window and struck them causing injuries which they survived.
Officer #1 was wearing a Body Worn Camera but failed to activate it before he arrived at the scene.
Officer #3 was conducting a follow-up investigation at another location when this call was dispatched, and at that time, they had forgotten to check out a camera as they usually do.
Officer #3 realized they did not have the camera while responding to the mall but did not take additional time to obtain one in order to expedite his arrival at the active shooter call.

DIRECTOR'S ANALYSIS

Pursuant to PM § 1.003 BPD policy permits an officer to use deadly force in defense of his life or the life of another when he or she, "reasonably believes that imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury exists" (PM § 1.003).

Pursuant to PM § 1.001 The decision to use force "should be based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime, whether the subject poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether the subject is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." The facts and totality of the circumstances demonstrated imminent danger to Officer #1, Officer #2, Officer #3, and anyone else in the area. Officer #1 reasonably believed that it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm to them and the other officers present, as well as anyone else who may have been hit by gunfire. The investigation revealed the courageous and decisive actions taken by BPD Officers #1, #2, and #3 ultimately stopped the continuing deadly threat to the public posed by the subject firing their weapon.

DIRECTOR'S CONCLUSIONS

A finding of SUSTAINED has been issued with respect to Officer #1 for failing to activate their department issued body-worn camera before their arrival (PM 17.020 Audio / Video Recordings). This finding represents a technical violation of policy.

A finding of SUSTAINED has been issued with respect to Officer #3 for failing to wear and activate their department-issued body-worn camera before his arrival (PM 17.020 Audio / Video Recordings). This finding represents a technical violation of policy. However, Officer #3's actions were prudent in expediting their arrival at the scene and preserving evidence by deliberately activating Officer #1's camera and attaching it to their uniform to memorialize actions taken during this critical time.

The Director also finds that the BPD, IA and the CITF investigations were thorough, objective, and complete. Finally, the Director finds no need to conduct any additional investigations of this incident.

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

OPO Use of Force Report - Moore, 7/24/2021

OPO Use of Force Report - Moore

CASE REVIEW
OPO21-0039
OIA21-0275
NOVEMBER 2022

Prepared by: Diane Loos, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Summer of 2021

Officers #1 and #2 were dispatched to a call of a person trespassing and possibly camping at an unoccupied property. Upon arrival, they saw what appeared to be a subject covered by a piece of cardboard. Officer #2 announced their presence and identified themselves as BPD officers. As Officer #2 lifted the cardboard, the subject sat up and pointed a large handgun at the officers. The officers told the subject to drop their weapon, and they refused to comply. Both the subject and the officers fired their weapons. The subject was struck multiple times and was fatally injured.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on-duty or off-duty) or a private vehicle while on-duty.

FOCUS OF THE INVESTIGATION

As its primary focus, this investigation had the use of force used by officers and the vehicle pursuit. The related sections of the BPD Policy and Procedures Manual (herein referred to as PM) in force at the time of this incident.

PM § 1.001 Authorization (Use of Force)
PM § 1.003 Use of Firearms in the Line-of-Duty

THE INVESTIGATION

The Office of Police Accountability opened an independent administrative investigation. The following steps were taken during that investigation.

Review of BPD records, including reports, statements, audio, video, and photographs.
Review of available body-cam footage from officers #1 and #2.
Review of Ada County dispatch records and submitted reports.
Review of BPD Internal Affairs (hereinafter referred to as IA) investigative documents, including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams.
Review of the Critical Incident Task Force (hereinafter referred to as CITF) investigation, including reports, statements, photos, records, and audio.
OPA Investigator participation in the interview of Officer #1 in conjunction with IA.

WHAT THE INVESTIGATION FOUND

Officers #1 and #2 were riding together and volunteered to handle a call for a property check within the city of Boise. While en route to the location, Officer #2 called the complainant to gather additional information about the situation and placed the phone on speaker so both officers could hear the conversation. The complainant told the officers it appeared a person or persons were camping out in a recently vacated rental house in the area. The complainant added that they were concerned about people camping near their home. The officers decided they needed to go and check the site for trespassing or a violation of the disorderly conduct ordinance.

After arriving in the area and parking their police vehicle, Officers #1 and #2 began to search for the possible location. As they checked the area, the officers located what appeared to be an alley behind a restaurant. Officer #1 searched the area with their flashlight and looked over a fence, where they saw a subject with their eyes closed, lying prone underneath a piece of cardboard. Officer #1 believed this location was where the complainant was referring to since it was reasonable that someone with permission to be at the location would not be sleeping on the ground in the carport. Officer #1 indicated to Officer #2 that they had located the subject. Officer #1 contacted BPD dispatch and advised of their location. Page 2 of 4Officer #2 opened the gate to the fence and entered the property. Officer #1 looked over the gate since they could not see through the fence as Officer #2 walked through and toward the subject. Officer #2 announced their presence as Boise Police and pulled the V-shaped piece of cardboard off the subject while Officer #1 stood at the open gate. The subject suddenly turned to their left and reached toward the left side with their right hand as Officer #2 told them, “Hey, go ahead and keep your hands…”. The subject sat up and pointed a large black handgun at the officers. Both Officers #1 and #2 fired their handguns at the subject while repeatedly yelling at them to drop their weapon. The subject’s handgun was clicking as they pointed it at the officers. During a brief lull in the gunfire, the officers repeatedly told the subject to drop their weapon. The subject told them “No,” cursed at them several times, and did not comply with their commands to lower the weapon. The officers engaged the subject again and fired their handguns.

When the subject ceased firing, Officer #1 called dispatch for paramedics, and the officers secured the subject and their weapon. They immediately began first aid until relieved by Ada County paramedics.

Upon examination, the suspect’s weapon was a large dark-colored BB handgun. Officer #1 sustained what appeared to be an injury caused by a BB to their arm. The subject was transported by ambulance to the hospital, ultimately succumbing to their injuries.

DIRECTOR’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

PURSUANT TO PM § 1.001 USE OF FORCE AUTHORIZATION
The decision to use force “should be based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime, whether the subject poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether the subject is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” The facts and totality of the circumstances demonstrate the imminent danger to the officers including the subject pointing a firearm at the officers and continuing to fire after having been given several opportunities to surrender and cease their use of deadly force against the officers. Officers #1 and #2 reasonably believed that it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent death or serious bodily harm to them.

PURSUANT TO PM § 1.003 USE OF FIREARMS IN THE LINE OF DUTY
BPD policy permits an officer to use deadly force in defense of his life or the life of another when they, “reasonably believes that imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury exists” (PM § 1.003). Officers #1 and #2 came under the immediate threat of deadly force as the subject pointed a handgun at them and continued to fire after being told numerous times to drop their weapon. The officers believed, based on the totality of the subject’s actions, that their lives were in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury and discharged their weapons at the subject.

A finding of EXONERATED has been issued in respect to Officer #1’s use of deadly force in the matter in question. Exonerated is defined as a specific act or omission of the police officer or police employee that was justified, lawful, and proper.

A finding of EXONERATED has been issued in respect to Officer #2’s use of deadly force in the matter in question. Exonerated is defined as a specific act or omission of the police officer or police employee that was justified, lawful, and proper.

The Director also finds that the BPD, IA, and CITF investigation of this incident was thorough, objective, and complete. Finally, the Director finds no need to investigate this incident further.

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

OPO Use of Force Report - Smith, 7/11/2021

OPO Use of Force Report - Smith

CASE REVIEW
OPO21-0036
OIA21-0259
May 2022

Prepared by: Diane Loos, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Summer of 2021

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on-duty or off-duty) or a private vehicle while on-duty.

FOCUS OF THE INVESTIGATION

PM § 1.001 Authorization (Use of Force)
PM § 1.003 Use of Firearms in the Line-of-Duty

THE INVESTIGATION

The Office of Police Accountability opened an independent administrative investigation. The following steps were taken during that investigation.

Review of BPD records, including reports, statements, audio, video, and photographs.
Review of available body-cam footage from officers #1 and #2.
Review of Ada County dispatch records and submitted reports.
Review of BPD Internal Affairs (hereinafter referred to as IA) investigative documents, including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams.
Review of the Critical Incident Task Force (hereinafter referred to as CITF) investigation, including reports, statements, photos, records, and audio.
OPA Investigator participation in the interview of Officer #1 in conjunction with IA.

WHAT THE INVESTIGATION FOUND

Officer #2 opened the gate to the fence and entered the property. Officer #1 looked over the gate since they could not see through the fence as Officer #2 walked through and toward the subject. Officer #2 announced their presence as Boise Police and pulled the V-shaped piece of cardboard off the subject while Officer #1 stood at the open gate. The subject suddenly turned to their left and reached toward the left side with their right hand as Officer #2 told them, “Hey, go ahead and keep your hands…”. The subject sat up and pointed a large black handgun at the officers. Both Officers #1 and #2 fired their handguns at the subject while repeatedly yelling at them to drop their weapon. The subject’s handgun was clicking as they pointed it at the officers. During a brief lull in the gunfire, the officers repeatedly told the subject to drop their weapon. The subject told them “No,” cursed at them several times, and did not comply with their commands to lower the weapon. The officers engaged the subject again and fired their handguns.

DIRECTOR’S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

The Director also finds that the BPD, IA, and CITF investigation of this incident was thorough, objective, and complete. Finally, the Director finds no need to investigate this incident further.

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

OPO Use of Force Report - Mkoma, 6/27/2021

OPO Use of Force Report - Mkoma

CASE REVIEW
OPO21-0038
DECEMBER 2021

Prepared by: John Meyer, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Summer of 2021

During the morning hours in the summer of 2021, Boise Police Department Officers (herein referred to as BPD) received an Attempt to Locate (ATL) notice regarding a known male adult subject who reportedly forcibly kidnapped his 13-year-old son from a residence in Boise. This was in violation of an active nocontact order, he fled in a known vehicle. The ATL notice included the subject's name, description, and vehicle description. An AMBER Alert was also in the process of being initiated regarding this reported kidnapping.

During the late afternoon hours on that same day, Sergeant #1 located the vehicle, the subject, and the kidnapping victim at a gas station in northwest Boise. Sergeant #1 notified BPD dispatch requesting emergency assistance from Officers and attempted to contact the subject. However, the subject fled in the vehicle with the victim inside sitting in the passenger seat. Sergeant #1 followed the subject and attempted a vehicle stop by activating his lights and siren on his marked BPD patrol vehicle. The subject did not yield and continued driving. Sergeant #1 continued to pursue the subject, who began waving a large knife outside the driver's window, still attempting to elude Sergeant #1 and not pull over.

Officers #1, #2, and #3 joined Sergeant #1 in the pursuit of the subject, who continued waving the large knife outside the driver's window as he fled. Sergeant #1 received authorization to initiate a Pursuit Intervention Technique maneuver (PIT) by using his vehicle to forcibly cause the subject’s vehicle to rotate a half turn and come to a stop to end the pursuit. When there was enough clearance on the roadway and speeds were low, Sergeant #1 completed the PIT maneuver, and the subject’s vehicle rotated as intended before coming to a stop in the street. Sergeant #1 continued past the subject’s vehicle, turned around, and stopped his patrol vehicle on the passenger side of the subject’s vehicle blocking him from fleeing again. Officers #1, #2, and #3 stopped on the other side of the subject vehicle and drew their weapons, ordering the subject to put his hands up and drop the knife.

Sergeant #1 approached the passenger side of the subject’s vehicle and opened the door to rescue the kidnapped child in the front seat. At this time, the subject leaned toward the child holding the large knife and raised the weapon as if he was going to stab the child seated next to him. Officers #1, #2, and #3 immediately discharged their weapons at the subject through the windshield of the subject’s vehicle, striking the subject multiple times. This hindered the subject and caused him to drop the large knife on his lap. Sergeant #1 was then able to successfully rescue the kidnapping victim from the passenger seat by removing him from the open passenger door. The child victim was not struck by gunfire and was immediately placed in a safe location in another patrol vehicle. Officers #1, #2, #3, and other arriving officers immediately began comprehensive life-saving efforts on the subject, who ultimately survived his life-threatening injuries.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

Boise City Code defines the authority and duties of the Office of Police Accountability. It grants the Office the authority to investigate and evaluate the performance of Officers whenever certain criteria are met.

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on-duty or off-duty) or a private vehicle while on-duty.

THE REVIEW

This investigation had, as its primary focus, the deadly force used by officers, a vehicle pursuit, and the execution of a pursuit intervention technique (PIT maneuver) and the following related sections of the BPD Policy and Procedures Manual (Herein referred to as PM) in force at the time of this incident.

PM § 1.001 Use of Force / Authorization
PM § 1.003 Use of Firearms in the Line-of Duty
PM § 1.006 Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT)
M § 4.001 Vehicle Pursuits PM § 4.004 Vehicle Force Methods
PM § 17.020 Audio / Video Recordings (On Body Video)

THE INVESTIGATION

The Office of Police Accountability opened an independent administrative investigation. The following steps were taken during that investigation.

Review of BPD records, including reports, statements, audio, video, and photographs.
Review of available body-cam footage from Officers #1 and #2.
Ada County dispatch records and reports.
BPD Internal Affairs (herein after referred to as IA) investigative documents including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams.
Critical Incident Task Force (herein after referred to as CITF) investigations including reports, statements, medical records, photos, records, video, and audio.
OPA participation in the interviews of Officer #1, #2, #3, and Sergeant #1 taken by BPD IA.

THE FACTS

Based on the preponderance of the evidence obtained and reviewed during this investigation, I issued the following findings of fact:

Sergeant #1, Officers #1, and #2 received “Attempt to Locate” information regarding the subject, his vehicle, and the victim before the critical incident.
The information received by involved personnel indicated that the subject was wanted for a felony crime of kidnapping and the victim child was in danger while with the subject.
Sergeant #1 observed the subject and his vehicle with the victim stopped at a gas station in northwest Boise.
Sergeant #1 attempts to turn on body camera to record contact with subject. It was later learned that the power on button was not depressed long enough to activate.
Sergeant #1 was in full BPD uniform and was driving a marked BPD patrol vehicle during his initial contact with the subject at the gas station.
Sergeant #1 Requested emergency assistance from area Officers over the radio regarding his contact with the wanted kidnapping subject.
Sergeant #1 attempted to detain the subject at the gas station by stopping his patrol vehicle in front of the subject’s vehicle and “mouthing” the word “stop” to prevent him from driving away with the victim seated in the vehicle.
The subject made eye contact with Sergeant #1 at the gas station, ignored Sergeant #1’s order to stop, then abruptly backed up to allow himself a path of escape before driving out of the lot with the victim.
Sergeant #1 followed the subject as he drove out of the gas station with the victim in the vehicle, activating his overhead lights and siren to get the subject to yield and stop his vehicle. Page 3 of 7
Sergeant #1 notified dispatch and responding units of his actions initiating a pursuit and the actions of the subject driving the subject vehicle violating traffic laws as he failed to yield.
Sergeant #1 pursued the subject, while continuing to give dispatch and responding officers information on the actions of the subject.
Officers #1 and #2 believing they will become involved in the incident – turn on body camera to record the contact.
Officer #1 joined the pursuit behind Sergeant #1 and took over radio transmissions to dispatch regarding the pursuit and actions of the subject.
The subject began waving a large knife outside the driver’s window of the subject vehicle as he continued to evade pursuing officers with their lights and sirens activated on their marked patrol vehicles.
Officers #2 and #3 also joined the pursuit behind Officer #1 and Sergeant #1.
Officer #3 upon joining the pursuit, failed to activate his body camera.
A BPD Lieutenant gave verbal approval over the radio authorizing the execution of a Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT) when it was prudent.
Sergeant #1 executed a PIT when the subject was driving at a slow speed on a clear / wide roadway, causing the subject’s vehicle to turn around and come to a stop.
After completing the PIT, Sergeant #1 continued driving past the subject vehicle, turned around, and stopped his vehicle to block the subject from continuing in the direction he had been driving.
Officers #1, #2 and #3 stopped their vehicles on the other side of the subject’s vehicle and drew their weapons, directing them at the subject who was still holding the large knife while seated in the driver’s seat of his vehicle next to the child victim.
Officer #1 yelled for the child to exit the vehicle from the passenger door, instructing the child by waving his arm to the side to get the child to move in that direction to the passenger door to get out of the vehicle.
Sergeant #1 observed that the passenger door of the subject’s vehicle was unlocked, and he opened the door to rescue the child.
The subject turned toward the child, raising the knife in a threatening manner, and leaned toward the child who was seated next to the subject.
Officers #1, #2, and #3 discharged their weapons at the subject, who was still seated in the driver’s seat of his vehicle.
The subject was struck by several of the shots fired by officers and became incapacitated, dropping the knife in his lap.
An additional officer who arrived just after the PIT maneuver was executed notified dispatch that shots were being fired.
Sergeant #1 was able to rescue the child victim by removing him through the open passenger door.
The child victim was assessed for injuries and placed in the back seat of a patrol vehicle on scene by officers.
Officers #1, #2, and #3 approached the subject vehicle to assess the condition of the subject and the location of the knife.
The knife was moved from the subject’s lap to the back seat area by an officer.
The subject was pulled from the vehicle by officers through the open driver’s door and laid on the sidewalk directly adjacent to the subject vehicle.
Officers #1, #2, and #3 and other responding officers began life-saving efforts on the subject and requested EMS (Paramedics). Page 4 of 7
Officers applied pressure to the subject’s wounds to stop his bleeding, applied clotting bandages, and initiated CPR before the arrival of paramedics.
The subject was transported by paramedics accompanied by BPD officers to St. Alphonsus Trauma Hospital in Boise for further emergency treatment and surgery.
The child victim was transported to another hospital for treatment of minor cuts from glass and follow up investigation.
The scene was documented with photographs (including drone photos), evidence was collected, and witnesses in the area were interviewed by the CITF regarding what they observed.
A crime scene was established at the scene, cordoned off, and documented with logs showing all who were present.
CITF personnel responded and initiated an investigation led by the Garden City Police Department.

DIRECTOR’S ANALYSIS & FINDINGS

Pursuant to PM § 1.003
BPD policy permits an officer to use deadly force in defense of his life or the life of another when they, “reasonably believes that imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury exists” (PM § 1.003). Officers #1, #2 and #3 observed the subject turn toward the child while holding the large knife in a threatening manner and lean toward the child who was sitting directly next to the subject. Officers #1, #2, and #3 believed based on the totality of the subject’s actions that the child was going to be stabbed or cut by the subject and be seriously injured or killed. Officers #1, #2, and #3 discharged their weapons at the subject in defense of the child whom they reasonably believed was in imminent danger of being seriously injured or killed by the subject with the knife.

Pursuant to PM § 1.001
The decision to use force “should be based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime, whether the subject poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether the subject is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” The facts and totality of the circumstances demonstrate the imminent danger to the child including the subject forcibly kidnapping the child, the failure of the subject to yield to pursuing officers, the subject brandishing the large knife in a threatening manner outside the driver’s window while officers were pursuing him, and the subject raising the knife toward the child in a threatening manner after his vehicle was stopped by the PIT maneuver. Officers #1, #2, and #3 reasonably believed that it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm to the child.

Pursuant to PM § 1.006
Only officers who are authorized will use the Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT). Circumstances warranting the use of PIT or other forced stop methods are when continued movement of the suspect vehicle would place others in significant danger of serious bodily harm and is so great as to outweigh the risk of harm in making the forcible stop and other means of apprehension have been considered and rejected as impractical. Sergeant #1 (a field supervisor) received verbal authorization for the use of the PIT by a Lieutenant due to the totality of the situation including the imminent danger to the child in the subject’s vehicle. Sergeant #1 was driving a marked, fully equipped Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV), utilized sound judgement in considering potential harm or danger to others from the PIT and intentionally executed the PIT when vehicle speeds were low, and the roadway was wide and clear of other traffic or pedestrians. The use of a PIT is also referenced in PM § 4.004 as an authorized forced stop method that Page 5 of 7may be used if in the judgment of the officers, the fleeing vehicle must be stopped immediately to safeguard life and preserve public safety based on the totality of the circumstances.

Pursuant to PM § 4.001
A vehicle pursuit is recognized as a valid law enforcement activity to attempt to apprehend a fleeing subject, under limited circumstances which include a supervisor’s command of the pursuit, and the crime (for apprehension) is a violent felony. Sergeant #1 (a field supervisor) initiated this pursuit based on prior information he received regarding a forcible kidnapping (felony crime) and was driving a marked vehicle that was properly equipped to initiate a PIT maneuver. It is the responsibility of the Sergeant to ensure that the danger posed by the continued pursuit outweighs the danger to the public of allowing the suspect to evade immediate capture. During this pursuit, Sergeant #1 continually monitored speeds of the pursued vehicle and the actions of the driver. Sergeant #1 and later Officer #1 kept dispatch and other officers continually appraised of traffic conditions and continued the pursuit due to the relatively low level of danger to the public which was outweighed by the danger posed to the child kidnapping victim who was a passenger in the pursued vehicle. According to BPD policy, typically no more than three units should be actively involved in a vehicle pursuit unless circumstances warrant the need for additional officers. This incident involved a kidnapping child victim (hostage) being held by a subject who displayed a deadly weapon to pursuing officers. These are examples of circumstances that would warrant an additional officer in the pursuit (Officer #3).

Pursuant to PM § 17.020
Uniformed officers will be responsible for ensuring they are equipped with a portable audio / video recorder issued by the Department and the recorder is in proper working order. Devices shall be worn in a prescribed manner and utilized per procedures. Uniformed officers shall record all investigative enforcement contacts, prisoner transports, persons complaining of officer conduct, or when a contact is anticipated to be confrontational

Conclusions:

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, a finding of EXONERATED has been issued with respect to Officer #1 use of deadly force in the matter in question.

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, a finding of EXONERATED has been issued with respect to Officer #2 use of deadly force in the matter in question.

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, a finding of EXONERATED has been issued with respect to Officer #3 use of deadly force in the matter in question.

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, a finding of EXONERATED has been issued with respect to Sergeant #1 use of the Pursuit Intervention in the matter in question.

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, a finding of EXONERATED has been issued with respect to Sergeant #1 initiating and participating in a vehicle pursuit.

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, a finding of EXONERATED has been issued with respect to Officer #1 participating in a vehicle pursuit.

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, a finding of EXONERATED has been issued with respect to Officer #2 participating in a vehicle pursuit.

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, a finding of EXONERATED has been issued with respect to Officer #3 participating in a vehicle pursuit.

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, a finding of SUSTAINED has been issued with respect to Sergeant #1 for failing to activate and record his body worn video camera / recorder to memorialize this incident. Sustained is defined as a specific act or omission of the police officer or police employee that is a violation of policy.

Based on the preponderance of the evidence, a finding of SUSTAINED has been issued with respect to Officer #3 for failing to activate and record his body worn video camera / recorder to memorialize this incident. Sustained is defined as a specific act or omission of the police officer or police employee that is a violation of policy.

The Director also finds that the BPD, IA, and the CITF investigations were thorough, objective, and complete. Finally, the Director finds no need to conduct any additional investigations of this incident.

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

2020

OPO Use of Force Report - Webb, 10/27/2020

OPO Use of Force Report - Webb

CASE REVIEW
OPO20-0044
OIA20-0325
APRIL 2022

Prepared by: Diane Loos, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Fall of 2020

On an evening in October of 2020, a stolen vehicle, a white Subaru BRZ out of Caldwell, was located by its owner on West Overland Road in Boise, Idaho. The victim attempted to follow the vehicle but lost track of it. A short time later, the victim found the car parked in a residential garage north of interstate (84) and west of the Flying Wye connector. The victim saw a possible suspect with wounds on his forehead and right arm.

The Boise Police Department (BPD) responded to the address to investigate the stolen vehicle. Officers confirmed that the car had been reported stolen, and soon the Officers had the name of the subject connected to the car theft.

After arriving at the residence, Officers received an updated report that a male subject was attempting to leave in a taxi nearby. As the taxi began to leave the area, the subject pushed the taxi driver out of the vehicle and drove away. The taxi-cab driver told the Officers that the subject had verbally told them he had a gun.

Officers engaged in a pursuit of the vehicle. While dangerously eluding police, the subject showed little regard for the general public and the Officers trying to apprehend him. Soon, the subject would find himself in a residential neighborhood, and a BPD Officer used deadly force by ramming the vehicle head-on with his patrol unit – ending the pursuit. The subject escaped via foot but was taken into custody by other officers.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on-duty or off-duty) or a private vehicle while on-duty.

DIRECTOR'S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

The Office of Police Accountability has reviewed this incident that took place several years ago. The following steps were taken during the review.

Review of BPD records including reports, statements, audio, video, and photographs.
Review of available body-cam footage from Officer #7 and Officer #2.
BPD Internal Affairs (herein after referred to as IA) investigative documents including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams.
Critical Incident Task Force (herein after referred to as CITF) investigations including reports, statements, medical records, photos, records, and audio.
Review of OPA interview with Officer #7.

As its primary focus, this review had the use of force by the Officer, a vehicle pursuit, and the use of a BPD vehicle in the ramming of a suspect vehicle. The following are the related sections of the BPD Policy and Procedures Manual (Herein referred to as PM) in force during this incident.

PM § 1.001 Use of Force / Authorization
PM § 4.001 Vehicle Pursuits
PM § 4.005 Extreme Measures

At approximately 9:30 p.m., Boise Police Department (BPD) Officer #1 arrived to investigate the stolen vehicle report. During the investigation, BPD learned that the stolen vehicle was located at the home occupied by a family member, who would go on to identify the subject. The family member said the car was brought there by their brother, and police were able to put a name and description together of the subject. BPD Officer #2 also responded to the residence. Officer #1 and Officer #2 obtained consent to search the home for the subject, but he was not found at the location.

Dispatch notified the Officers of a call from a nearby residence regarding an adult male with a possible wound on his forehead who wanted to use the phone. The caller advised they refused to allow the subject the use of their phone. Officer #2 responded to the location and remained in the area, believing the subject was still nearby. Officer #2 saw a red Kia Taxi enter the neighborhood and park. He saw a male walk from the rear of the residence and get into the front passenger seat of the taxi. Officer #2 went to a side channel and requested Officer #7 to respond to the area to assist. Officer #3 heard the request on the side channel and saw that Officer #7 was ten minutes away from Officer #2. Officer #3 knew he was closer than Officer #7 and contacted Officer #2, who explained he was looking for a male subject about a stolen vehicle and thought he saw the subject enter a taxi. As the taxi left the location, Officer #2 initiated a traffic stop with Officer #3 behind him.

Officer #2 watched the taxi come to a stop and saw the front passenger believed to be the male subject, push and force the cab driver out of the taxi. The driver stepped out with both his hands up in the air, facing the subject that had pushed him from the vehicle. Officer #2's observations of the male pushing the taxi driver out of the taxi by force and the driver's hands held up in the air led him to believe the male subject had carjacked the taxi. Officer #2 broadcasted this information over the primary radio channel. He drew his duty handgun and started to point it at the subject while ordering him to put his hands up. Instead of complying, the subject rapidly drove away from the scene in the taxi. Officer #2 requested an additional officer to meet with the taxi driver as Officer #3 began a pursuit of the taxi with Officer #2 as the second unit.

During the pursuit, the subject was seen by several officers driving into oncoming lanes, turning off his headlights, driving at a very high rate of speed, driving erratically, and driving directly at civilian and law enforcement vehicles.

Officer #4 became the lead pursuit vehicle as the subject turned west on Fairview Road. Officer #4 saw the subject's vehicle travel in the opposite traffic lanes, turn his headlights off and on several times, and barely missed striking two vehicles head-on while at speeds of 85 miles per hour and above. Ada County Deputy #1 responded to assist and attempted to deploy spike strips near Cloverdale Road and Victory Road. The subject drove toward Deputy Ada Deputy #1 and his patrol vehicle, narrowly missing striking him. The subject also steered toward both Ada Deputy #2 and a nearby citizen. Both had to swerve off the roadway to avoid a collision.

As the pursuit continued, the subject vehicle attempted to hit an oncoming patrol vehicle that was traveling west on Victory Road. The subject vehicle got as close as it could to the patrol vehicle and forced it toward a ditch and a small tree line. The subject vehicle went through Overland Road and turned west into the last entrance of a neighborhood before going over the overpass. Before entering the neighborhood, Officer #4 heard a radio transmission from an officer referencing ramming or pitting the subject vehicle. Officer #4 heard received supervisor permission to use a Pursuit Intervention Technique (PIT), if safe to do so. Officer #4 saw the subject vehicle was driving back and forth across all the lanes. Officer #4 was not able to PIT the subject vehicle due to the subject weaving back and forth. Officer #4 believed if they could not get the subject vehicle to stop, the subject vehicle would attempt to hit another patrol vehicle. Officer #4 told Officer #3 that if he could get close enough, he would ram the subject vehicle or do a PIT maneuver.

Officer #7 was eastbound on Franklin Road near Five Mile Road when Officer #2 attempted the traffic stop on the taxi. Officer #7 elevated his response when Officer #2 advised the driver of the taxi had committed an armed robbery and that the subject had a gun. Officer #3 continued to provide the pursuit location and said they were going southbound through a neighborhood. Officer #7 closed to approximately a hundred yards behind the pursuit, and the subject turned onto Five Mile Road. When Officer #7 was on Five Mile, he could see the pursuit had picked up to a high rate of speed. He saw the vehicles make a left turn onto westbound Fairview Avenue. He paralleled the pursuit by turning onto Emerald Street in case the pursuit turned southbound, where he could deploy stop sticks. He heard radio traffic advising the subject was going into oncoming traffic.

From his previous patrol of the area, he knew there was a 24-hour restaurant that was always busy, and he was concerned that the subject would cause an accident. Officer #7 witnessed an attempt by an ACSO deputy to deploy stop sticks to end the pursuit, only to see the subject drive toward the deputy. Officer #7 believed that the subject was traveling at high speed, and that any contact with the deputy would have resulted in his death. He saw the subject swerving into oncoming traffic and turning westbound into a neighborhood. Officer #7 was familiar with the area and turned into the same neighborhood on a different street. From his knowledge of the area, he knew the subject would have to slow down because of the number of turns in the neighborhood. Officer #7 continued to drive through the neighborhood but did not see the pursuit.

Suddenly he saw headlights turning toward him, and Officer #7 decided to stop the vehicle. Earlier during the pursuit, he asked on the radio if "ramming" was authorized, and the watch commander authorized a PIT. Officer #7 believes ramming was authorized under the same protocol in the BPD policy. Given the subject's speeds, Officer #7 thought that the PIT was not authorized and would have fallen under deadly force due to his training.

Now driving towards Officer #7, the subject swerved the vehicle from side to side, covering the whole roadway, as witnessed by Officer #2. Officer #7 was concerned that the subject would not stop voluntarily and would continue to endanger the public and other officers if he wasn't stopped. All prior attempts to get the subject to stop, including the use of spike strips, had failed.

The subject swerved to the left (Officer #7's right), trying to enter a gap between Officer #7's vehicle and a parked vehicle in front of a residence. Officer #7 believed that the subject was going to try to go through the gap. He blocked the gap and struck the subject head-on. The airbags were deployed in the patrol vehicle, but the Officer #7 could still see that the subject was trying to get out.

After a short foot pursuit, the subject was taken into custody by other Officers on the scene.

Pursuant to PM § 1.001

The decision to use force "should be based on the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime, whether the subject poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether the subject is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight." The facts and totality of the circumstances demonstrate the imminent danger to the to the public and other officers including the subject forcibly stealing the taxi from the driver, the claiming he had a gun, the failure of the subject to yield to pursuing officers, and the subject's dangerous high speeds on the roadways. Officer #7 reasonably believed that it was necessary to use force to prevent imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm to the public or other officers.

Pursuant to PM § 4.001

A vehicle pursuit is recognized as a valid law enforcement activity to attempt to apprehend a fleeing subject, under limited circumstances which include a supervisor's command of the pursuit, and the crime (for apprehension) is a violent felony. Officer #2 and Officer #3 initiated this pursuit based on Officer #2's directly witnessing what appeared to be an armed carjacking, a felony crime. During this pursuit, Officer #3 and other involved officers kept dispatch and other active officers continually appraised of traffic conditions. They continued the pursuit due to the extreme danger the subject posed due to his violent crime, his disregard for the citizens and the officers on the road with his extremely high speed and steering toward oncoming vehicles, and his failure to stop for the officers.

Pursuant to PM § 4.005

Deliberately ramming a vehicle is considered an extreme measure. "The use of extreme measures will (emphasis mine) have prior authorization by the Incident Commander, and is warranted only when other means of termination have failed or are impractical. The danger shall be clearly imminent and the Officer shall be able to articulate the subject's/driver's actions are life threatening to another person." Officer #7 asked if he could ram the subject's vehicle and was told by the lieutenant to PIT the subject if he had the opportunity.

Though Officer #7 used an extreme measure compared to a PIT maneuver, the conditions he faced with the failure of other methods to stop the subject, plus the subject's refusal to stop, left him with ramming as the best-forced stop option at that moment to end the pursuit. Given the dynamic situation, the need to rapidly decide how to stop the pursuit, and the dangerous driving of the subject, Officer #7 articulated the need for ramming the subject's vehicle and bringing an end to this pursuit. The choice of ending the pursuit in a neighborhood, at slower speeds, resulted in a forced stop that was less likely to cause injury to the public, the officers, and the subject.

Conclusions:

Based on my review, I have come to the following conclusions:

The BPD internal review of this incident was thorough, objective, and complete.
I find no need to conduct any additional investigation of this incident.
I concur with BPD's conclusion that the involved Officers acted in a manner consistent with BPD's policy and procedures governing the use of deadly force.

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

OPO Use of Force Report - Ferrel, 8/31/2020

OPO Use of Force Report - Ferrel

CASE REVIEW
OPO20-0035
OIA20-0245
JANUARY 2022

Prepared by: John Meyer, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Fall of 2020

During the early morning hours in the Fall of 2020, Boise Police Officers (hereinafter referred to as BPD officers) responded to a campground in a neighboring city to assist their police department. The police had received reports that a male subject was firing his weapon inside his camper indiscriminately. When BPD officers arrived, they could hear numerous gunshots coming from inside one specific camper that was parked in a space among multiple other campers and trailers. The campers and trailers at this location were parked close to each other and were occupied. The situation would end when several BPD officers used deadly force on the subject.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on-duty or off-duty) or a private vehicle while on-duty.

DIRECTOR'S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

The Office of Police Accountability has reviewed this incident. The following steps were taken during the review.

Review of BPD records including reports, statements, audio, video, and photographs.
Review of records from the neighboring Police Department
Ada County dispatch records and reports.
BPD Internal Affairs (herein after referred to as IA) investigative documents including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams.
Critical Incident Task Force (herein after referred to as CITF) investigations including reports, statements, medical records, photos, records, and audio.

The subject who was firing a handgun inside a camper in a crowded campground during the overnight hours was endangering the lives of many. He was also clearly risking the lives of the responding officers at the scene with the gunfire. The investigation of this incident revealed that bullets fired by the subject had struck and damaged campers that were parked nearby. The ongoing gunfire and darkness kept the officers from safely evacuating many neighboring campers. The actions of the subject firing the handgun are consistent with that of an active shooter in that he was continuously firing a weapon indiscriminately in an occupied area.

BPD officer #1 advanced to a location where he could observe the subject where the shots were being fired. Officer #1 was armed with a rifle which is more effective and accurate at a more extended range than a regular duty handgun. Officer #1 and other BPD officers could see that gunfire was traveling through the camper's walls and striking other trailers parked nearby, which were occupied. Officer #1 moved to a location where he could see through a window of the camper where the gunfire was occurring. Officer #1 got into a prone position laying on the ground and could see the subject with a handgun through a large camper window. Officer #1 observed the subject fire the weapon inside the camper in the direction of another trailer that was parked directly adjacent to the east. Officer #1 observed the subject raise his gun again, pointing it in the direction of the same camper. Officer #1 fired his rifle at the subject, striking him and causing him to drop to the camper's floor out of sight. Because the subject could no longer be seen, a small drone was deployed to fly up to the window on the back of the camper to view inside to determine the condition and activity of the subject who had been firing a handgun. The drone revealed that the subject was bleeding from a chest wound but was moving on the floor and was reloading a handgun. Moments later, the subject began shooting again inside the camper as several shots were heard by BPD officers who had advanced to a position of cover closer to the camper.

The BPD officers were instructing individuals who were coming outside their campers due to the gunfire and commotion to stay inside. The subject could still not be seen as he remained on the floor of the camper. BPD officers #2 and #3 as well as other officers at the scene, developed a plan to advance to the rear of the camper just below the large window to observe and make contact with the subject to demonstrate a police presence and get him to surrender. As officers #2 and #3 got up to the window, they used the rear bumper and ladder affixed to the camper to get high enough to see inside. They saw the subject lying on his left side, facing away from them on the floor. His hands were not visible, but they could see that he was moving and breathing. As officers #2 and #3 were at the window, the subject abruptly rolled over toward them with his right arm outstretched with a gun in his right hand. Both officer #2 and officer #3 fired their duty handguns at the subject in self-defense. The subject was struck by gunfire and was incapacitated, dropping the handgun at his side. Additional officers then entered the camper's door, which had been barricaded, clearing the camper of other individuals and rendering medical aid to the subject. Officers carried the subject outside the trailer and performed life-saving efforts; however, the subject succumbed to his injuries.

COMMUNICATION

This investigation revealed information indicating that communication, coordination, and command organization could have been better between BPD and the neighboring police force at the scene. This situation was complex and extremely dangerous to all involved, especially the bystanders in the area.

This type of incident, which involves resources from more than one agency, demands an incident command structure. Resources can be given specific assignments, including evacuation of bystanders, securing a perimeter, medical response / triage, and a specific team to directly address the threat.

Officers in each assignment should know their primary mission and be communicating their critical actions in accomplishing their mission to the incident commander. These communications are received by all officers on scene and this communication aids in preventing crossfire and friendly fire situations between different groups of officers acting independently. This type of coordination also aids all officers in effectively carrying out each respective assignment given by the incident commander. Although BPD came in to assist the neighboring police force, all involved officers share this responsibility.

BPD officer #1 justifiably fired his service rifle to stop the ongoing threat, did so without any communication, which caused some confusion with other officers at the scene. Officers could hear the distinct difference in the rifle fire as opposed to the subject's continuous handgun fire but were not aware if the rifle fire was from an officer, the subject, or another person altogether. It appears there was sufficient time and distance between Officer #1 and the subject firing a handgun to make some form of communication either immediately before taking such action or immediately after where the element of surprise was not compromised.

As officers were beginning to converge on the subject's location, ongoing communication between the groups would have prevented some of the crossfire situations that developed on the site.

Although this incident was a very dangerous, dynamic, and fluid situation involving an individual firing a weapon, officers were on the scene for a sufficient amount of time to establish an effective incident command where responding resources could have been communicated with and coordinated by giving specific assignments, so all involved officers knew what was expected of them. This would have provided for enhanced overall teamwork, which would have mitigated some of the inherent dangers to the officers and the public in this type of situation.

CONCLUSION

BPD Policy permits an officer to use deadly force in defense of their life or the life of another when they reasonably believe that imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury exists.

Based on my review, I have come to the following conclusions:

The BPD, IA, and the CITF investigations were thorough, objective, and complete.
I find no need to conduct any additional investigation of this incident.
I concur with the Office of Internal Affair's (OIA) conclusion that the involved officers acted in a manner consistent with BPD's policy and procedures governing the use of deadly force.

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

2019

OPO Use of Force Report - Dewitt, 10/21/2019

OPO Use of Force Report - Dewitt

CASE REVIEW
OPO19-0038
OIA19-0479
NOVEMBER 2022

Prepared by: John Meyer, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Fall of 2019

During the early morning hours in late October of 2019, Boise Police (hereinafter referred to as BPD) received a call for service regarding a subject acting suspiciously in a residential neighborhood in the City's Northwest area. It was reported the subject was knocking on doors and driving around the neighborhood looking for an individual who allegedly had taken some property from them. BPD Officer #1 was the first to arrive and observed the subject seated in a vehicle on the street. Officer #1 saw the reporting party pointing at the subject in the vehicle, indicating that they were the individual involved.

Officer #1 stopped their marked patrol vehicle facing the front of the vehicle the subject was seated in and directed his forward-facing lights and spotlight to illuminate the subject’s and the vehicle's interior. Officer #1 approached the subject from the front and contacted them at the driver's door. Officer #1 began speaking with the subject about what they were doing and asked them for identification. BPD Officers #2 and #3 (riding together in the same marked patrol vehicle) arrived to assist during Officer #1's initial contact with the subject. Officer #2 positioned themselves by the passenger door of the subject's vehicle, and Officer #3 stood by the rear of the vehicle on the driver's side behind and adjacent to Officer #1.

As Officer #1 spoke with the subject, they noted that the subject was very nervous and fidgeting with items in the car. Officer #1 saw an empty holster on the car's front seat and asked the subject about it. The subject said it belonged to a relative who had recently purchased a BB gun. Officer #1 asked the subject if there was a gun in the vehicle, and they replied that they didn't own a gun. Officer #1 again asked the subject for identification. They observed the subject begin to look through their personal items, and while they was doing that, the officer observed syringes inside their belongings. Based on this observation, Officer #1 felt it was possible the syringes were related to drugs or other paraphernalia in the vehicle, so the officer asked the subject for their bag and placed it on top of the vehicle for temporary safekeeping.

The subject then reached down to the passenger seat area where numerous items were cluttered on the floor. Officer #2 observed the subject manipulate a handgun from the floor with their fingers into a position where they were able to grab it with their right hand. Officer #2 immediately called out, "Hey, don't grab that!" Holding the gun in their right hand, the subject reached around to the driver's window and pointed the gun at Officer #1. At that point, Officer #2 and Officer #3 could now clearly see the gun pointing at Officer #1, and both fired their duty weapons at the subject simultaneously. Officer #2 fired three rounds and Officer #3 fired five rounds. Officer #1 did not fire their weapon as they were taken by surprise and responded by rapidly retreating toward cover. Immediately after firing, Officer #2 and Officer #3 retreated to find a position of cover behind a parked vehicle on the street nearby. Officers gave commands for the subject to show their hands; however, they remained motionless, slumped over in the driver's seat. A BPD K-9 Officer arrived a short time later, and the K-9 performed a life check on the subject who was not responsive to the presence of the K-9. When Officers approached the vehicle, they determined the subject was deceased from gunshot wounds.

During the subsequent investigation of this shooting by the Critical Incident Task Force, it was learned that the subject's weapon pointed at Officer #1 was a BB gun and not an actual firearm. The size, color, and physical design of the BB gun were strikingly similar to an actual 9mm firearm that is currently manufactured and sold to the public. Photos depicting the similarity of the involved BB gun and the 9mm firearm that is strikingly similar were included in the Critical Incident Task Force investigation of this shooting. It was also learned that the involved subject discharged the BB gun when they pointed it at Officer #1. The discharged BB struck a vehicle that was parked on the street, causing a broken window.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on-duty or off-duty) or a private vehicle while on-duty.

THE REVIEW

The Office of Police Accountability has reviewed this incident that took place in October of 2019. The following steps were taken during the review.

Review of BPD records including reports, statements, audio, video, and photographs.
Review of available body-cam footage from officers #1, #2 and #3
Ada County dispatch records and reports.
Ada County Coroner's report. 5. BPD Internal Affairs (herein after referred to as IA) investigative documents including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams. 6. Critical Incident Task Force (herein after referred to as CITF) investigations including reports, statements, medical records, photos, records, and audio.

DIRECTOR'S ANALYSIS

BPD policy permits an officer to use deadly force in defense of their life or the life of another when he or she, reasonably believes that imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury exists. The subject in this incident was being questioned by Officer #1 in response to a call for service regarding her presence and actions in the neighborhood. During their questioning, additional officers arrived to assist in the investigation. Officer #1 noted the subject's nervous and fidgety actions and the presence of a gun holster and hypodermic syringes on their person. These factors and the totality of the circumstances led Officer #1 to believe the subject was possibly engaged in illegal activity. As the officer continued to question the subject, the subject reached for and grabbed a BB gun on the passenger seat floorboard that closely resembled a semi-automatic firearm and pointed it at Officer #1. Observing this and fearing for their safety as well as the safety of Officer #1, Officers #2 and #3 responded to this threat by firing their duty weapons at the subject. The subject was struck by gunfire from Officer #2 and #3 and succumbed to their injuries.

The actions of Officer #2 and Officer #3 in firing their duty weapon at the subject in defense of Officer #1 due to a perceived deadly threat were consistent with BPD policy concerning the use of deadly force in defense of life.

DIRECTOR'S CONCLUSIONS

The Director finds that the BPD, IA and the CITF investigations were thorough, objective, and complete. Finally, the Director finds no need to conduct any additional investigations of this incident. Based on my review, I have come to the following conclusions:

The BPD internal review of this incident was thorough, objective, and complete.
I find no need to conduct any additional investigation of this incident.
I concur with BPD's conclusion that the involved officers acted in a manner consistent with BPD's policy and procedures governing use of deadly force.

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

2018

OPO Use of Force Report - Angle, 1/2/2018

OPO Use of Force Report - Angle

CASE REVIEW
OPO18-0001
OIA18-0002
FEBRUARY 2022

Prepared by: John Meyer, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – JANUARY 2018

In January 2018, several Boise Police Department Officers (BPD Officers) were dispatched to a "man with a gun" call at a residence in the Franklin – Randolph neighborhood area during the early morning hours.

As BPD officers arrived, they surrounded the residence to form an effective perimeter before searching for the male subject. The "man with a gun" was reported to be sitting on the front porch of the residence.

Eventually, the subject walked into view of the officers from the carport and began to approach the officers while keeping his right hand behind his back and out of sight. Officer #1, the closest officer to the subject, ordered the male to stop and show his hands. The commands were constant, and the male subject refused to comply.

The subject continued to move forward while keeping his right hand behind his back - forcing Officer #1 to discharge his duty weapon. Officer #1 fired three times, striking the subject and ending the threat. The male subject would survive his injuries.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on-duty or off-duty) or a private vehicle while on-duty.

DIRECTOR'S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

The Office of Police Accountability has reviewed this incident. The following steps were taken during the review.

Review of BPD records including reports, statements, timekeeping/payroll, audio, video, and photographs.
Ada County dispatch records and reports.
BPD Internal Affairs (herein after referred to as IA) investigative documents including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams.
Critical Incident Task Force (herein after referred to as CITF) investigations including reports, statements, medical records, photos, records, and audio.

Before arriving on the scene, Officer #1 had learned that law enforcement had previously responded to this address for a "no-contact order" violation. Officer #1 had also received an update from dispatch – that a family member had called about her "dad," saying he was going home to die. Officer #1 believed that "dad" was the male subject that had violated the no-contact order and was also the man with the gun.

In response to this information, the circumstances of this call, and previous call history, Officer #1 was mentally prepared for a possible hostage situation or a murder-suicide. Immediately after their arrival on the scene, Officer #1 and #2 were preparing to evacuate the neighboring residence that was physically attached to the location in question (a duplex) to move the occupants to a safe place until the situation was resolved.

Before they could evacuate the adjoining residence, Officer #1 and Officer #2 heard a loud crash noise coming from the shared carport area of the duplex. These officers directed their attention to this carport because of the noise. Officer #1 located the reportedly armed male subject in the dark carport area. Officer #1 had his weapon drawn due to the extreme danger of contacting an armed subject who may be suicidal and violating a no-contact order. Officer #1's weapon was affixed with a flashlight that illuminated the male subject, who was now walking out of the dark carport. Officer #1 could see that the male was a large man with blood on his neck. The subject walked from the carport area of the residence. The subject began walking towards the street and directly toward Officer #1, who had taken a cover position behind a parked vehicle.

Officer #1, who was in full uniform with BPD markings, kept his weapon pointed at the subject and gave him numerous commands to stop and show his hands. The subject continued walking directly toward Officer #1 and offered his left hand but kept his right hand behind his back out of view. The subject maintained what Officer #1 described as a "thousand-yard stare" as he continued walking slowly toward Officer #1, failing to comply with Officer #1's multiple commands to stop and to show his hands. Officer #1 had prior Law Enforcement experience as a negotiator. He utilized this experience to develop a conversation with the male by telling him he was here to offer him help. The male subject would not verbally respond to any command or question from Officer #1. Officer #2 was near Officer #1 and attempted to get a line of sight of the male's right hand but could not do so as the male was holding it behind his back. Officer #2 took cover with Officer #1 behind the exact parked vehicle.

Based on the totality of the situation, Officer #1 believed the male with blood on his neck was armed and had possibly harmed someone inside the residence due to the loud crash heard and his failure to comply with his simple commands to stop and show his hands. When the subject was about 20 - 25 feet away, Officer #1 saw the male's right shoulder twitch, and Officer #1 believed the male was about to pull out a gun from behind his back and shoot. Officer #1 fired his weapon three times at the subject, who immediately fell back to the ground and was incapacitated. Officer #1 and other BPD officers ran to the male subject's location and began comprehensive life-saving efforts. During these efforts, it was discovered by BPD officers that the male had a small knife sticking in the flesh of his right leg and lacerations to his wrist and neck. He was bleeding from these wounds. The male was not armed with any weapons other than the knife that was stuck in the flesh of his leg. The male was treated by paramedics and transported to the hospital for further treatment. He survived his injuries.

INITIAL "MAN WITH A GUN CALL"

It was later learned that the first call made to the Boise Police Department regarding this incident was made by the male subject involved. Once the male subject told dispatchers that there was a man with a gun on the residence porch, he disconnected the call. Dispatchers attempted to call the male back, but he would not answer. Dispatchers were able to check the phone number used to make this call and learned it was a number previously used by a male subject who had police contact due to no contact violations at this residence. Dispatchers then received a call from the daughter of the male, who stated that her father told her he was coming home (to the duplex) to die. Dispatchers provided this updated information to all responding officers in this incident.

K-9 OPTION

A BPD K-9 officer who was typically assigned to this shift was off due to it being a holiday. A K-9 was not available to officers in this quickly unfolding situation as a force option.

It is likely that a K-9 Officer with a Police Dog would have been an asset to officers in this situation and would have given them another force option in stopping the threat posed by the male subject. Information obtained in this review indicated that a K-9 officer with a police dog usually works with the officers on this shift who responded to this call. However, the K-9 officer was forced to take this day off because it was a holiday (New Years Day). After further investigation, it was learned that Boise Police Department has since stopped the practice of forcing officers off on holidays to be at minimum staffing levels to conserve financial resources. BPD ceased this practice in October of 2021.

CONCLUSION

BPD Policy permits an officer to use deadly force in defense of their life or the life of another when they reasonably believe that imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury exists.

Officers responding to this call of a man with a gun were prepared for the possibility of confronting an armed subject. Additional information was provided to responding officers that indicated the male was likely suicidal and a known subject domestically associated with the residence who had previous contacts with BPD officers and possibly violated a no contact order.

Officers #1 and #2 heard a loud crashing sound in the carport area directly in front of the residence in question. Officer #1 located the male subject walking out of the carport area and could see that the male had blood on his neck. The male began walking directly toward Officer #1, who was about 80 feet away, taking cover behind a parked vehicle on the street. Officer #1 gave numerous commands to the male to show his hands and stop where he was. Officer #1 also tried to establish a rapport with the male by telling him he was there to help him and tried to establish a dialog. The male would not verbally respond to anything Officer #1 said. When Officer #1 repeatedly told the male to show his hands, he briefly held up his left hand. Still, he kept his right hand behind his back as if he was concealing something from the view of officers. Officer #2 was near Officer #1, was closely observing the male and attempting to view what was in his concealed right hand. The subject continued to walk slowly toward Officer #1 with a blank stare. When he was about 20 feet away, his right shoulder twitched, causing Officer #1 to believe the male was about to produce a gun from behind his back and begin shooting. Officer #1 fired three shots from his duty weapon at the subject, incapacitating him.

Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer #1 reasonably believed he and other officers at the scene were in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. Officer #1 fired his duty weapon to stop this threat. Officer #2, who was a witness near Officer #1 as this incident unfolded, corroborated the statements of Officer #1.

Based on my review, I have come to the following conclusions:

The BPD, IA, and the CITF investigations were thorough, objective, and complete.
I find no need to conduct any additional investigation of this incident.
I concur with the Office of Internal Affairs (OIA) conclusion that the involved officers acted in a manner consistent with BPD's policy and procedures governing the use of deadly force.

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

2017

OPO Use of Force Report - Barnes, 3/20/2017

OPO Use of Force Report - Barnes

CASE REVIEW
OPO17‐0014
OIA17‐0127
APRIL 2022

Prepared by: John Meyer, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Spring of 2017

During the morning hours in March of 2017, Boise Police Department (BPD) Officers responded to the Boise foothills regarding a male subject reportedly harassing people and threatening them with a gun.

Police arrived at the location but could not find the subject. Police interviewed witnesses, but they could not resolve the issue and departed the scene because they were unable to locate the subject.

Later that morning, police received another report from dispatch explaining that a man on a bike who had been shouting and acting erratic had shot and killed a dog. The caller gave specific directions to the location.

Police arrived and located a witness and the dead dog. The witness was distraught but could make a good description of the subject. Six Patrol Officers began to search for the subject and located him approximately one mile up the trail, hiding in the brush.

The subject started to challenge the police and would not comply with their directives. The subject then raised his handgun and fired at the police. The Officers returned fire, killing the subject on the scene.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

If a BPD Officer or employee is involved in a critical incident, defined below, as a principal, victim, witness or custodial Officer, BPD shall immediately notify the Office of Police Accountability. The Director may provide on‐scene monitoring of critical incidents and may act as a real‐time observer to any criminal, administrative, or civil investigation conducted by or on behalf of BPD (e.g., the Critical Incident Task Force). The Director shall be given full access to observe interviews or any other aspects of the investigation. If the Director believes additional investigation is necessary, the Director may employ an outside investigator who will perform investigatory functions at the discretion of the Director. Critical incidents include:

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on‐duty or off‐duty) or a private vehicle while on‐duty.

DIRECTOR'S ANALYSIS & CONCLUSION

The Office of Police Accountability has reviewed this incident that took place several years ago. The following steps were taken during the review.

Review of BPD records including reports, statements, audio, video, and photographs.
Ada County dispatch records and reports.
Ada County Coroner reports.
BPD Internal Affairs (herein after referred to as IA) investigative documents including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams.
Critical Incident Task Force (herein after referred to as CITF) investigations including reports, statements, medical records, photos, records, and audio.

BPD received various reports about a male subject acting erratically near the Boise Foothills. The subject had been observed riding his bike into a runner on the sidewalk, causing the runner to nearly fall. The same subject reportedly attempted to kick a dog as he passed by on his bike a short while later. These witnesses reported they observed the subject throwing his bike down, rummaging through his backpack, and producing a black handgun quickly and deliberately. The subject pointed the gun at the hiker's dog when she and her dog were about ten yards away from the subject. The hiker fled with her dog, and the subject rode his bike out of the area. Witnesses reported this incident to the Boise Police Department, and BPD Officers responded to investigate. BPD Officers took a report from the female victim and searched for the subject but could not locate him.

About an hour and a half after the first incident with the female victim, BPD Officers were dispatched to the Boise Foothills trail system (about 2 – 3 miles northeast of where the first incident occurred) regarding a report of shots being fired. A witness with their dog and another witness were walking on the trail when they encountered a male subject who was off his bike in a rocky area where people typically walk their bikes over the rugged terrain. They passed by the subject, who got back on his bike and then rode past them on the trail in the same direction. A short distance later, the subject stopped on the left side of the trail ‐ as if to allow the witness with the dog and the other witness to pass by on the right.

As the witness with the dog was next to the subject, he produced a handgun and shot the dog point‐blank on the dog's left side. The dog owner challenged the subject as to why he had shot his dog. The subject then pointed his handgun at both witnesses and told them to back off. The witnesses fled the area in different directions and contacted other witnesses, asking them to call the police. The witness whose dog was shot then heard more‐gun shots. Several witnesses called for police and explained to dispatchers that the subject had fired at least six shots after shooting the dog. Witnesses described the male subject, including his clothing and where he was last seen on the trail.

Several BPD Officers responded to the Boise Foothills area, and Officers were updated by dispatch on the shots fired by the subject as well as his physical and clothing description. The Officers received information that the male subject had likely shot at numerous people on the trails. A group of six BPD Officers searched for the subject on the trail and spotted him hiding in the brush. These six Officers broke off into two groups, one to the north of the trail and one to the south, to better monitor, observe, and communicate with the subject as they got closer to him. Officers (including one K‐9 Officer) could see that the subject was visually tracking their movements as they approached. The Officers maintained a distance of approximately fifty yards from the subject.

The group of Officers observing the subject began by verbally announcing their presence to him as the Boise Police Department and for him to show his hands. In a very loud voice, one Officer told the subject that he was under arrest and for him to come out showing his hands. The subject did not comply and began to yell back at the Officers that he (had encountered) an aggressive dog. Officers were aware that the subject had at least committed the crime of reckless discharge of a firearm and aggravated assault. They also realized that he was armed, had fired several shots before their arrival, and posed a significant threat to the citizens in the area. The K‐9 Officer also warned the subject that his K‐9 might bite him if he did not comply. Officers continued to give the subject commands for over three minutes to show his
hands and come out of the brush, but he would not comply.

The subject continued to move around while hiding in the brush and took off his backpack. Officers observed him rummaging through his backpack and retrieving an item. The male then got into a shooting position with his arms outstretched and pointed a weapon at the Officers. The K‐9 Officer could see that the male was pointing a gun at the Officers in the other group. Officers could hear gunshots coming from the subject's gun and could see smoke coming out of the gun's barrel. The six Officers engaged the subject by discharging their weapons at him to stop his threat. The Officers fired sixty‐two rounds from their .45 caliber handguns and (six) 12 gauge shells for a total of sixty‐eight rounds. After the exchange of gunfire, the subject fell to the ground motionless.

Officers took a position above the trail in a berm that overlooked the scene. From this vantage point, they could see the subject lying on the ground. It was unknown to the Officers whether the subject was alive, wounded, or simply laying down to set an ambush. The Special Operations Unit (SOU) had been previously dispatched to the scene and arrived to clear the area. A canine was sent to the scene with the purpose of trying to see if the subject would react; the canine made contact with the subject including physical contact. The SOU Officers contacted the subject and verified that he was, in fact, deceased. A semi‐automatic handgun was found next to the subject, and two spent shell casings were found near his body. The male subject was killed by gunfire from the six Officers who discharged their weapons.

BPD policy permits an officer to use deadly force in defense of his life or the life of another when they reasonably believe that imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury exists. This armed subject pointed a handgun at several people in the foothills who were walking the trails. In an abrupt and unprovoked manner, he shot and killed a dog that, according to witnesses, was not aggressive. Before the arrival of Officers, the subject's actions demonstrated a severe threat to the public. When uniformed Officers responded to investigate and contact him, he would not comply with their commands. He pointed a handgun at Officers and ultimately began shooting at them. All six Officers who were in contact with him discharged their weapons in self‐defense. The actions of the involved Officers stopped the deadly threat to the public.

Based on my review, I have come to the following conclusions:

The BPD internal review of this incident was thorough, objective, and complete.
I find no need to conduct any additional investigation of this incident.
I concur with BPD's conclusion that the involved Officers acted in a manner consistent with BPD's policy and procedures governing the use of deadly force.

Jesus Jara, Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972‐8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

2016

OPO Use of Force Report - Rodriguez, 6/14/2016

OPO Use of Force Report - Rodriguez

CASE REVIEW
SUMMARY – NOVEMBER 2021
OPO16-0014

Prepared by: John Meyer, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Summer of 2016

Stop #1

During the evening hours of darkness, Boise Police Department (BPD) Officer #1 was dispatched to a location regarding a possible drunk driver with a provided vehicle description. Officer #1 located the described vehicle with its engine off and headlamps on occupied by a male subject. Officer #1 requested assistance from dispatch to assist with a possible driving under the influence investigation. BPD Officers #2 and #3 arrived to assist Officer #1. Officer #2 spoke with the male subject and agreed with Officer #1 that the subject was either under the influence of alcohol, delusional, or both as he was claiming to see people that were not present.

While still seated in the vehicle, the subject picked up a large screwdriver (about 12” long) and a wrench. The subject was asked to exit the vehicle several times, but he would not comply. Fearing the subject may attempt to flee in the vehicle, Officer #3 laid stop sticks in front of the subject’s vehicle tires. After repeated attempts to get the subject to exit the vehicle, Officer #2 decided to remove the subject from the vehicle. Officer #2 reached into the vehicle to physically grab the subject’s wrists. When Officer #2 did this, the subject abruptly moved his hands in an upward motion, pushing the screwdriver shank up towards the body of Officer #2. Officer #2 felt they were going to be stabbed by the subject with the screwdriver. The subject then started the vehicle, put it in gear, and quickly sped away, almost colliding with Officer #3 who was standing near the front of the subject’s vehicle. Due to the movement of the subject with the screwdriver toward Officer #2 and narrowly colliding his vehicle with Officer #3, Officer #2 reported that the subject committed two aggravated assaults on Officers. Officers then began to search for the subject.

Stop #2

About 30 minutes later, Officer #2 located the subject parked in the same area as the prior stop. Officer #2 waited for the arrival of assisting Officers before initiating a felony stop. Officers #4, #5, and #6 all arrived about the same time. A few moments later, Officers #3 and #7 arrived.

Officers #2 and #3 parked their patrol cars in front and behind the subject’s vehicle, boxing the subject in between. Officer #3 was positioned at the rear passenger side of the subject’s vehicle. Officers #4 and #6 approached the subject’s driver’s side. The subject then revved the engine of his vehicle, spinning the tires and causing smoke from friction with the pavement to engulf the passenger side of the subject’s vehicle. The subject did not follow loud commands to exit the vehicle and continued to depress the accelerator spinning his tires creating smoke while pushing against the patrol cars that were boxing in his vehicle. The force created by the suspect’s vehicle was significant and rocked both patrol cars. An Officer was yelling “stop!”

Officers #6 and #4 were pointing their weapons at the subject through the driver’s side of the subject’s vehicle. Commands were shouted to the subject, “Don’t move!” The subject would not comply and continued to rev his engine, spinning his tires which continued to fill the area with smoke from friction. Officer #6 fired one shot from a few feet away, striking the subject on his left side while still seated in his vehicle. Officers yelled, “Shots fired, Shots fired!” The engine of the subject’s vehicle stopped revving and the tires stopped spinning. Officers yelled to the subject, “Don’t move!”

Officer #4 opened the subject’s driver side door with Officer #2 assisting. Officer #2 removed the subject from the vehicle. Paramedics were immediately requested. Officers assisted with life-saving efforts until the arrival of paramedics. The subject succumbed to his injuries a short time later.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

Boise City Code defines the authority and duties of the Office of Police Accountability and grants the Office the authority to investigate and evaluate the performance of Officers whenever certain criteria are met.

INVESTIGATION OF CRITICAL INCIDENTS

If a BPD Officer or employee is involved in a critical incident, defined below, as a principal, victim, witness or custodial Officer, BPD shall immediately notify the Office of Police Accountability. The Director may provide on-scene monitoring Page 2 of 5of critical incidents and may act as a real-time observer to any criminal, administrative, or civil investigation conducted by or on behalf of BPD (e.g., the Critical Incident Task Force). The Director shall be given full access to observe interviews or any other aspects of the investigation. If the Director believes additional investigation is necessary, the Director may employ an outside investigator who will perform investigatory functions at the discretion of the Director. Critical incidents include:

Use of deadly force (excluding animals).
Use of force or any other police or law enforcement action that results in the death of one or more persons, or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicle pursuits, roadblocks, or intercepts resulting in the death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission.
Vehicular collisions resulting in death or serious bodily injury requiring hospital admission that occurred while a police Officer or police employee was operating a city vehicle (either on-duty or off-duty) or a private vehicle while on-duty.

THE REVIEW

The Office of Police Accountability has reviewed this incident that took place several years ago. The following steps were taken during that review.

Review of BPD records, including reports, statements, audio, video, and photographs.
Ada County dispatch records and reports.
BPD Internal Affairs (hereinafter referred to as IA) investigative documents including statements, records, audio, reports, photographs, and diagrams.
Critical Incident Task Force (hereinafter referred to as CITF) investigations including reports, statements, medical records, photos, records, and audio.

DIRECTOR’S ANALYSIS

BPD policy permits Officers to utilize vehicle force methods to stop a vehicle to safeguard life and preserve public safety. Vehicle force stop methods include stop sticks (tire deflation devices) and boxing-in. The appropriate method should be based on the totality of the circumstances. BPD policy permits an Officer to use deadly force in defense of his life or the life of another when they reasonably believe that imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury exists.

When Officers located the subject for the second time, there was a warranted concern that the subject would again try to flee the area in his vehicle as he previously did about 30 minutes earlier. This would likely have resulted in him fleeing in the residential area. To mitigate the opportunity for the subject to again flee in his vehicle, Officers boxed in his vehicle with a patrol car at the front, and a patrol car at the rear. An officer also approached the rear of the subject’s vehicle to place a device by the tires designed to rapidly deflate the tires when driven over. As this occurred, the subject began accelerating, revving his engine, spinning the tires on the right side of his vehicle as he attempted to drive away. This action put extreme force on both patrol vehicles blocking him in, slightly moving, and rocking them. Officer #6 believed that the subject was still armed with a large screwdriver that he used to try to stab another Officer during the prior stop thirty minutes ago. Officer #6 approached the driver’s door with his weapon drawn and commanded “Stop” and “Don’t Move” to the subject. Officer #6 observed the subject continuing to accelerate the engine, endangering the lives of the Officers standing adjacent to his vehicle and the Officer behind the vehicle with the tire deflation device. Officer #6 believed the subject was imminently going to free his vehicle, so he discharged his weapon at the subject in defense of these officers he reasonably believed were in imminent danger of being seriously injured or killed by the subject’s vehicle.

DIRECTOR’S CONCLUSIONS

The Director finds that the BPD, IA, and the CITF investigations were thorough, objective, and complete. Finally, the Director finds no need to conduct any additional investigation of this incident.

The Director has issued the following findings with respect to the allegations.

Based on my review, I have come to the following conclusions:

The BPD internal review of this incident was thorough, objective, and complete.
I find no need to conduct any additional investigation of this incident.
I concur with the Office of Internal Affair’s conclusion that Officer #6 acted in a manner consistent with BPD’s policy and procedures governing the use of deadly force.

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

OPO Use of Force Report - Warren, 5/18/2016

OPO Use of Force Report - Warren

CASE REVIEW
OPO16-0012
OIA16-0280
DECEMBER 2021

Prepared by: John Meyer, Jesus Jara

THE SITUATION – Late Spring of 2016

Boise Police Department (BPD) officers including Officer #1 were dispatched to a “Man with a gun” call. It was reported that the male with the gun had barricaded himself in a residence and was possibly suicidal. His physical and clothing description was provided to responding officers. Prior to the arrival of Officer #1 and other officers, information was given that the male who had been in possession of a handgun had exited the residence, however, the handgun was still missing from the residence. When Officer #1 arrived in the area, he located a male subject walking on a sidewalk that matched the description of the male with the gun. Officer #1 who was in a full BPD uniform gave commands to the male to sit down, but the male would not comply. Based on the totality of the circumstances, including the likelihood the male was suicidal and in possession of a gun endangering himself, the public in the area and officers, Officer #1 attempted to place the male on the ground using soft empty hand techniques. The male immediately physically resisted Officer #1, pulling away and pushing Officer #1. Officer #1 was able to get the male on the ground but was not able to gain control of his arms and take him in to custody. Officer #1 was holding the male when three independent witnesses observed this struggle. It was apparent to the witnesses that Officer #1 needed assistance. The witnesses assisted Officer #1 in controlling the male’s legs and arms, enabling Officer #1 to place the male in handcuffs.

One of the assisting witnesses had been riding a motorcycle nearby and his helmet was equipped with a small video camera that recorded and memorialized the assistance provided to Officer #1. The footage captured on the helmet camera clearly depicts Officer #1 struggling to hold onto the male on the ground. It then shows witnesses holding the male’s legs down and one witness pulling the male’s arms to a position behind his back, enabling the officer to handcuff the male. No other force was captured on the camera.

After the male was handcuffed, an assisting BPD officer arrived on scene and rendered further assistance to Officer #1. The male was searched, and no weapons were found. Witnesses provided their information to officers and then left the scene. The male was placed handcuffed in the back seat of a BPD vehicle as the BPD investigation continued. The male then began violently kicking the inside of the vehicle. The male was subsequently taken out of the vehicle and a hobble restraint device was placed around his legs to prevent him from damaging the vehicle or injuring himself. After the hobble restraint was applied, the male calmed down and the hobble was removed by officers before he was taken to Ada County Jail and booked for Obstructing and Resisting an Officer.

REASON FOR THE REVIEW

BPD received a complaint alleging excessive use of force by Officer #1 in this incident. A BPD investigator completed an Internal Investigation into this allegation. The Office of Police Oversight (OPA) completed a review of this complaint and the subsequent investigation completed by BPD. I reviewed the following:

Boise Police Department Reports
Officer #1 Audio Recordings
Photographs
Dispatch Records
Helmet Camera Video supplied by a witness

DIRECTOR’S ANALYSIS & FINDINGS

PM 1.00.00 Use of Force

It is alleged that the Officer began to use unnecessary force before Complainant had an opportunity to understand what the nature and purpose of the contact was and before the officer had properly identified the complainant. Complainant further describes the officer receiving assistance in the force used by untrained civilians.

The OPA investigation and review finds that the complainant was being sought by officers for being suicidal and armed with a weapon. These circumstances present extremely high danger to the public, officers, and the complainant himself. The responding officer in full uniform must quickly assess the situation, gain control of the complainant and ultimately secure the weapon (if any). When the complainant refuses to follow lawful commands from the uniformed officer to sit down, the totality of the circumstances become even more dangerous. The officer must utilize his training and experience to control a potentially armed subject by using minimal force that is reasonably necessary. Empty hand grasping and forcing the non-compliant subject to the grass is a reasonable use of force under these circumstances. The complainant continued to physically resist the uniformed officer’s commands and physical efforts to control him. When approached by witnesses, the officer requested assistance and the assistance that was rendered amounted to minimal physical contact of grasping the complainant’s arms and holding his legs down in a stationary position. This minimal assistance enabled the officer to place the complainant in handcuffs and effect a search for a weapon, ultimately bringing a safe conclusion for all to this incident. Additionally, the witness assistance provided a video memorializing this assistance for the benefit of a comprehensive review at this later time.

PM 2.01.00 Arrests

Complainant alleges that he was arrested for resisting arrest, and that there was no cause for an arrest to occur, since he had not committed a violation until the officer initiated the use of force, which the Complainant argues was unnecessary and excessive.

The OPA investigation and review finds that the complainant was arrested for obstructing and resisting the lawful orders of the uniformed BPD officer, hindering the officer in the performance of his duty by physically resisting. The complainant was not told he was under arrest at first contact until he resisted and obstructed the officer in the performance of his duty by refusal to follow lawful commands and physically resisting.

PM 11.01.07 Relationship with Others and Demeanor

Complainant alleges that the initial contact began with the involved officer giving commands to sit down without any additional conversation and without any explanation as to why contact was being made with him.

The OPA investigation and review finds that the officer contacting a potentially suicidal armed male greatly increased the urgency of this situation. This required the officer to utilize his training and experience based on the totality of the information he had received to maximize public safety by gaining control of the complainant to secure his weapon (if any). In this dynamic and fluid situation, the officer must use discretion in what information he may initially divulge to the complainant to maximize safety for all involved.

The OPA concurs with BPD IA and has determined that Officer #1’s actions were consistent with BPD policy, procedures and standards.

This matter is closed with the following findings, based on the preponderance of the evidence:

Officer #1
PM 1.00.00 Use of Force – Exonerated
PM 2.01.00 Arrests - Exonerated
PM 11.01.07 Relationship with Others and Demeanor - Exonerated

Jesus Jara Director – Office of Police Accountability
Email: jjara@cityofboise.org
Office: (208) 972-8380
www.cityofboise.org/opa

OPO Use of Force Report - Timmons, 3/4/2016

OPO Use of Force Report - Timmons